



THE PRINCIPLE OF ANALOGY
IN PROTESTANT
AND CATHOLIC THEOLOGY

BY

BATTISTA MONDIN S.X.



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TO
HIS EMINENCE
RICHARD JAMES CARD. CUSHING
*Great Apostle of Christ
and
Christian Unity*

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FOREWORD

In recent years there has been a remarkable revival of interest in the doctrine of analogy, and many important studies on this doctrine have appeared in the form of articles and books. Today many of the greatest living philosophers and theologians consider some sort of analogy to be an indispensable tool for any fruitful research in metaphysics and theology. In this atmosphere we are sure that a study of the history of the principle of analogy in Protestant and Catholic theology is welcome. This is one of the reasons for the present undertaking. A second reason for this study is to seek to divert the ecumenical dialogue from secondary questions and to direct it to an area where it is necessary to agree in order to be one.

The title of our work is somewhat misleading; it may lead one to believe that it deals with all Catholic and Protestant theologians of past and present. Actually it does not. It deals only with some of the major figures of Catholic and Protestant theology. It concentrates especially on Aquinas' analogy of intrinsic attribution, on Barth's analogy of faith and on Tillich's symbolic analogy. It attempts to compare and evaluate these three theological methods, from the standpoint of determining their adequacy to interpret the God-creature relation and to justify the use of theological language. Our criterion in determining their adequacy will be their ability to safeguard both God's transcendence and His immanence. We shall try to show that Tillich's symbolism, in so far as it is grounded on the principle of correlation, is capable of expressing God's immanence but it is a threat to God's transcendence. On the other hand Barth's analogy of faith is a threat to His immanence in nature. Finally, Aquinas' analogy of proper proportionality is unable to express God's immanence, but his analogy of intrinsic attribution is capable of expressing and safeguarding both divine transcendence and immanence.

Our study of Aquinas' doctrine will be both philosophical and theological, since in his case analogy is a philosophical principle with a theological application.

The basic material of the present work is drawn from a Thesis that we presented at the Harvard Department of Philosophy of Religion in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the subject of Philosophy of Religion in 1959.

BATTISTA MONDIN S.X.

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"Two things are to be avoided: one is the making of false statements especially such as are contrary to revealed truth, the other is the assertion that what we think to be true is an article of faith, for as Augustine says (*Conf.* x) when a man thinks his false opinion to be the teaching of godliness, and dares obstinately to dogmatise about matters of which he is ignorant, he becomes a stumbling block to others"

St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Potentia*, 3, 1

CHAPTER I

THE USE OF THE TERM "ANALOGY" IN GREEK AND MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY

1. GREEK USE OF "ANALOGY"

"Analogy" is a word which has a long and glorious past. Its origin is Greek. In Greek language "analogy" is first used in mathematics.¹ The mathematician Achytas calls "analogy" the middle term of an arithmetical series and the second term of a proportionality which comprises only three terms.² The geometer Euclid uses "analogy" to mean both a proportion (i.e. a reciprocal relation between numbers or a direct similarity between them³) and a proportionality (i.e. equality of ratios or agreement between two or more numerical relations).⁴

The first philosopher to make use of the word "analogy" is Hyppocrates of Chio, but with him "analogy" still retains its mathematical meaning of numerical likeness.⁵ It is Plato who introduces the term "analogy" into philosophy to indicate proportions and proportionalities which are not mathematical.

Plato uses the word "analogy" to signify the proportionality (i.e. the similarity of relations) between the four elements (fire/air = air/water = water/earth),⁶ between the four forms of knowledge (knowledge/opinion = thinking/imagining),⁷ and between two kinds of being and

¹ See T. Heath, *A History of Greek Mathematics* (Oxford, 1921) Vol I, espec. pp. 325-327, 384 ff.

² See H. Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Berlin, 1934-1935), 5th ed., I, p. 435 f.

³ This seems to be the etymological sense of the word *ἀναλογία*. The word *ἀναλογία* is made up of the proposition *ἀνά* and the noun *λόγος*. *Λόγος* signifies both a concept and a word expressing a concept. *Ἀνά* used as a prefix in composition with another word has several shades of meaning. The meaning which seems most appropriate in its composition with *λόγος* is the notion of a backward relation, roughly corresponding to the prefix *retro* in Latin. Thus in this strictly etymological sense, *ἀναλογία* signifies a reciprocal relation between ideas. According to some Greek scholars, who take *ἀνά* to mean „according to“, the etymological meaning of *ἀναλογία* is „according to due relation“. Cf. J. F. Anderson, *The Bond of Being* (London: Herder, 1954), p. 15, note 37. Actually, when used adverbially, *ἀνά λόγον* means „according to due ratio“ and, sometimes, „in the same kind of way“.

⁴ Euclid, *Elements*, trans. T. L. Heath, (Cambridge, 1908), vol. II, pp. 112-117, and 120-124.

⁵ Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 5th ed., I, p. 396.

⁶ Plato, *Timaeus*, 32c.

⁷ Plato, *Republic*, 534a

two kinds of knowledge (being/becoming = knowledge/opinion).¹ He calls "analogy" also the proportion (i.e. direct similarity) of two things or of two concepts, the proportion between things and ideas, or between knowledge and things known.² The things, ideas and concepts which are the terms of this relation are said to be "analogous".³ With Plato, then, the word "analogy" in both its meanings of proportion and proportionality is extended to the philosophical fields of epistemology and ontology.⁴

Aristotle, who has been called by some scholars the "father of analogy,"⁵ continues to use this word in its already established meanings of numerical, ontological and epistemological likeness both as direct similarity and as similarity of relations.⁶ He gives other important meanings to the term "analogy", however, by extending its use to science, ethics and logic. In science, for instance, he calls "analogous" the physical likeness between the birds' wings and the fishes' fins.⁷ In ethics he calls "analogous" the relations of friendship between superiors and subordinates,⁸ and the relations of distributive justice.⁹ But Aristotle's main contribution to the concept of analogy is in logic. In his *Organon*¹⁰ when he classifies the various forms of signification, he makes the first systematic study of the use of analogy in logic. But, to our great surprise, he does not employ the word "analogy." He divides the terms, according to their modes of signification, into three classes. He calls the terms of the first class, those which have one meaning only, univocal; and he calls the terms of the second class, those which have many meanings, equivocal. We would, then, expect him to call "analogous" the terms of the third class, those which are predicated of different subjects with a meaning partly the same and partly different. But this use of the word "analogy" does not go back to Aristotle, who defines this class of words as terms which do not differ by way of equivocality.

¹ Plato, *Republic*, 534a.

² Plato, *Republic*, 508b, *Timaeus*, 29c.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ For a more exhaustive study of the use of the term "analogy" by Plato see H. Lyttkens, *The Analogy between God and the World: An Investigation of its Background and Interpretation by Thomas of Aquino* (Uppsala, 1952) pp. 15-28, hereafter cited as *The Analogy*.

⁵ See A. Goergen, *Kardinal Cajetans Lehre von der Analogie*, Diss. (München, 1938) p. 86.

⁶ For numerical analogy cf. *Ethica Nic.* 1131a, 30-b, 7; for epistemological analogy cf. *De Memoria* 452b 16 ff.; for ontological analogy cf. *Metaphysica*, 1043a 4, 1070a 31-b 35.

⁷ *De Part. Animal.* 645b 3 ff.

⁸ *Ethica Nic.* 1158a 35; b 23 ff.; 1162b 4.

⁹ *Ethica Nic.* 1132a.

¹⁰ Aristotle studies the problem of signification in *Topica* 106a-108a, where he suggests many criteria for distinguishing between univocal and equivocal terms. Cf. also *Categoriae* 1a.

It is only later, in the Middle Ages, that the word "analogy" is used for this form of predication.¹ Also the terminology "reasoning by analogy," which is the name for a kind of proof with which Aristotle is familiar,² is not of Aristotelian origin. Aristotle calls this proof "paradigm."³ Sometimes Aristotle uses the word "analogy" to mean metaphor and image,⁴ a usage which has become customary in Hellenistic Greek. Aristotle, then, extends the use of the word "analogy" to almost all the branches of knowledge. He also develops the meaning of analogy beyond its original mathematical context. But in most of its applications he continues to use analogy in the sense of proportionality.⁵ Finally Aristotle does not employ analogy in a very important branch of knowledge, i.e. theology. It is only with Proclus and Pseudo-Dionysius that the term "analogy" enters into theological discourse, and it is only with them that analogy acquires the meaning of similarity based on attribution.

In the theology of the Neoplatonists, analogy has two main functions. *First*, it accounts for the possibility of speaking of God. This possibility is grounded on the principle: "Everything which by its existence bestows a character on others, itself primitively possesses that character, which it communicates to the recipient."⁶ Now, God is the cause of everything. Hence all created perfections may be ascribed to Him. Indeed, all perfections and their names belong to God primarily and to creatures only secondarily, i.e. they are predicated of God and creatures analogously, not univocally.⁷ *Second*, analogy provides a principle of unity between the various levels of reality. Reality is propor-

¹ Yet there are passages in Aristotle which suggest this use of the word "analogy". For instance in *Metaphysica* 1070a & b he says that the first principles and causes are one *κατ' ἀναλογίαν* and in *Ethica Nic.* 1096b, 28 ff he says that the concept of good is one *κατ' ἀναλογίαν*. In the last case he speaks of epistemological unity. In the first case he speaks of ontological unity. But this ontological unity implies a unity of concepts, and since these concepts which have analogical unity may be called analogous, the terms which signify them may also be called analogous. Aristotle, then, could have called, as the Scholastics actually did, the terms "matter", "form", "good", "being" etc. analogous. Cf. also *Topica*, 136b-137a, 124a, 15 ff.

² *Analytica Priora* 68b-69a.

³ See *Analytica Posteriora* 712, 10. We find in Aristotle another sort of reasoning by analogy which he calls *κατὰ ἀναλογίαν*. See e.g. *Topica* 124a, 15 ff; 136b-137a etc. Probably this accounts for the origin of the terminology of "reasoning by analogy".

⁴ Actually analogy is a sub-type of the class, metaphor. Cf. e.g. 1410b, 36, 1457b, 6. For image see 1406b, 20 ff.

⁵ See G. L. Muskens, *De vocis "analogias" significatione ac usu apud Aristotelem* (Groningue: Wolters, 1943).

⁶ Proclus, *The Elements of Theology* 18, Trans. by Dodds (1953) p. 21.

⁷ See Proclus, *Commentarium in Platonis Parmenidem* (Paris: Cousin, 1864), p. 851, 8 ff.; 852, 17 ff.; 880, 11 ff.; 890, 11 ff. etc. In this context Proclus does not use the word *ἀναλογία* but the expression *ἀπ' ἐνὸς καὶ πρὸς ἕν* which in Latin, is translated by the Scholastics *unius ad alterum*, usually preceded by the word *analogia*, since the *unius ad alterum* is a form of analogy.

tionately distributed in different degrees. This proportionate distribution is called analogy.¹ The degree of reality of something is designated by its definite "proportion" to things of higher and lower grades.²

2. LATIN USE OF 'ANALOGY'

From Greek the word "analogy" passes into Latin, where it preserves all the meanings already acquired. Classical writers do not make any technical use of it. By "analogy," generally, they mean either direct resemblance or agreement of several things, or similarity of relations.³ A new use of the word "analogy" is made when Varro introduces this term in linguistics to signify the similarity of declension of some words.⁴

The Church Fathers and the Scholastics use the word "analogy" mainly for theological and ecclesiastical purposes. With them the term acquires in the field of religion some new meanings. In the plural the term "analogies" denotes the sacred images.⁵ Coupled with the word "faith" (*analogia fidei*) "analogy" indicates the rule of biblical exegesis, according to which the exegete should explain the more obscure passages by reference to the essential contents of Christian doctrine.⁶ Very frequently the term "analogy" means simile, similitude and metaphor.⁷

With its long history the word "analogy" comes down to St. Thomas Aquinas, who masters the use of the term in its great variety of meanings. He employs it to mean direct similarity (logical, ontological, epistemological and physical), similarity of proportions, reasoning by resemblance, proportionate distribution, right degree of being, metaphor, simile and, more frequently, several modes of predication.⁸ Moreover,

¹ Pseudo-Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus* in Migne's *Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Graeca* vol. 3, p. 588 A, 497 A; *Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, ib. p. 372 D, 537 D etc. Pseudo-Dionysius is mainly concerned with analogy as a cosmological principle. For this matter see *Oeuvres Complètes du Pseudo-Denys*, Trans. M. de Gandillac (Aubier: Montaigne, 1943) p. 40.

² For an excellent study of the use of analogy by the Neoplatonists see Lyttkens, *The Analogy*, pp. 58-109. For Pseudo-Dionysius see V. Lossky, „La notion des 'Analogies' chez Denys le Pseudo-Arcopagite", *Archives d'Histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* (1930), ff p. 279 ff.

³ See „Analogia", *Harpers' Latin Dictionary*.

⁴ Varro, *De Lingua Latina*, 10, 74: "Analogia est verborum similium declinatio."

⁵ Cf. "Analogia" in Ducange's *Glossarium mediae et infimae Latinitatis*.

⁶ Augustin, *De Utilitate Credendi*, 5.

⁷ This is the meaning of analogy in the expression of „analogies of the Trinity". Cf. Augustin, *De Trinitate*, VIII - XV; Bonaventura, *In Sententiis P. Lombardi*, I, d. 3, a. 1, q. 1-3; and d. 16, a. 1, q. 1-3.

⁸ For physical and ontological likeness see *In I Sent.* 8, 1, 2; *S. Theol.* I, 13, 5 ad 1; for logical similarity see *In IV Meta.* no. 535; *De Pot.* 7, 7; for similarity of proportions see *De Veritate* 2, 11; *In Post. Anal.* I, 12; for reasoning by resemblance see *In De Trin.* lect. I, q. 2, a. 2, Resp.; for right degree of being see *In IV Sent.* 49, 2, 1 ad 2; *In Divinis Nominibus* I, lect. 1, no. 19, 20 & 37; for a mode of predication see *In Meta* no. 535 and 2197; *De Potentia* 7, 7; *S. Theol.* I, 13, 5; 16, 6.

instead of the word "*analogia*" Aquinas frequently uses some of its synonyms, as proportion (*proportio*), agreement (*convenientia*), similitude (*similitudo*), community (*communitas*), etc.¹ One should notice that not all the synonyms of the word "*analogia*" are synonyms among themselves. So *communitas* is not a synonym of *proportio*, and *convenientia* is not a synonym of *similitudo*. This means that *proportio*, *communitas* etc. are not synonyms of *analogia* in all its meanings, but one is a synonym of some of its meanings and another of others. Therefore, without previously proving the total synonymy, for instance, of *analogia* and *proportio*, one cannot explain *analogia* in terms of *proportio* alone.

The other great scholastics, especially Bonaventure and Scotus, also make an ample use of analogy. According to Bonaventure every creature bears some analogy to God, because every creature is an imitation of God inasmuch as it is caused by God and is conformed to Him through the divine idea. He distinguishes between two main levels of likeness: the vestige (*vestigium*) and the image (*imago*). The vestige is the likeness that irrational creatures bear to God. The image is the likeness of rational creatures to God. The ascent to God on the part of the individual involves a turning from the *vestigium* to the interior reflection of God (the *imago Dei*). On the main lines Bonaventure's theological use of analogy is the same as Aquinas'. But there is a difference in emphasis. While Aquinas uses analogy to express both the similarity and dissimilarity between creatures and God, Bonaventure uses analogy mainly to express similarity.

Where St. Thomas shows himself mainly preoccupied with establishing the proper being of the creature so as to debar it from any pretence to divine being, St. Bonaventure shows himself mainly preoccupied with disclosing the bonds of kinship and dependence that connect the creature to the Creator lest nature should be credited with a complete sufficiency and considered as an end in itself.²

Scotus makes extensive use of analogy in theology but he insists that analogy presupposes univocity since we could not compare creatures with God unless we had a common concept of both. God is knowable by man in this life only by means of concepts drawn from creatures and unless these concepts were common to God and creatures we should never be able to compare the imperfect creatures with the perfect God: there would be no bridge between creatures and God.³

¹ Aquinas calls analogy *proportio* in *De Veritate*, 2, 2; 2, 11; in *V Metaph.* 1, 8; *communitas* in *De Veritate* 9, 11 ad 6; in *I Sent.* Prol. 1, 2 ad 2; *convenientia*, in *De Veritate*, 2, 11; in *I Sent.* 35 1, 4; *aequalitas disquparantiae* in *Comm. in Div. Nomin.* viii, lect. 4; *similitudo* in *IV Sent.* 49, 2, 1 ad 6; *parificatio* in *I Sent.* 19, 5, 2 ad 1.

² E. Gilson, *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, (London: 1938), p. 236.

³ See E. Gilson, *Jean Duns Scot* (Paris: 1962) pp. 101 ff.

After the Middle Ages analogy tends to disappear from philosophy but continues to be used by both Catholics and Protestants in Theology. The main effort of Catholic theologians is to interpret and systematize Aquinas teaching, whereas the aim of Protestant theologians is to elaborate a consistent and satisfactory theory of theological language.

CHAPTER II

AQUINAS' DIVISION OF ANALOGY

The history of the term "analogy" has shown that for both Aristotle and Aquinas analogy is first of all a logical category concerning the meaning of names. There is however a slight difference between the conceptions of Aristotle and Aquinas. Aristotle conceives analogy as a mode of signification of any term in general, whereas Aquinas conceives it as a division of a predicate.¹ Two kinds of explanations may be offered for Aquinas' innovation. (a) He may have been led to this restriction by the fact that in a sentence the signification of both subject and predicate is usually determined by the predicate.² (b) Aquinas sometimes uses the term "predication" in a rather wide sense, that comes to be almost equivalent to that of signification.³ Consequently Aquinas' conception becomes practically equivalent to Aristotle's. The textual evidence drawn from Aquinas' works does not prove conclusively either explanation. Only further research into Aquinas' predecessors will be able to give the final solution to this minor historical problem.

In the division of predication into univocal, equivocal and analogous, Aquinas is substantially faithful to Aristotle's division, with the exception of some slight change in terminology. The terms that Aquinas calls "analogous" are called by Aristotle "not wholly equivocal." Aristotle divides these terms into four groups: (1) terms applied to many things having the same end (e.g. "medical" in its application both to the science of producing health and to the science of prescribing diet); (2) terms applied to things which are contraries (of this Aristotle does not give any example here. His assumption is that contraries belong

¹ Cfr. Aristotle, *Categ.* I, 3; *Topica* 6, 10; Aquinas, *S. Theol.* I, 13, 5 & 16, 6; *C. Gent.* I, 33 & 34; *De Pot.* 7, 7; *In IV Meta* 535.

² This view is still prevalent among modern Thomists. See Coffey, P., *The Science of Logic* (London: Longmans, 1918) vol. I, pp. 207 ff.; Toohey, J. J., "The term 'Being'," *New Scholasticism* (1943) pp. 107-129, especially pp. 111-113.

³ Cf. for instance *In XI Meta* no. 2197.

to the same science, e.g. health and disease are both objects of the science of medicine); (3) terms applied to certain common accidents which exist in things according to a difference of primariness and subsequency, i.e. *per prius et posterius* (e.g. the desire of the sweet-toothed person for sweetness and for wine: in the former case it is *per prius et per se*, in the latter case it is *per posterius et per accidens*, i.e. because of the accident that the wine happens to be sweet); (4) terms applied to things which are relative (of this, again, Aristotle does not give any example, but we cannot go wrong if we think of such terms as those predicated of both matter and form, or of act and potency).¹ Aristotle did not claim that this classification of terms, which are neither wholly equivocal nor univocal, was an exhaustive one nor did he give to this class of terms a special name. As we have already said, Aquinas calls these terms analogous. As to their classification it appears that he does not fully agree with Aristotle's classification. Attempting several other classifications, Aquinas does not claim priority or finality for any of them. The inconclusive character of Aquinas' maze of terminology and classifications resulted in many attempts to clarify and systematize the Thomistic doctrine of analogy. Although this has been the goal of commentators since Ferrariensis' time,² only the work of Cajetan received acceptance. Since his commentary, most effort has been directed either to uphold its adequacy or to prove its inadequacy. Presently, Cajetan's division of Thomas' analogy is being treated quite critically. Scholars like Klubertanz and McInerny, who have examined it very carefully, have shown that it is unable to interpret a large body of Aquinas' texts on analogy and they have tried to work out a more satisfactory division. In our opinion however neither Klubertanz' very complex division³ nor McInerny's⁴ most simple one is apt to give the final answer to the vexed question. This has led us to face the problem again in order to

¹ For an excellent study of Aristotle's classification of the equivocal terms in *Topica* 110b, 16–111a, 7 see H. A. Wolfson's essay „The Amphibolous terms in Aristotle, Arabic Philosophy and Maimonides," *Harvard Theol. Review* 1938, pp. 151–173.

² Francis Sylvester de Sylvestris, known as the Ferrariensis (1474–1528) wrote the best commentary on Aquinas' *Summa contra Gentiles*. It is in his commentary to Ch. 34 of Book One that he presents his interpretation of Aquinas' doctrine of analogy.

³ For a detailed analysis of Klubertanz' *St. Thomas Aquinas' on Analogy* (Loyola University Press: 1960) see our review in „A propositio dell'Analogia", in *Rivista di Filosofia Neoscholastica* 1962, pp. 366–369.

⁴ In his recent work *The Logic of Analogy* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1962) R. M. McInerny tries to show that Aquinas' numerous types of analogy are reducible to only one, i.e., to the one known under the name of *per prius et posterius*. But we believe that this attempt has failed since the analogy of *per prius et posterius* cannot take care of such important instances as the analogous predication of being, substance, accident, potency, act, in a word of all the basic metaphysical categories.

seek, through a careful analysis of the basic texts, a more satisfactory conclusion.

In the present chapter we shall first go through Aquinas' works, search for the texts dealing with analogy, analyze and compare them in order to establish their true meaning; we shall, then, give a brief summary of Cajetan's systematization of Aquinas' doctrine and test its adequacy, finally we shall present and justify our new division of the analogy of Aquinas.

1. AQUINAS' DIVISION OF ANALOGY IN THE 'COMMENTARY TO THE SENTENCES'

The best known of Aquinas' passages on analogy is found in his youthful work *In IV Libros Sententiarum P. Lombardi*, Lib. I, Dist. 19, Q. 5, a. 2, ad 1. It is the answer to an objection, which argues that the name "truth" is predicated in the same way as "health". But health is predicated of many things because of their relations to a living organism, in which alone health is intrinsically found. Therefore truth is intrinsically found only in one being (*ergo videtur quod una sit veritas*) and it is predicated of everything else because of some relation to this one being. The answer reads as follows:

There are three ways in which something may be said by analogy. *In the first place*, according to intention only and not according to being (*secundum intentionem tantum et non secundum esse*). This happens when one intention refers to several things according to priority and posteriority, but has being in one only. For example, the intention *health* refers to animal, urine and diet, in a different manner according to priority and posteriority, but not according to a diversity of being, because health has being only in animals. *In the second place*, according to being and not according to intention (*secundum esse et non secundum intentionem*). This happens when several are considered equal in the intention of something they have in common, but this common element does not have a being of the same kind in all. For example, all bodies are considered equal in the intention of corporeity. Hence the logician, who considers only intentions, says that the name "body" is predicated univocally of all bodies. However, the being of this nature is not of the same character in corruptible and incorruptible bodies. Hence for the metaphysician and the philosopher of nature, who consider things according to their being, neither the name "body" nor any other name is predicated univocally of corruptible and incorruptible bodies, as is clear from the Philosopher and the Commentator in *X Metaphysics*. *In the third place*, according to intention and according to being (*secundum intentionem et secundum esse*). This happens when a thing is considered neither equal in a common intention nor equal in being. For example being is predicated of substance and accident in this way. In such cases the common nature must exist in each of those things of which it is predicated, but its existence differs according to a higher or a lesser degree of perfection. In this manner I say that truth, goodness and all other similar terms are predicated of God and creatures by analogy.¹

¹ *In I Sent.* 19, 5, 2 ad 1.

In his answer, then, Aquinas distinguishes all analogous terms into three main classes: (1) the class of terms which are analogous only in intention, i.e. only in the mind; the example he gives is that of "healthy," when predicated of urine, diet and animal; (2) the class of terms which are analogous only in being; the example is that of "body," when predicated of material things and celestial bodies; (3) the class of those which are analogous both in intention and being; the example for this last category is that of being when predicated of substance and accident. Besides the examples given by Aquinas one should not fail to notice in this passage the absence of such terms, so familiar in the vocabulary of analogy, as attribution, proportionality, proportion and *unius ad aliud* or *plurium ad unum*. Also worthy of attention is the identification of the terms which are analogous only in the mind with the terms which are predicated *per prius et posterius*. Finally it is said that terms like "truth," "goodness" etc. are predicated of God and creatures according to the analogy of both intention and being.

Elsewhere in the *Commentary to the Sentences* we find several dichotomous divisions of analogy. In the First Book (Dist. 35, Q. 1, A. 4) he says that science may be predicated analogically of both God and creatures. But there are two kinds of analogy. (1) A term may be predicated of two things because they have in common a *tertium quid*, which is predicated of them according to priority and posteriority (*per prius et posterius*); (2) or it may be predicated of two things which are similar since one is the image, i.e. the imperfect imitation of the other. Terms like "science" are predicated of God and creatures only according to the second kind of analogy, not according to priority and posteriority.¹ This passage is characteristic of Aquinas' vagueness of terminology. None of the familiar terms of the vocabulary of analogy appears. There is only an allusion to the class *duorum vel plurium ad unum* in the terms which are analogous because they have a *tertium quid* in common. The second class appears

¹ *In I Sent.* 35, 1, 4: "Et igitur dicendum quod scientia analogice dicitur de Deo et creatura, et similiter omnia huiusmodi. Sed duplex est analogia. Quaedam secundum convenientiam in aliquo uno quod eis per prius et posterius convenit; et haec analogia non potest esse inter Deum et creaturam, sicut nec univocatio. Alia analogia est, secundum quod unum imitatur aliud quantum potest, nec perfecte ipsum assequitur; et haec analogia est creaturae ad Deum." Cf. also *In I Sent.* 45, 1, 4 & *In II Sent.* 16, 1, 2 ad 5. However, there are few passages in the *Commentary* (e.g. *In I Sent.* 8, 1, 2; *ibid.* 22, 1, 2 ad 3) where the phrase *per prius et posterius* is accepted as a valid description of the analogy between God and creatures. Klubertanz offers the following explanation for this terminological shift: "In those texts in which it is accepted, the expression seems to mean only that a perfection possessed by God in a more perfect manner and according to (causal) priority is shared by creatures in a less perfect manner and only consequently upon that possession by God. In those texts in which it is rejected, it implies that both God and creatures share in some common perfection which is somehow distinct from both and prior to both." (Klubertanz, *St. Thomas' Aquinas on Analogy*, pp. 30-31).

to be an analogy of imitation. Aquinas does not give an example for either of these classes.

A similar classification of analogy is found also in the Prologue to the first Book of the *Sentences*. The two classes of the division are the same, i.e. analogy according to priority and posteriority and analogy of imitation. The only difference is that here the division is made from an ontological and not from a logical standpoint. For the analogy of two things which are sharing according to priority and posteriority in a *tertium quid* Aquinas supplies two examples: (1) the sharing of both act and potency in being, (2) the sharing of both substance and accident in being. For the analogy of imitation he provides the example of the relation between creatures and Creator.¹

Another important passage concerning analogy in the *Commentary to the Sentences* is found in the Fourth Book (Dist. 49, Q. 2, A. 1, ad 6). This is not explicitly presented as a division of analogy. It is the answer to the objection that human intellect cannot know God because there is no proportion between finite and infinite. The answer is a twofold one, according to the two different meanings in which the term "proportion" is used. If "proportion" is used in its original connotation of a definite relation of one quantity to another, as when we say that four is twice as much in proportion to two, then it is true that there is no proportion between finite and infinite, "because the distance of the infinite from the finite is unlimited." In this case one can say only that between finite and infinite there is *proportionality*, "for as a finite thing can be compared to anything finite, so can the infinite be compared to the infinite." If, however, the term "proportion" is used, not in its strict, technical, original connotation, but in its ordinary, wider meaning of any relation of similarity between two things, as when one says that there is proportion between matter and form, then one may be justified in saying that there is proportion between finite and infinite.² The distinction which

¹ In *I Sent. Prol.* q. 1, a. 2 ad 2: "Ad secundum dicendum, quod Creator et creatura reducuntur in unum, non communitate enivocationis, sed analogiae. Talis autem communitas potest esse duplex. Aut ex eo quod aliqua participant aliquid unum secundum prius et posterius, sicut potentia et actus rationem entis, et similiter substantia et accidens; aut ex eo quod unum esse et rationem ab altero recipit; et talis est analogia creaturae ad Creatorem: creatura enim non habet esse nisi secundum quod a primo ente descendit, nec nominatur ens nisi in quantum ens primum imitatur; et similiter est de sapientia et de omnibus aliis quae de creatura dicuntur."

² In *IV Sent.* 49, 2, 1 ad 6: "Ad sextum dicendum, quod quamvis finiti ad infinitum non possit esse proportio, quia excessus infiniti supra finitum non est determinatus; potest tamen esse inter ea proportionalitas quae est similitudo proportionum; sicut enim finitum aequatur alicui finito, ita infinito infinitum... Vel dicendum quod proportio secundum primam nominis institutionem significat habitudinem quantitatis ad quantitatem secundum aliquem determinatum excessum vel adaequationem; sed ulterius est translatum ad significandum

Aquinas draws here between the technical and the ordinary meaning of the term "proportion" is very important. We will refer to it when we try to reconcile some apparently contradictory statements of the *Summa Theologica* and the *De Veritate*.

2. AQUINAS' DIVISION OF ANALOGY IN THE 'DE VERITATE'

Another well known passage on analogy is contained in *De Veritate* also a youthful work.¹ Article Eleven of Question Two deals with the problem of how "science" is predicated of God and man. Aquinas denies that the term is predicated either univocally or equivocally. "Science" is predicated of God and man analogously. But there are various kinds of analogy or proportional likeness.

Proportional likeness can be twofold, giving rise to a double community of analogy. (1) There exists a certain conformity among things proportioned to each other (*secundum proportionem*) because of a mutual determinate distance or some other (determinate) relation between them, as two is proportioned to one by being the double of one. (2) Sometimes we find a mutual conformity of two things between which there is no (determinate) proportion, but rather a mutual likeness of two proportions (*similitudo duarum ad invicem proportionum*); e.g. six is like four in this, that just as six is the double of three, so four is the double of two. The first kind of conformity is thus one of proportion, the second of proportionality (*prima ergo convenientia est proportionis, secunda autem proportionalitatis*). So, in accordance with that first kind of conformity we find something predicated analogically of two things one of which is related to the other, as being (*ens*) is said of substance and of accident through the

omnem habitudinem cuiuscumque ad aliud; et per hunc modum dicimus, quod materia debet esse proportionata ad formam; et hoc modo nihil prohibet intellectum nostrum, quamvis sit finitus, dici proportionatum ad videndum essentiam infinitam." See also ad 7 and *In IV Sent.* 1, 1, 1, 5, 3; *In III Sent.* 1, 1, 1, 3. A suggestive hypothesis has been recently advanced by Hayen concerning the interpretation of some other passages of the *Commentary on the Sentences*, where Aquinas divides analogy into proportion and proportionality. According to Hayen Aquinas is far less concerned to contrast proportionality with proportion than "large" with "strict" proportion or, in my terminology, proportion in its technical (strict) and ordinary (large) use. He believes that by proportionality Aquinas means proportion in *lato sensu*. Here are some passages where according to the author, Aquinas contrasts large with strict proportion: "Proportio secundum diversas species eiusdem generis (strict prop.)... proportio secundum diversum genus (large prop.)" (*In II Sent.* 9, 1, 3, 5; see also *In I Sent.* 48, 1, 1, where the *proportio lato sensu* is called *proportionalitas*). "Proportio convenientium in eadem natura (strict prop.)... proportio potentiae ad actum (large prop.)" (*In II Sent.* 30, 1, 1, 7). See also *C. Gent.* III, 54: "Commensuratio proportionem existente... quaecumque habitudo unius ad alterum" and *Quodl.* 10, 17, 1: "Determinatus excessus... quaelibet habitudo." A. Hayen, *L'Intentionnel selon St. Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris, 1943), pp. 78-82. Hayen's hypothesis has been recently applied by McInerney to the interpretation of the famous text of the *De Veritate* 2, 11 in order to show that there is no need "to see an opposition between proportion and proportionality" (o.c. p. 89) since what St. Thomas is stressing in this passage is that the proportion or relation between God and creatures is indeterminate. This may very well be true but we don't see how this justifies McInerney's attempt to reduce proportionality to proportion.

¹ The *Commentarium in Libros Sententiarum* is generally dated around 1253-1255; the *De Veritate* is dated around 1256-1259.

relation that substance and accident have to each other, and as "healthy" is predicated of urine and of animal because urine has a certain likeness to the health of the animal. But sometimes a term is predicated analogically according to the second kind of conformity (proportionality), as the name "vision" is said of corporeal vision and of intellectual vision by the reason of the fact that just as sight is in the eye, so intellect is in the soul. In things predicated analogically in the first way (proportion) there must be some determinate relation between the entities to which a term is common by analogy. It is therefore impossible for anything to be said of God and creature by this mode of analogy. For no creature has a relation to God such that, through it, the divine perfection could be determined. But in the second mode of analogy no determinate relation exists between those things to which something is common by analogy. Therefore nothing prevents some name from being predicated analogically of God and creature according to this mode of analogy. There are however two modes of predication by way of proportionality. (1) Sometimes the name to be predicated implies in its primary meaning something respecting which no likeness can obtain between God and creature, not even in the aforesaid manner (i.e. as sight with respect to eye and intellect). Such is the case in all the names predicated of God symbolically (*quae symbolice de Deo dicuntur*) as when words like "lion" or "sun" are said of Him. For in the definition of such terms is included matter which cannot be attributed to God. (2) Sometimes the name predicated of God and creature involves in its principal signification nothing that could prevent the aforesaid mode of community (proportionality) from existing between creature and God. Such is the case with all the names whose definition entails no imperfection, nor any actual dependence upon matter. This (absence of limitation) we find in the terms being, good and the like.¹

In this remarkable passage Aquinas distinguishes between three kinds of analogy: analogy of proportion, analogy of proper proportionality and analogy of improper or metaphorical or symbolical proportionality. No distinction is made within proportion, between the technical and the ordinary use of the term. The technical use is the only one mentioned here by Aquinas: "a mutual determinate distance or some other (determinate) relation between things, as two is proportioned to one by being the double of one." In addition to this example of the proportion between one and two, for the analogy of proportion, Aquinas gives the example of the proportion between substance and accident with respect to being, and that of healthy medicine to healthy animal. For the analogy of proper proportionality he gives the example of vision, which is said both of corporeal vision and of intellectual vision by reason of the fact that just as sight is in the eye, so intellect is in the soul. For improper or metaphorical proportionality he gives the example of the names "lion" and "sun," when they are predicated of God. These names cannot be properly predicated of God "since they imply in their primary meanings something respecting which no likeness can obtain between God and creature." Names like "being," "good," etc. are predicated of God and creatures neither according to analogy of proportion nor

¹ *De Veritate*, 2, 11.

of improper proportionality. They are predicated according to the analogy of proper proportionality. No reference is made in this passage to the terminology of *I Sentences*, Dist. 19, Q. 5, A. 2 ad 1, and in his later works Aquinas gives preference to the more definite terminology of the *De Veritate*, 2, 11. With regard to the examples, there is little in common between the passage of the *Sentences* and the passage of the *De Veritate*. Although two examples ("healthy" and "being") are the same, "being" predicated of substance and accident in the *Sentences* exemplifies the analogy to both intention and being, but in the *De Veritate* it illustrates the analogy of proportion. In the *De Veritate* 2, 11 no mention is made of the analogia secundum prius et posterius nor of the analogy unius ad alterum.

Another interesting passage on analogy is the answer to the sixth question of *De Veritate* 2, 11. The objection says that there cannot be any analogy between God and the world because in analogy the primary analogate enters into the definition of all secondary analogates. In the answer Aquinas distinguishes between two modes of analogy: (1) analogy of one to another (*unius ad alterum*) and (2) analogy of two to a third (*duorum ad alterum*). These are both subdivisions of the analogy of proportion, which in the body of Article Eleven, has been excluded from theological discourse, because it is an analogy which requires a measurable distance between primary and secondary analogates. In the answer to the objection St. Thomas repeats that these two modes of analogy cannot be used in theology because they are based on a measurable distance. But there are other modes of analogy which are not subject to this limitation and can be used to describe the relations between God and man. For the analogy of one to another Aquinas gives the example of the relation between substance and accident, where substance enters into the definition of accident. For the analogy of two to a third he gives the example of the relation of both quality and quantity to substance, and also in this case substance enters into the definition of quality and quantity.¹

Very important to the aim of the present chapter is another passage of the *De Veritate*: it is the answer to the second question of *De Veritate* 21, 4. The objection argues that creation is called good only extrinsically

¹ *De Veritate* 2, 11 ad 6: "Ad sextum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de communitate analogiae quae accipitur secundum determinatam habitudinem unius ad alterum: tunc enim oportet quod unum in definitione alterius ponatur, sicut substantia in definitione accidentis; vel aliquid unum in definitione duorum, ex eo quod utraque dicuntur per habitudinem ad unum, sicut substantia in definitione quantitatis et qualitatis."

because of its relation to the goodness of God. Aquinas' answer reads as follows:

A thing is denominated with reference to something else in two ways: (1) this occurs when the very reference itself is the meaning of the denomination (*ipse respectus est ratio denominationis*). Thus urine is called healthy with respect to the health of an animal. For the meaning of healthy as predicated of urine is 'serving as a sign of the health of an animal.' In such cases what is thus relatively denominated does not get its name from a form inherent in it but from something extrinsic to which it is referred. (2) A thing is denominated with reference to something else when the reference is not the meaning of the denomination but its cause (*respectus non est ratio denominationis, sed causa*). For instance air is said to be bright from the sun, not because the very fact that the air is referred to the sun is the brightness of the air, but because the placing of the air directly before the sun is the cause of its being bright (*est causa quod luceat*). It is in this way that the creature is called good with reference to God.¹

In this passage Aquinas distinguishes between two analogies based on a relation. In the first analogous predication the relation to the primary analogate is both the cause (*causa*) and the meaning (*ratio*) of the secondary analogate. The analogous name, when predicated of the secondary analogate does not signify any perfection intrinsic to it but only a relation of the secondary to the primary analogate. Such is the case when urine is called healthy because of its relation to the health of the animal. In the second analogous predication the relation of the secondary analogate to the primary is only the cause (*non est ratio denominationis sed causa*), not the meaning of the attribution of the analogous name to the secondary analogate. The meaning is something intrinsic to the secondary analogate itself. Such is the case when "good" is predicated of creatures because they are caused by the supreme Good. They are called good not simply because they are caused by the Good, but because having been caused by Him they are good themselves. Aquinas does not employ the term "attribution" to describe the two modes of analogy mentioned in this passage nor indeed does he ever use the term with clear reference to analogy. But there is no doubt that what Aquinas called intrinsic and extrinsic denomination, can be equally well described as intrinsic and extrinsic attribution.

De Veritate 23, 7 ad 9 almost literally repeats *In IV Sententiarum*, Dist. 49, Q. 2, A. 1 ad 6. It is the answer to the objection that since man is infinitely distant from God, there cannot be any proportion between him and God. Aquinas answers that there is no doubt that man is conformed to God since he is made to God's image and likeness. He then goes on to determine the nature of this conformity. It cannot be considered as a direct, measurable proportion but it can be understood

¹ *De Veritate* 21, 4 ad 2; cf. Klubertanz, *op cit.*, p. 45.

both as an indefinite proportion and as a proportionality. For the case of direct, measurable proportion Aquinas does not provide any example. For the case of indefinite proportion we find the following example: "as we say that there is a likeness of proportions in this instance: the pilot is to the ship as the ruler to the commonwealth." This example is very remarkable, inasmuch as it is expressed according to the formula of analogy of proper proportionality although it is given as an example of analogy of indefinite proportion. This shows that to Aquinas indefinite proportion and proportionality sometimes mean the same thing.¹

3. AQUINAS' DIVISION OF ANALOGY IN THE 'CONTRA GENTILES'

The *Summa contra Gentiles*, the next of Aquinas' works in chronological order (c. 1259-1264), devotes Chapters 30-34 of Book I to the study of the predication of divine names. Chapter 30 distinguishes between three kinds of names: (1) "names that express a perfection along with the mode of supereminence with which they belong to God: these names are said of God alone. Such names are *the highest good*, *the first being*, and the like." They can be used for creatures only according to likeness and metaphor. (2) "Names that express a perfection along with the mode that is proper to a creature: these names can be said of God only according to likeness and metaphor. According to metaphor, what belongs to one thing is transferred to another, as when we say that a man is a *stone* because of the hardness of his intellect." (3) "Names that unqualifiedly designate a perfection without defect (i.e. they designate an absolute perfection without expressing the mode according to which it is found in a particular subject): these names are predicated of both God and other things: For example goodness, wisdom, being and the like." Actually all the names used by man are accompanied by a definite mode of signification: the mode of signification with which they belong to creatures,

for our intellect, taking the origin of its knowledge from the senses, does not transcend the mode which is found in sensible things... As a result, with reference to the mode of signification there is in every name that we use an imperfection, which does not befit God, even though the thing signified in some eminent way does befit God. This is clear in the name *goodness* and *good*. For goodness has signification as something not subsisting, while *good* has signification as something concentered. And so with reference to the mode of signification no name is fittingly applied to God; this is done

¹ *De Veritate* 23, 7 ad 9; see also *De Veritate* 5, 8 ad 3. This gives further support to Hayen's and McNerny's hypothesis. See note 2, pp. 11-12.

only with reference to that which the name has been imposed to signify. Such names, therefore, as Dionysius teaches, can be both affirmed and denied of God. They can be affirmed because of the meaning of the name; they can be denied because of the mode of signification.¹

Chapter 31 shows that the plurality of divine names is not opposed to the divine simplicity. The first argument concludes with this interesting statement: "God is called *wise* not only in so far as He produces wisdom, but also because, in so far as we are wise, we imitate to some extent the power by which He makes us wise."² Here Aquinas distinguishes between two modes of predication of an absolute perfection with respect to God: according to the first mode the perfection is extrinsically attributed to God because He is considered only as the cause of such a perfection in creatures; according to the second mode the perfection is attributed to God intrinsically, because the created perfection is viewed as an imitation of a divine perfection. This division of analogous predication into intrinsic and extrinsic is already present in *In I Sententiarum* D. 19, Q. 5, A. 2 ad 1 and in *De Veritate* 21, 4. But in these previous works Aquinas assumes that names of absolute perfections, like "good," "wise" etc. are properly predicated of God and he is concerned with determining how they are predicated of creatures. In the *Summa Contra Gentiles* I, 31 he starts from a more empirical ground and admits that names of absolute perfections are properly predicated of creatures and tries to determine how they can be attributed to God. He arrives at the conclusion that they may be predicated of God both intrinsically and extrinsically according to the different presuppositions.

Chapter 32 shows that no name, not even the names of absolute perfections, can be predicated univocally of God and creatures. In Chapter 29 Aquinas had already shown that God is not a univocal cause. Moving from this conclusion he now argues that an effect that does not receive a form specifically the same as that through which the agent acts cannot receive according to a univocal predication the name arising from that form. Thus, the heat generated by the sun and the sun itself are not called univocally *hot*. Now, the forms of the things God has made do not measure up to a specific likeness of the divine power; for the things that God has made receive in a divided and particular way that which in Him is found in a simple and universal way. It is evident, then, that nothing can be said univocally of God and other things. The Chapter concludes with the following argument:

¹ *C. Gent* I, 30.

² *C. Gent* I, 31.

What is predicated of some things according to priority and posteriority is certainly not predicated univocally. For the prior is included in the definition of the posterior, as substance is included in the definition of accident according as an accident is a being. If, then, being were said univocally of substance and accident, substance would have to be included in the definition of being in so far as being is predicated of substance. But this is clearly impossible. Now nothing is predicated of God and creatures as though they were in the same order, but, rather, according to priority and posteriority. For all things are predicated of God essentially. For God is called being as being entity itself, and He is called good as being goodness itself. But in other beings predications are made by participation, as Socrates is said to be a man, not because he is humanity itself, but because he possesses humanity. It is impossible, therefore, that anything be predicated univocally of God and other things.¹

This passage is remarkable for two reasons: (1) for what it says about predication according to priority and posteriority and (2) about essential and participative predication. We have seen that, both in the Prologue and in Distinction 19 of the First Book of the *Sentences* Aquinas rejected the view that the predication of the divine names is a predication according to priority and posteriority. Here in the *Summa Contra Gentiles* he seems to adopt the opposite view. He denies that divine names are predicated of God and creatures univocally and asserts that they are predicated according to priority and posteriority. Aquinas is not contradicting himself. From the examples given in *The Sentences* it is clear that by analogous predication according to priority and posteriority he means analogy of two to a third. But the example of the *Summa Contra Gentiles* is the example of the analogy of one to another. Aquinas, then, seems to distinguish between various kinds of analogy according to priority and posteriority but, in theology, for the attribution of absolute perfections to God, he admits only the analogy of one to another. The other important statement made by Aquinas in the passage which we are analyzing, is the statement that when a name is predicated of one being essentially and of other beings by participation, as when *good* is predicated of God and creatures, that name is not predicated univocally but according to priority and posteriority, i.e. according to a special mode of analogy. Finally it is interesting to notice that in this passage the predication of being of substance and accident is given by Aquinas as an illustration of the analogy according priority and posteriority of one to another and not as an illustration of the analogy according to priority and posteriority of two to a third. Here, then, Aquinas identifies being with substance.

Chapter 33 shows that not all names are said of God and creatures in a purely equivocal way. Aquinas does not argue that none of the

¹ C. Gent I, 32.

names we predicate of God and His creatures are equivocal but only that not all of them can be equivocal. In support of his thesis he lines up six arguments. Of peculiar strength is the argument *ad absurdum*: "If names are said of God and creatures in a purely equivocal way, we understand nothing of God through those names; for the meanings of those names are known to us solely to the extent that they are said of creatures. In vain, therefore, would it be said or proved of God that He is a being, good, or the like."¹ Especially interesting for the doctrine of analogy is the first argument where, by excluding equivocals by chance because they are predicated without any order of reference of one to another, by implication Aquinas comes to say that names that are predicated of God and creatures are predicated according to the analogy of one to another. Indeed, "we note in the community of such names the order of cause to effect."¹

Chapter 34 shows that names that are said of God and creatures are said analogically. St. Thomas explains that by analogous predication he understands a predication "according to an order or reference to something one" (*secundum ordinem vel respectum ad aliquod unum*). He then distinguishes between two modes of analogous predication according to a reference to something one: (1) analogy of many to one and (2) analogy of one to another. Names that are predicated of both God and creatures are predicated according to the analogy of one to another. Aquinas writes:

Names said of God and creature are predicated neither univocally nor equivocally but analogically, that is, according to an order or reference to something one. This can take place in two ways. In one way, according as many things have reference to something one. Thus with reference to one health we say that an animal is healthy as the subject of health, medicine is healthy as its cause, food as its preserver, urine as its sign. In another way, the analogy can obtain according as the order or reference of two things is not to something else but to one of them. Thus, "being" is said of substance and accident according as an accident has reference to a substance, and not according as substance and accident are referred to a third thing. Now, the names said of God are not said analogically according to the first mode of analogy, since we should then have to posit something prior to God, but according to the second mode.¹

¹ C. Gent I, 33.

² C. Gent. I, 33: "Non quidquid de Deo et de rebus aliis praedicatur, secundum puram aequivocationem dicitur, sicut ea quae sunt a casu aequivoca; nam in his quae sunt a casu aequivoca, nullus ordo aut respectus attenditur unius ad alterum, sed omnino per accidens est quod unum nomen diversis rebus attribuatur: non enim nomen impositum uni, signat ipsum habere ordinem ad alterum. Sic autem non est de nominibus quae de Deo dicuntur et creaturis; consideratur enim in huiusmodi nominum communitate ordo causae et causati, ut ex dictis (c. 29 et 32) patet. Non igitur secundum puram aequivocationem aliquid de Deo et rebus aliis praedicatur."

³ Contra Gentiles I, 34.

In the remaining section of Chapter 34 Aquinas recalls the distinction between the mode of signification and the perfection signified by a name and then concludes that "because we come to a knowledge of God from other things, the reality in the names said of God and other things belongs by priority in God according to His mode of being, but the meaning of the name belongs to God by posteriority. And so He is said to be named from His effects."¹

We have seen that in Chapter 32 Aquinas describes the analogy of one to another as an analogy according to priority and posteriority. In previous works he had reserved the terminology "analogy according to priority and posteriority" to the analogy of two to a third or of many to one and excluded it from the predication of divine names. But in the *Summa Contra Gentiles* the expression "according to priority and posteriority" is used for any mode of analogy in general and can no longer be rejected from theological discourse. Aquinas is concerned to exclude a particular kind of analogy according to priority and posteriority, i.e. the analogy of many to one or of two to a third. "Good," for instance, cannot be predicated of God and creatures as a *tertium quid* in which they both take a share. This mode of predication would annihilate God's supremacy and must therefore be eliminated. Names denoting absolute perfections are predicated of God as "being" is predicated of substance, i.e. essentially; they do not denote a *tertium quid* in which God participates but the divine essence with which they are identical. For this mode of predication Aquinas does not use any of the technical terms of the vocabulary of analogy. He does not describe analogy in terms of proportion or of proportionality or of attribution but he names it vaguely as "analogy of one to another." However, one thing is clear. This analogy cannot be interpreted as an analogy of extrinsic attribution either with respect to creature or with respect to God, because, according to what St. Thomas has shown in Chapter 30, names of absolute perfections are predicated intrinsically both of God and creatures. Moreover this analogy can hardly be interpreted as an analogy of proportionality since it is constantly based on the causal relation.²

Elsewhere in the *Summa Contra Gentiles* we find other less significant statements about analogy. In Book Two, Chapter 16 Aquinas says that "whenever in the universe we find some mutual proportion and order among things, one of those things must derive its being from another (*unum... ab alio*), or both from some one thing (*ambo ab aliquo*)

¹ *Ibid.*

² Cf. *C. Gent.* I, 29 & 32.

uno)."¹ This is the familiar division of analogy according to priority and posteriority into analogy of one to another and analogy of many to one. It is the latter that is rejected in a proportion between God and creatures. In many other passages St. Thomas deals with analogy from an ontological standpoint by considering it either as a relation between cause and effect or between human intellect and divine intellect or between human being (*esse*) and divine being (*Esse*) or between created wisdom and divine wisdom, etc.²

4. AQUINAS' DIVISION OF ANALOGY IN THE 'DE POTENTIA'

Question Seven of the *De Potentia* deals with some of the problems discussed in Chapters 30-34 of Book One of the *Summa Contra Gentiles*. Although the *De Potentia* was begun before the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, internal evidence seems to prove that Question Seven has been written after Chapters 30-34.³ For this reason we have analyzed Aquinas' doctrine of analogy according to the *Summa Contra Gentiles* first. Question Seven of the *De Potentia* deals with the problem of the simplicity of the divine essence. Article Five shows that the multiplicity of the divine names does not destroy the simplicity of God, since divine names are all identical with divine substance. Aquinas' main preoccupation in this and the following articles is to ban Maimonides' theory on the predication of the divine names. It is not our task here to solve the differences between the two great Scholastics on this point.⁴ It will be sufficient to give a brief summary of what Aquinas has to say here about the nature and division of analogy and its necessity in theology. In Article Five Aquinas shows that the analogy between God and creatures rests

¹ *C. Gent.* II, 16: "Quorumcumque in rerum natura est aliqua proportio et aliquis ordo, oportet unum eorum esse ab alio, vel ambo ab aliquo uno."

² For analogy between cause and effect cf. *C. Gent.* I, 29 & 31; for analogy between human intellect and divine intellect cf. III, 54, 13: "The proportion of the created intellect to the understanding of God is not, in fact, based on a commensuration in an existing proportion, but on the fact that *proportion means any relation of one thing to another*, as of matter to form, or of cause to effect. In this sense, then, nothing prevents there being a proportion of creature to God on the basis of a relation of one who understands to the thing understood, just as on the basis of the relation of effect to cause." See also *C. Gent.* III, 47 & IV, 11, 14. For the analogy between created being and divine being cf. III, 97. For the analogy between created wisdom and divine wisdom cf. III, 162 & IV, 21 etc.

³ Cf. for example, *De Potentia* 7, 7 where Aquinas clearly presupposes the knowledge of *C. Gent.* I, 33. In the *Contra Gentiles* Aquinas fully elaborates his arguments against equivocal predication of divine names. In *De Potentia* he merely gives a list of the same arguments.

⁴ For some excellent studies on Maimonides' doctrine of predication see the following essays by Prof. H. A. Wolfson: "Maimonides on Negative Attributes," *Louis Ginzberg Jubilee Volume*, pp. 411-446; "Maimonides and Gersonides on Divine Attributes as Ambiguous Terms," *Mordecai M. Kaplan Jubilee Volume*, pp. 515-530; "Amphibolous Terms in Aristotle, Arabic Philosophy and Maimonides," *The Harvard Theological Review* (1938), pp. 151-173.

on two principles: (a) creatures are effects of God's agency, (b) there is some kind of similarity or analogy between cause and effect. Because creatures are images of God man can know Him. But since creatures are only imperfect images of God, man can know Him only imperfectly and the names that man gives to God signify Him only imperfectly: "Therefore, although these terms which our intellect attributes to God from such conceptions signify the divine essence, they do not signify it perfectly as it is in itself, but as it is conceived by us. Accordingly we conclude that each of these terms signifies the divine essence, not comprehensively but imperfectly."¹ St. Thomas concludes that it is necessary to distinguish between the mode of signification and the thing signified. The thing signified may be attributed to God, but the mode of signification must be denied.² This view of Aquinas is not to be confused with Maimonides' theory of negative predication. Maimonides excludes all affirmative predicated with regard to God. Aquinas excludes affirmative predicates only with regard to the mode of signification, but with regard to the things signified, if they are names of absolute perfections, they are properly predicated of God. One may ask what we can know of God in this way. Aquinas is very clear on this point. In answering the fourteenth objection he says: "Man reaches the highest point of his knowledge about God when he knows that he knows Him not, inasmuch as he knows that that which is God transcends whatever he conceives of Him."³ The answer to the eighth objection is also revealing. To an objector who questions the validity of the principle of ontological analogy between cause and effect Aquinas answers:

An effect includes something whereby it is like its cause, and something whereby it differs therefrom: and this by reason of its matter or something of the kind. Take for example a brick hardened by fire: the clay is heated by the fire and thus becomes like the fire: then it is condensed and hardened, and this is due to the nature of the material. Accordingly if we ascribe to the fire that wherein the brick is likened to it, it will be ascribed to it properly in a more eminent degree and with priority: because fire is hotter than the brick: and it is hot in a more eminent way, since the brick is hot by being made hot, while the fire is hot by nature. On the other hand if we ascribe to the fire that wherein the brick differs from the fire, it will be untrue, and any term that signifies this condition of dissimilarity cannot be said of fire unless metaphorically.

¹ *De Potentia* 7, 5: "Ideo licet huiusmodi nomina quae intellectus ex talibus conceptionibus Deo attribuit significant id quod est divina substantia, non tamen perfecte ipsam significant secundum quod est, sed secundum quod a nobis intelligitur. Sic ergo dicendum est, quod quodlibet istorum nominum significat divinam substantiam, non tamen quasi comprehendens ipsam, sed imperfecte."

² Cf. *De Potentia* 7, 5 ad 2.

³ *De Potentia* 7, 5 ad 14: "Illud est ultimum cognitionis humanae de Deo quod sciat se Deum nescire, in quantum cognoscit, illud quod Deus est, omne ipsum quod de deo intelligimus, excedere."

Thus it is false to say that fire, the most subtle of bodies, is dense. It can, however, be described as hard on account of the violence of its action, and the difficulty to quench it. Accordingly in creatures there are certain perfections whereby they are likened to God, and which as regards the thing signified do not denote any imperfection, such as being, life, understanding and so forth: and these are ascribed to God properly, in fact they are ascribed to Him first and in a more eminent way than to creatures. And there are in creatures certain perfections wherein they differ from God, and which the creature owes to its being made from nothing, such as potentiality, privation, movement and the like. These are falsely ascribed to God: and whatsoever terms imply such like conditions cannot be ascribed to God otherwise than metaphorically, for instance lion, stone and so on, inasmuch as matter is included in their definition. They are, however, ascribed to him metaphorically by reason of a likeness in their effects.¹

This passage is later taken up in the discussion of the similarity between cause and effect as the ground of analogy of intrinsic attribution.²

Article Six deals with the problem as to whether the divine names are synonymous. Aquinas believes that they are not, but not because they are predicated of God by extrinsic denomination (i.e. their meaning is different since each one of them denotes a different effect) as some scholastics had argued. Extrinsic denomination may escape synonymy of divine names but fails to do justice to the facts. "God is not called wise because he is the cause of wisdom: but because He is wise, therefore does He cause wisdom."³ Moreover according to the theory of extrinsic denomination it would follow that names of absolute perfections are attributed to the creature before the Creator. But this is impossible.⁴ The cause of the difference or multiplicity in the divine names lies in the human intellect, which is unable to compass the vision of the divine essence in itself, but sees it through many faulty likenesses thereof which are reflected by creatures as by a mirror.⁵

Article Seven takes up the subject of the mode of predication of the names of absolute perfections: are these names ascribed univocally or equivocally to God and creatures? They are ascribed to them neither univocally (because God is not a univocal cause)⁶ nor equivocally

¹ *De Potentia* 7, 5 ad 8.

² See *Infra* p. 90.

³ *De Potentia* 7, 6: "Non ergo sapiens dicitur Deus quoniam sapientiam causet; sed quia est sapiens, ideo sapientiam causat."

⁴ *De Potentia* 7, 6 in corp.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Also noteworthy is the other argument used here by Aquinas against univocal predication of the divine names. The argument may be reformulated in the following way: A different relation to being precludes a univocal predication of being, e.g. being is not predicated univocally of substance and accident, because substance is a being as subsisting in itself, while accident is that whose being is to be in something else. Now God's relation to being is different from that of any creature's: for He is his own being, which cannot be said of any creature. Hence in no way can it be predicated univocally of God and a creature. See *De Potentia* 7, 7.

(because pure equivocals are not predicated according to a relation of one to another: whereas all things predicated of God and creatures are predicated of God with a certain respect to the creatures or vice versa). Names of absolute perfections are predicated of God and creatures analogously. But there are two modes of analogous predication:

The first is when one thing is predicated of two with respect to a third (*aliquid praedicatur de duobus per respectum ad aliquid tertium*): thus being is predicated of quantity and quality with respect to substance. The other is when a thing is predicated of two by reason of a relationship between these two (*aliquid praedicatur de duobus per respectum unius ad alterum*): thus being is predicated of substance and quantity. In the first kind of predication the two things must be preceded by something to which each of them bears some relation: thus substance has a respect to quantity and quality: whereas in the second kind of predication this is not necessary, but one of the two must precede the other.

Wherefore since nothing precedes God, but He precedes the creature, the second kind of analogical predication is applicable to Him but not the first.¹

The passage just quoted is very much the same as Chapter 34 of Book One of the *Summa Contra Gentiles* inasmuch as they are both concerned with the first mode of analogy mentioned by Aquinas. In the *Summa* this analogy is called analogy of many to one; in the *De Potentia* it is called analogy of two to a third. Also the examples are different. In the *Summa* the analogy of many to one is exemplified by the predication of "healthy" with regard to animal, food, medicine and urine. In the *De Potentia* the analogy of two to a third is exemplified by the predication of "being" with respect to quantity, quality and substance. But the reason for excluding the analogy of many to one and the analogy of two to a third is the same, namely that according to these two modes of predication "we should have to posit something prior to God." It is clear that, notwithstanding a minor variation in terminology, Aquinas here refers to the same kind of analogy. It is the analogy that does not safeguard God's uniqueness and absoluteness. In his early works (*In IV L. Sententiarum* and *De Veritate*) he calls this mode of analogy "mensurable proportion" and rejects it because it destroys the infinite distance between God and creatures. In his more mature works Aquinas generally abandons the term "proportion," which could be misleading because

¹ *De Potentia* 7, 7: "huius autem praedicationis duplex est modus. Unus quo aliquid praedicatur de duobus per respectum ad aliquid tertium, sicut ens de qualitate et quantitate per respectum ad substantiam. Alius modus est quo aliquid praedicatur de duobus per respectum unius ad alterum, sicut ens de substantia et quantitate. In primo autem modo praedicationis oportet esse aliquid prius duobus, ad quod ambo respectum habent, sicut substantia ad quantitatem et qualitatem; in secundo autem non, sed necesse est unum esse prius altero. Et ideo cum Deo nihil sit prius, sed ipse sit prior creatura, competit in divina praedicatione secundus modus analogiae et non primus."

of its mathematical connotation and adopts a more flexible terminology. The terminology of "analogy of one to another," "many to one," "two to a third" is less technical but more indicative of the distinctive nature of two essentially different modes of analogy: one mode is able to safeguard God's uniqueness, absoluteness and pre-eminence, the other mode degrades God at the level of other beings and subjects Him to the categories of His creatures.

5. AQUINAS' DIVISION OF ANALOGY IN THE COMMENTARIES TO ARISTOTLE, BOETHIUS AND PSEUDO DIONYSIUS

In his commentaries to Aristotle, Boethius and Pseudo Dionysius Aquinas deals less extensively with the problem of analogy of predication. More frequently he deals with the ontological ground of analogy.¹ The most interesting passages on the nature and division of analogy are found in his Commentaries to Aristotle's *Ethics* and *Metaphysics*.

In his commentary to Aristotle's *Ethics* Aquinas gives the following division of analogy:

In another way, one name is predicated of many according to notions (*rationes*) which are not entirely diverse but agree in some one point (*in aliquo convenientes*). Sometimes they agree in this that they refer to one principle (*ad unum principium*), as when several things are called "military"... Sometimes in this that they refer to one end (*ad unum finem*), as when medicine is called "healthy"... Sometimes according to diverse proportions to one subject (*secundum diversas proportionem ad idem subiectum*), as when quality is called "being" because it is a disposition of being, i.e., of substance, and quantity is called "being" because it is its measure, and the like. Or, finally, according to one proportion to diverse subjects (*secundum proportionem ad diversa subiecta*) e.g., sight with respect to the body is in the same proportion as the intellect with respect to the soul. Thus the Philosopher says that "good" is not predicated of many according to entirely diverse notions... but rather according to analogy (*secundum analogiam*), i.e. according to the same proportion, insofar as all good things depend upon one first principle of goodness or are ordered to one end... Or also all things are called "good" according to analogy, i.e. according to the same proportion as sight is a good of the body and the intellect of the soul. Hence he prefers the third mode because it is taken according to goodness inherent to things, whereas the first two modes are according to separate goodness, by which a thing is denominated good in a less proper way.²

We may now compare the doctrine of analogy contained in this passage with the doctrine of analogy expounded by Aquinas in the theological works which we have examined up to now. In this passage Aquinas puts aside the terminology "analogy according priority and

¹ Some of the best analyses of the ontological ground of analogy are found in Aquinas' *In Librum Beati Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus Expositio*. See especially Cap. I, Lect. 3, no 86 & ff.; Cap. II, Lect. 4, no 185 & ff.; Cap. IX, Lect. 3, no 832 & ff.

² *In X Libros Ethic. Aristoteles Expositio* Lib. I, Lect. 7, no. 95-96.

posteriority," "analogy of many to one," "analogy of two to a third," "analogy of one to another," etc. and reintroduces the term "proportion" and the analogy of proportionality. The justification for this change is to be sought in the different nature of the problem faced in this section of the commentary to *Ethics*. Here Aquinas is not dealing with the problem of the predication of the divine names i.e. with the problem of the predication of names of absolute perfections with regard to God, but with the problem of the predication of names of absolute perfections with regard to creatures. In the problem of the predication of divine names his main concern is to find a mode of predication which can do justice to God's priority over His creatures, to His supereminence and uniqueness. Such a mode of predication is assured by the analogy according to priority and posteriority of one to another, since God is here the primary analogate. In the commentary to *Ethics* the problem is that of the predication of names of absolute perfection, e.g. "good," with regard to creatures. According to Aquinas creatures do not possess these perfections according to a reference of one to another.¹ Although creatures possess absolute perfections in different degrees, they all enjoy them independently and individually. Therefore the only mode of predication which can do justice to the intrinsic possession of absolute perfections by creatures is a mode of predication which ascribes these perfections to them by formal possession rather than by extrinsic denomination. Here Aquinas' task is not that of eliminating modes of analogy which endanger God's absoluteness. His concern is to eliminate modes of analogy which may threaten the ontological consistence of creatures and to find a mode of analogy which is capable to indicate the intrinsic possession of perfections, like being and good, by creatures. Therefore Aquinas here eliminates all the analogies of extrinsic denomination in favor of the analogy of proportionality. No mention is made of the analogy of one to another. But there is no reason to mention it here, since its function is not primarily that of indicating the intrinsic possession of an absolute perfection. The function of analogy of one to another is to underline the priority of the primary analogate and the theologian must resort to it in the problem of the predication of divine names. For the problem of the commentary to *Ethics* Aquinas needs an

¹ Aquinas denies again and again that a creature can give being (i.e. can create) or any other absolute perfection to another creature; see, for example, *Summa Contra Gent.* II, 21; *Summa Theol.* I, 45, 5. For their being creatures depend only on God, who does not fail to communicate to each one of them, intrinsically, the perfections required by their own being. Therefore "good," "being" etc. are predicated of creatures by intrinsic denomination. Cf. *In I Sent.* 19, 5, 2 ad 1.

analogy which indicates the proportional possession of absolute perfections by different creatures. This is better expressed by analogy of proportionality than by analogy of one to another. This accounts for Aquinas' use of the analogy of proportionality and his omission of the analogy of one to another in the passage in question.

In his commentary to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* Aquinas deals with the division of analogy in several different contexts. Once, following Aristotle, he considers analogy as an ontological principle of unity.¹ There are things which are one numerically. Others are one specifically and others generically. Finally there are things which have a very small degree of unity; these are the things which are one only by analogy. Things can be one by analogy in two ways: (1) through diverse proportions to one subject, e.g. urine as a sign of health and medicine as a cause of health are one through their different relations to the health of the animal's organism; (2) through one proportion to diverse subjects, e.g. the serenity of the air and the tranquillity of the sea are one with respect to calmness (*quies*). From the logical point of view this division has nothing new to say. It repeats the last two elements of the division of the commentary to *Ethics*.

We pass, then, at once to other two important divisions of analogy of the commentary to *Metaphysics*.² They occur in Book Four, Lect. 1, and in Book Seven, Lect. 4. In both instances, analogy is presented as a division of predicative analogy. Analogy is distinguished into three main kinds: (1) analogy of many through different relations to one end, e.g. "healthy" is predicated of diet, medicine and urine because of their different relations to the same end, the health of the animal; (2) analogy of many through different relations to one efficient cause, e.g. "medicative" is predicated of medicine and medical instruments through their different relations to the same efficient cause, the physician; (3) analogy of many through different relations to one subject, e.g. "being" is predicated of various kinds of accidents because of their different relations to the same subject, substance. Also this division of analogy says nothing new. The three modes of analogy enumerated here are the first three modes of analogy contained in the division of the commentary to *Ethics*. These three modes are all of the kind which in the *Summa Contra Gentiles* and the *De Potentia* are called "analogy of many to one" and in the commentary to *Ethics* are considered as analogies of extrinsic

¹ In *V Metaph.* Lect. 8, no 879.

² For a fairly complete list of the texts of the *Commentary to the Metaphysics* as well as of the other works, where Aquinas deals with analogy see Klubertanz' *St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy*, Appendix 1.

denomination. The divisions of analogy given by Aquinas in his commentary to *Metaphysics*, therefore, should not be taken as exhaustive any more than other classifications we have found in previous works. In his various divisions of analogy Aquinas enumerates only those kinds which are necessary to solve the problems at hand. One final remark about the examples used by Aquinas to illustrate the modes of analogy mentioned in his commentary to Book Four of *Metaphysics*. The example he gives for the analogy of many through different relations to the same subject is "being" when predicated of various kinds of accidents because of their different relations to substance. This shows the liberty with which Aquinas uses his examples for the various kinds of analogy. The same example, that of the predication of being both of substance and accidents, is used to illustrate analogy according to intention and being, analogy of many to one and analogy of one to another.¹ This is possible because analogy as a form of predication is a logical category and the human mind is free to take many different standpoints in its analysis of the relations between different things.

In Aquinas' commentaries to Boethius' *De Trinitate* and to Pseudo Dionysius' *De Divinis Nominibus* we encounter many significant passages on analogy in several different contexts. Some texts discuss analogy as an instrument of discovery. We are told that matter is not known immediately and per se, but "per analogiam sive per proportionem."² Other passages deal with the distinction between logical and physical genus. Of the first it is said that it can be predicated univocally whereas the second cannot. Things univocal for the logician, and equal in their participation in a common notion, can be unequal for the *naturalis* who looks to the *genus subiectum*, the matter.³ Finally, there are passages where Aquinas deals with analogy as a similarity between God and His creatures. In these texts he points out that such a similarity can be understood only as a similarity between cause and effect, and that in this case it is not a univocal but an analogous similarity since the cause bears not a univocal but an equivocal (i.e. analogous) relationship to its effects.⁴

¹ In the *De Veritate* 2, 11; *C. Gent.* 1, 34 and *De Potentia* 7, 7 the predication of "being" of both substance and accidents is given as an example of the analogy of one to another; in *In I Sent.* 19, 5, 2 ad 1 it is given as an example of the analogy both according to intention and according to being; in *In IV Metaph.* Lect. 1 it is given as an illustration of the analogy of many to one.

² In *De Trinitate* 4, 2. Cfr. *ibid.* 6, 3, where Aquinas suggests that it is by way of analogy that man comes to know God, but he does not elaborate how this takes place.

³ In *De Trinitate* 4, 2; 6, 3. This distinction is the ground for the type of analogy that in the *Commentary to the Sentences* was called "secundum esse, non secundum intentionem."

⁴ In *De Trinitate* I, 2 ad 3; I, 4 ad 4; In *Divinis Nominibus* I, lect. 3; II, lect. 4.

6. AQUINAS' DIVISION OF ANALOGY IN THE 'SUMMA THEOLOGICA'
AND IN THE 'COMPENDIUM THEOLOGIAE'

In the *Summa Theologica*, Aquinas' most mature theological work (c. 1266-1273), he deals with the nature and division of analogy especially in Question Thirteen of Part One. In the previous Question Aquinas has shown that since creatures are related to God as effects to their cause "we can be led from them so far as to know of God *whether He exists*, and to know of Him what must necessarily belong to Him, as the first cause of all things, exceeding all things caused by Him."¹ In the present Question, the first problem St. Thomas has to face is that of showing how it is possible to talk about God and to give Him any name if all our language is taken from creatures, which are neither part of God nor His adequate image. He argues that since we know God from creatures and as their cause, we can name Him from creatures, yet not so that the name which signifies Him expresses the divine essence in itself.² What, then, is the meaning of our words when we apply them to God? The fact that we name God from creatures is no justification for holding the view that by the divine names we signify merely His relationship towards creatures. Thus in the words "God is good" we do not merely mean, God is the cause of goodness in things. A theory of predication of extrinsic denomination is unable to express what we intend to say by the words "God is good." By the name "good" we express God, so far as our intellect knows Him. Now since our intellect knows God from creatures it knows Him as far as creatures represent Him. But since creatures represent Him imperfectly the name "good" signifies God in an imperfect manner.³ Divine names, then, are not predicated of God by extrinsic denomination. They predicate of God perfections which belong to Him formally but they signify these perfections in an imperfect way. Therefore with respect to divine names two aspects ought to be distinguished: (1) the perfection signified and (2) the mode of signification. "As regards what is signified by these names, they belong properly to God, and more properly than they belong to creatures, and are applied primarily to Him. But as regards their mode of signification,

¹ *S. Theol.* I, 12, 12: "Sed quia (creaturae) sunt eius effectus a causa dependentes, ex eis in hoc perducere possumus, ut cognoscamus de Deo, an est: et ut cognoscamus de ipso ea, quae necesse est ei convenire, secundum quod est prima omnium causa, excedens omnia sua causata."

² *S. Theol.* I, 13, 1.

³ *S. Theol.* I, 13, 2.

they do not properly and strictly apply to God; for their mode of signification applies to creatures."¹

Article Four deals with the problem as to whether names applied to God are synonymous. Aquinas shows that they are not. The reasons he gives are condensations of arguments which we have already found in *De Potentia*, 7, 6.²

Article Five discusses the crucial problem of the nature of the predication of the divine names, i.e. the nature of our theological language. Is theological language univocal, equivocal or analogous to our scientific and ordinary language? After having proved that man knows God but knows Him imperfectly it is easy for Aquinas to show that man can talk about God but can talk of Him only in an imperfect way. His arguments against univocity and equivocality are brief repetitions of the arguments of the *Summa Contra Gentiles* and *De Veritate*. His argument for analogy is the following:

It must be said that these names are said of God and creatures in an analogous sense, that is, according to proportion. Now names are thus used in two ways: either according as many things are proportionate to one (*multa habent proportionem ad unum*), thus for example "healthy" is predicated of medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to health of a body, of which the former is the sign and the latter the cause: or according as one thing is proportionate to another (*unum habet proportionem ad alterum*), thus "healthy" is said of medicine and animal, since medicine is the cause of health in the animal body. And in this way some things are said of God and creatures analogically, and not in a purely equivocal sense nor in a purely univocal sense. For we can name God only from creatures (A. 1). Thus whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the relation of a creature to God as its principle and cause, whereas all perfections of things pre-exist excellently. Now this mode of community of idea is a mean between pure equivocation and simple univocation. For in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals, one and the same, yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but a term which is thus used in multiple sense signifies various proportions to some one thing: thus "healthy" applied to urine signifies the sign of animal health, and applied to medicine signifies the cause of the same health.³

As in the *Summa Contra Gentiles* and *De Potentia*, Aquinas here divides analogy into analogy of many to one and analogy of one to another. Divine names are predicated of God according to analogy of one to another. The only striking difference between Aquinas' teaching on analogy in the *Summa Theologica* and in his previous theological works is the use of the same example, that of the predication of "healthy", both

¹ *S. Theol.* I, 13, 3: "Quantum igitur ad id, quod significant huiusmodi nomina, proprie competunt Deo, et magis proprie, quam ipsis creaturis, et per prius dicuntur de Deo. Quantum vero ad modum significandi, non proprie dicuntur de Deo: habent enim modum significandi, qui creaturis competit."

² See *Supra*, p. 23

³ *S. Theol.* I, 13, 5.

for analogy of many to one and analogy of one to another. But this should be no surprise to us. We have seen with what liberty he uses the example of the predication of "being" by taking each time different logical points of view. Here, where Aquinas uses "healthy" for two different kinds of analogy, he considers the predication of "healthy" from two different logical standpoints. In the analogy of many through different relations to one, e.g. medicine and urine in relation to healthy body, "healthy" exemplifies the analogy which exists between medicine and urine because of their relations to the same end, the healthy body. The logical standpoint here is not that of the analogy between healthy medicine and healthy body or between healthy urine and healthy body, but that of the analogy which exists between the secondary analogates themselves because of their relations to the same primary analogate. In the analogy of one to another, e.g. medicine and animal body, the logical standpoint is another. "Healthy" is treated as an analogous predicate because of the analogy that exists between the primary and the secondary analogate through the causal relation that they have to one another. To understand the meaning of these examples one must first determine which particular aspect of analogy St. Thomas intends to clarify by them. In this case the reader would entirely miss the point if he were to understand the analogous predication of "healthy" in the *Summa Theologica* in the same way as in the *Commentarium in IV Libros Sententiarum*, where it is given as an example of analogy by extrinsic denomination. In the *Summa Theologica* I, 13, 5 extrinsic denomination is not in question. On the contrary, even before dealing with the problem of the analogous predication of the divine names, Aquinas shows that they are predicated of God formally and not by extrinsic denomination. He is concerned in this article of the *Summa Theologica* to find a mode of analogy which safeguards God's absoluteness and uniqueness, i.e. His transcendence, even when language taken from creatures is applied to Him. Aquinas believes that the analogy of one to another is suitable for this task, since by ascribing to God the position of primary analogate it guarantees His priority and pre-eminence over His creatures. Yet the reader may still question the wisdom of using the example of "healthy" instead of "being" for this kind of analogy. For isn't "healthy" always predicated extrinsically of the secondary analogates (diet, color medicine etc.) and intrinsically only of the primary analogate (the healthy body)? Aquinas, however, believes that the ground for the analogy between healthy medicine and healthy body lies in the causal relation between medicine and organic body: medicine is the cause of health in the or-

ganic body. There is no doubt that Aquinas would classify medicine among equivocal causes. But even effects of equivocal causes preserve some analogy with their causes, since effects are always precontained in some way in their causes.¹ Therefore analogous terms, which are predicated of things united by a relation of efficient causality, are attributed to them not by extrinsic but by intrinsic denomination. God is an equivocal cause, but even in His case the principle of similarity between cause and effect holds,² and names of absolute perfections are predicated of both God and His creatures intrinsically, though analogously. The example of "healthy" for analogy of one to another, therefore, should not be misleading. Certainly, if Aquinas in his last and best *Summa* replaces the example of "being" which he consistently used in all his previous theological works, with the example of "healthy," he must have some good reason. And the reason is that the analogous predication of "healthy" (with regard to medicine and animal body) exemplifies better than the predication of "being" (with regard to substance and accident) the analogous predication of the divine names. The analogous predication of the divine names is in fact based on the relation of efficient causality between God and His creatures. Also the analogous predication of "healthy" is based on the relation of efficient causality between medicine and animal body; whereas the analogous predication of "being" is based not on a relation of efficient causality between accident and substance but on a relation of inherence of accident in substance as its subject. However, since *omnia exempla claudicant*, also the example of the analogous predication of "healthy" has a flaw itself. While in the predication of names of absolute perfections the cause (God) is the primary analogate, in the predication of "healthy" the cause (medicine) is the secondary analogate. Notwithstanding this flaw St. Thomas prefers the example of the predication of "healthy" to that of the predication of "being."

There are other passages of the *Summa Theologica* where Aquinas deals less directly with the nature and division of analogy. It is necessary only to touch upon them very briefly. In Part One, Q. 12, A. 1 ad 4 he dismisses the objection that there is no analogy between the finite and the infinite by distinguishing between two senses of analogy: mathematical and non-mathematical. In the next Question, Article Six he distinguishes between names of which God can be the primary analogate

¹ Cf. *In Libros Sent.* I, 35, 4 ad 1; II, 1, 2, 2; IV, 4, 3; *C. Gent.* I, 29; *De Potentia* 7, 1 ad 8; *De Malo* 4, 3; *S. Theol.* I, 4, 3; I, 13, 5.

² *Ibid.*

and names of which He cannot. He can be the primary analogate only of names of absolute perfections, but He cannot be the primary analogate of names of mixed perfections. In the same article Aquinas insists that "in names predicated of many in an analogical sense, all are predicated because they have reference to some one thing; and this one thing must be placed in the definition of them all."¹ Here, as in many other passages,² Aquinas uses analogy in its original meaning of proportion (both mensurable and non-mensurable) and not in the sense of proportionality. In Part One, Question Sixteen, Article Six, where the problem is whether there is only one truth, Aquinas says that since "truth" is the name of an absolute perfection, it is predicated according to analogy. In this analogy God is the primary analogate, created intellects and things are the secondary analogates. With regard to the primary analogate there is one truth, but with regard to the secondary analogates there are many truths. In the First Part of the Second Part, Q. 88, A. 1, ad 1, to the objection that the division of sin into venial and mortal is wrong and that all sins should be considered mortal, Aquinas answers that the division of sin into venial and mortal is not a division of a genus into its species which have an equal share of the generic nature. Rather is the division of an analogous term in its parts of which it is predicated according to priority and posteriority. Consequently the perfect notion of sin applies to mortal sin. Venial sin is called a sin in relation to mortal sin.

In the *Compendium Theologiae*, Aquinas' last theological work, written shortly before his death (1272-1273), he summarizes his teaching on analogy in the following words:

(Names applied to God and to other beings) are predicated according to analogy, that is, according to their proportion to one thing. For, from the fact that we compare other things with God as their first origin, we attribute to God such names as signify perfections in other things. This clearly brings out the truth that, as regards the assigning of the names, such names are primarily predicated of creatures, inasmuch as the intellect that assigns the names ascends from creatures to God. But as regards the things signified by the name, they are primarily predicated of God, from whom the perfections descend to other things.³

In this short statement of analogy written not for a trained theologian but for a layman, Aquinas eliminates all distinctions and leaves out all

¹ *S. Theol.* I, 13, 6: "In omnibus nominibus, quae de pluribus analogice dicuntur, necesse est quod omnia dicantur per respectum ad unum. Et ideo illud unum oportet quod ponatur in definitione omnium."

² Cf. *S. Theol.* I, 13, 5; I, 16, 6; I/2, 61, 1ad 1; *C. Gent.* I, 34; *De Potentia* 7, 7; *In IV Metaphy.* Lect. 1; *In VII Metaphy.* Lect. 4.

³ *Compendium Theologiae* 27.

examples. But the essence of analogy is still the same as we have found it carefully elaborated in his previous theological works. Names applied to God and to other beings are predicated according to analogy of one to another. The ground of this analogy is the causal relations that things have to God. With respect to the perfection signified God is the first analogate; with respect to the mode of signification God is the secondary analogate. No reference to analogy of proportionality is found in this statement.

7. MAIN TEXTUAL CONCLUSIONS

Before analysing the manner in which Aquinas' commentators have understood his doctrine of the nature and division of analogy we can summarize briefly the main traits of Aquinas' teaching on analogy. The texts that we have analyzed demonstrate the following characteristics of analogy:

(1) The ontological ground of the analogy between God and other beings is the relation of efficient causality of these beings to God.

(2) Names applied to God and to other beings are predicated according to analogy of one to another if they are names of absolute perfections. In defining analogy of one to another Aquinas' constant aim is to preserve God's absoluteness, pre-eminence and transcendence. He condemns univocity, the analogy of two to a third, and the analogy of many to one because, by subjecting God to a genus, they put Him on the same level as other finite things. They place Him under other categories and, therefore, annihilate His uniqueness. It is a deep respect for God's absoluteness and uniqueness that leads Aquinas to the doctrine of analogous predication of one to another. This respect for God's pre-eminence also explains his rejection of the analogy of mathematical (i.e. measurable) proportion. But God's absoluteness and uniqueness are not to be saved at the expense of other beings: their safeguard cannot be a mode of predication which empties the name of its meaning when it is predicated of finite beings. This is the danger of extrinsic attribution, which in some respect is as pernicious as equivocity: it leads to agnosticism either with regard to creatures or with regard to God. Only the analogy of one to another does justice to the facts. According to this mode of analogy the same absolute perfection is predicated both of God and His creatures, but it is predicated according to priority and posteriority: the same perfection belongs to both of them but not in the same way. Analogy of one to another is fit for theological discourse since, on

one hand, it safeguards God's absoluteness and uniqueness and, on the other hand, does not destroy the ontological consistence of finite beings.

(3) Names of mixed perfections are predicated of God according to metaphorical analogy.

(4) Names of absolute perfections applied to beings of different species without any relation to God are predicated according to the analogy of proper proportionality.

This, in its main lines, is Aquinas' teaching on analogy. But, as we have seen, he has expressed these few basic ideas in a great variety of ways. He has given many different divisions of analogy, and to the same division he has frequently given different names. Several times he has used the same example to illustrate different modes of analogy. Aquinas' commentators have found all this very confusing and have tried to introduce some order into his teaching by adopting a fixed terminology and by reducing all his divisions of analogy to only one. The most successful of these attempts is the one made by Cajetan and it is to this that we now turn.

8. CAJETAN'S VERSION OF AQUINAS' DOCTRINE OF ANALOGY

Thomas de Vio, better known as Cardinal Cajetan, was born at Gaeta, Italy, on February 20, 1468. At the age of 16 he entered the Order of Preachers, which sent him to study at Naples and Bologna. At the age of 23 he began his teaching career as a lector at Pavia. Two years later he became a Bachelor at the University of Padua and was appointed the task of interpreting the Books of Sentences. In 1494 he received the Chair of Thomistic Metaphysics at the same university. Three years later Cajetan was called by the Duke of Milan to teach theology at the university of Pavia. Upon the death of the Procurator General of the Order in 1500 Cajetan was called to occupy the vacant position. In 1509 the Pope appointed him Vicar General, and in 1510 the Chapter General of the Order elected him, at the age of forty, Master General. In this new capacity he dedicated all his strength to restoring discipline and zeal of learning among his confreres. In 1517 Pope Leo X made him a Cardinal and a Counselor of the Pope, which did not prevent Cajetan from continuing to govern his Order. Thereafter he was forced to abandon his life of cloistered scholar and had to dedicate most of his time to the service of the Order and of the Pope. As Master General he directed the activities of the Friars Preachers against the errors of his time, promoted ecclesiastical discipline and unity and sent

missionaries to the New World; as a Counselor of four Popes, Jilius II, Leo X, Adrian VI and Clement VII, and as a Papal Legate, he dealt with such matters as the Pseudo-Council of Pisa and Luther himself. Notwithstanding all this activity he found time to write no less than 157 works of philosophy, theology and exegesis. In 1534, the aging Cardinal fell sick, and on October 10 of the same year he died. At his express command he was buried in simplicity at the entrance of the Church of Santa Maria Sopra Minerva in the heart of Rome.

The most important of Cajetan's works is his profound *Commentaria* on the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas. Other famous works are the *Summula Peccatorum*, the Commentaries on Aristotle and the *De Nominum Analogia*. The latter is a little book written in 1498. Although Cajetan wrote this treatise at the youthful age of thirty, it shows no traces of the immaturity which usually reveals itself in the earlier works even of great philosophers. Without any sign of hesitation or uncertainty, he systematically explains the whole Thomistic theory of analogy in such way that neither he nor any subsequent philosophers for many years found reason to add anything to the fundamental principles and outlines laid down by him.

The reason which prompted Cajetan to write *The Analogy of Names* is given by him in the opening passage of the treatise itself: "Motivated both by the obscurity of the subject itself and the deplorable scarcity of profound studies in our age, I intend to publish during this vacation a treatise on the analogy of names. An understanding of this doctrine is so necessary that without it no one can study metaphysics, and ignorance of it gives rise to many errors in other sciences."¹

The form of exposition is simple. The content is presented in tight logical sequence. After a brief consideration of analogy in general, Cajetan devotes three chapters to the study of the division of analogy. He shows that there are three fundamental modes of analogy: inequality, attribution and proportionality. These, according to Cajetan, correspond to the modes of analogy described by Aquinas in *The Sentences* as: according to being but not according to intention (inequality), according to intention but not according to being (attribution), according to both intention and being (proportionality). All other divisions of analogy which are found in Aquinas' works may be reduced to this trichotomous one. In Chapters Four to Ten Cajetan carefully analyzes

¹ Cajetan, *The Analogy of Names*, transl. Bushinski & Koren (Pittsburgh, 1953), p. 9. The Latin quotations from the *De Nominum Analogia* are according to the Venetian edition of the *Opuscula Omnia Thomae de Vio Cajetani*, in *Divi Thomae Opera Omnia* (Venice, 1593).

the nature of analogy, especially that of analogy of proportionality. Chapter Eleven is of more practical nature. In it, he indicates the safeguards to be taken in order to avoid errors in the use of analogous terms. For the present purposes of our study only the first three chapters are relevant and only these chapters are given a detailed analysis.

In Chapter One, after stating that all forms of analogy may be included under one threefold division, Cajetan shows that "all analogous terms can be reduced to three modes of analogy, analogy of inequality, analogy of attribution, analogy of proportionality."¹ The rest of this chapter contains a brief description of the nature of analogy of inequality. "Things are said to be analogous by analogy of inequality if they have a common name, and the notion indicated by this name is exactly the same but unequally participated in."² An example of this analogy is the predication of the term "body." "Body" is a term common to all bodies. But there are inferior and superior bodies, which shows that the perfection designated by the name "body" is not realized according to an equal grade but according to an analogous grade. The notion of body, however, remains the same for all bodies. For this reason "the logician refers to analogous terms of this type as univocal. The philosopher, on the other hand, regards them as equivocal, the difference coming from the fact that the former considers the intentions expressed by the names, and the latter their natures." Cajetan concludes this chapter with the statement that analogy of inequality is the same kind of analogy that in *The Sentences* St. Thomas calls "analogy according to being but not according to intention."

Chapter Two is by far the longest of the three chapters under consideration. It begins with this definition of analogy of attribution. "Analogous by attribution are those things which have a common name, and the notion signified by this name is the same with respect to the term but different as regards the relationships to this term."³ Cajetan's example for this analogy is the predication of the term "healthy." The name "healthy" is common to medicine, urine and animal, but the notion of all in so far as healthy expresses different relationships to one term,

¹ Cajetan, *De Nominum Analogia*, 1, 3: "Ad tres ergo modos analogiae analogia omnia reducuntur, scilicet ad analogiam inaequalitatis, et analogiam attributionis, et analogiam proportionalitatis."

² *De Nominum Analogia* 1, 4: "Analogia secundum inaequalitatem vocantur, quorum nomen est commune, et ratio secundum illud nomen est omnino eadem, inaequaliter tamen participata."

³ *De Nominum Analogia* 2, 1: "Analogia autem secundum attributionem sunt quorum nomen est commune, ratio secundum illud nomen est eadem secundum terminum et diversa secundum habitudines ad illum."

namely, health. For if any one describes what an animal is insofar as it is healthy, he will say that it is the subject of health, and that urine insofar as it is healthy is a sign of health, whereas medicine insofar as it is healthy will be mentioned as a cause of health. In this example it is perfectly clear that the notion of health is not entirely the same nor entirely different, but to a certain extent the same and to a certain extent different. For there is a diversity of relationships, but the term of those relationships is one and the same. Analogy of attribution may take place in four different ways according to the four genera of causes. The primary analogate, with which the secondary analogates are in a relation of attribution, may be either the end or the efficient cause of the exemplar or the material subject of the secondary analogates. The essential characteristic of this mode of analogy is that "only the primary analogate realizes the perfection formally, whereas the others have it only by extrinsic denomination."¹ Then Cajetan shows that not only are names like "healthy" and "medical" predicated in this way but also "good" and "being" may be used according to this mode of predication. For, although *materially*, i.e., in reality, good is an intrinsic property of all things, *formally*, i.e., from a logical point of view, the notion of good may be considered to be verified intrinsically only in the essential good; the others are called good by extrinsic denomination, because of their relation of causal dependence on the essential good. Cajetan says:

The same applies to good. Although all beings are good by goodness formally inherent in them, nevertheless when they are called good with respect to the first goodness considered as their efficient, final, or exemplary cause, all other things are said to be good by a purely extrinsic denomination – namely, by that goodness by which God Himself is formally good.²

Cajetan insists on this point and wants his explanation to be understood in the sense that "every name which is analogous by attribution as such, i.e., insofar as it is analogous in this manner, is common to the analogates in this way that it pertains to the primary analogate formally and to the others by extrinsic denomination."³ Cajetan then proceeds

¹ *De Nominum Analogia* 2, 3: "Analogia ista fit secundum denominationem extrinsecam tantum, ita quod primum analogatorum tantum est tale formaliter, coetera autem talia denominantur extrinsece."

² *De Nominum Analogia* 2, 5: "Simile enim de bono. Licet omnia entia bona sint bonitatibus sibi formaliter inhaerentibus, in quantum tamen bona dicuntur bonitate prima effective, aut finaliter aut exemplariter, omnia alia non nisi extrinseca denominatione bona dicuntur illa bonitate, qua Deus ipse bonus formaliter in se est."

³ *Ib.*: "Omne nomen analogum per attributionem ut sic vel in quantum sic, analogum commune est analogatis sic, quod primo convenit formaliter, reliquis autem extrinseca denominatione."

to enumerate other characteristics of analogy of attribution. In this analogy the primary analogate is one in reality as well as in the mind. The primary analogate is put into the definition of the secondary analogates. The only thing in common among the secondary analogates is the external word, which implies an identical term (*terminus*) diversely referred to. The analogous name signifies the primary analogate distinctly and the secondary analogates only in a confused manner. There is nothing prior to the primary analogate in which the whole perfection expressed by the analogous term is formally realized. In the concluding section of this chapter Cajetan shows that his analogy of attribution is the same as Aquinas' analogy according to intention but not according to being. He maintains that the analogy of two to a third (*duarum ad tertium*), the analogy of many to one (*plurium ad unum*), the analogy of one to another (*unius ad alterum*) and the analogy of proportion (*analogia proportionis*) can all be reduced to analogy of attribution.

Chapter Three deals briefly with analogy of proportionality. Cajetan first gives its definition. "We say that analogous by proportionality are called those things which have a common name and the notion expressed by this name is proportionately the same. Or to say the same in a different way, analogous by proportionality are called those things which have a common name, and the notion expressed by this name is similar according to a proportion."¹ An example of this analogy is the predication of the verb "to see" of the eye and of the intellect. To see by corporeal vision (the eye) and by intellectual vision (the intellect) are indicated by the common term "to see," because just as to understand presents something to the mind, so to see presents something to the animated body. But there are two kinds of proportionality, namely, metaphorical and proper.

It is metaphorical when the common term has absolutely one formal meaning which is realized in one of the analogates and predicated of the other by metaphor. For example "to smile" has one meaning in itself, but is metaphorically analogous with respect to a true smile and a blooming meadow or good fortune; for thus we indicate that these things are just like a man smiling... Analogy of proportionality occurs in the proper sense when the common name is predicated of both analogates without the use of metaphors. For instance "principle" can be predicated of the heart with respect to an animal and of a foundation with respect to a house. As Averroes

¹ *De Nominum Analogia* 3, 1: "Dicimus analogia secundum proportionalitatem dici quorum nomen est commune et ratio secundum illud nomen proportionaliter eadem. Vel sic analogia secundum proportionalitatem dicuntur, quorum nomen commune est, et ratio secundum illud nomen est similis secundum proportionem; ut videre corporali visione et videre intellectualiter, communi nomine vocantur videre; quia sic intelligere rem animae offert ut videre corpori animato."

says in his seventh commentary on *I Ethics* Ch. vi, it is predicated of them proportionately.¹

Cajetan concludes Chapter Three with an enthusiastic eulogy on the excellence of the analogy of proper proportionality, which alone deserves the name of analogy in the proper sense. Inequality and attribution are incorrectly called analogous, since from a logical point of view they are univocal predications. Finally only the analogy of proper proportionality has metaphysical value. For "by means of analogy of (proper) proportionality we know indeed the intrinsic entity, goodness, truth, etc. of things, which are not known from the other analogies."²

9. CRITICISM OF CAJETAN'S INTERPRETATION OF AQUINAS' DOCTRINE OF ANALOGY

The influence of Cajetan's little book *De Nominum Analogia* was extraordinary. His classification of analogy was accepted as definitive by many philosophers, who thought with John of St. Thomas that "the difficulties concerning analogy, which are more metaphysical, have been argued so thoroughly and subtly by Cajetan in the opusculum *On the Analogy of Names* that no room is left to find out anything further."³ Cajetan's analysis and systematization was accepted by most of Aquinas' disciples. In an era which rejected analogy of proportionality from metaphysics as something "blasphemous,"⁴ those who accepted Cajetan's view held that analogy of proportionality was the only true metaphysical analogy.⁵ In this choir of praises for Cajetan, there was, however, from the very beginning a powerful dissenting voice, the voice of Suarez. In his *Disputationes Metaphysicae*⁶ Suarez attempts to prove that Cajetan misinterprets Aquinas' doctrine of analogy on two main points:

¹ *De Nominum Analogia* 3, 3: "Analogia fit metaphorice quidem, quando nomen illud commune absolute unam habet rationem formalem, quae in uno analogatorum salvatur, et per metaphoram de alio dicitur: ut ridere unam secundum se rationem habet, analogum tamen metaphorice est vero risui et prato virenti aut fortunae successui; sic enim significamus haec se habere, quemadmodum homo ridens... Proprie vero fit quando nomen illud commune in utroque analogatorum absque metaphoris dicitur, ut principium in corde respectu animalis, et in fundamento respectu domus salvatur. Quod, ut Averroes in Com. 7 primi Ethic. ait, proportionaliter de eis dicitur."

² *De Nominum Analogia* 3, 4: "Scimus siquidem secundum hanc analogiam rerum intrinsecas entitates, bonitates, veritates, etc. quod ex priori analogia non scitur."

³ John of St. Thomas: *Cursus Philosophiae Thomisticae*, (Marietti Ed.) I, p. 481.

⁴ Cajetan, *De Nominum Analogia*, 3.

⁵ Cf. J. F. Anderson, "Some Basic Propositions concerning Metaphysical Analogy," *Review of Metaphysics* (1951-1952), pp. 465 ff.; J. Le Rohellec, *Problèmes Philosophiques* (Paris, 1932), 97 ff.

⁶ Suarez, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, disp. XXVIII, in *Opera Omnia* (Ed. Vives: Paris, 1877), Vol. XXVI, pp. 13-21.

(1) On analogy of proportionality. – According to Suarez Aquinas does not teach any analogy of proper proportionality, in which the analogous name is predicated properly and intrinsically of all the analogates. Every true analogy of proportionality includes an element of metaphor and of impropriety, just as “smiling” is said of a meadow through metaphorical reference. It is for this reason that Aquinas refuses to recognize any analogy of proportionality between God and creatures. For, “being” and all the other names of absolute perfections are predicated properly and intrinsically of both of them. Therefore Cajetan is wrong in giving such prominence to the analogy of proportionality. (2) On analogy of intrinsic attribution. – According to Suarez, besides an analogy of extrinsic attribution, Aquinas teaches also an analogy of intrinsic attribution, i.e. an analogy where the denominating form exists intrinsically in both (or all) the terms, in one absolutely and in the other or others relatively, through intrinsic relation to the former. This kind of analogy is frequently illustrated by Aquinas through the predication of “being” of substance and accident. Whereas substance is being in the primary and absolute sense, accident is not designated “being” by extrinsic denomination from the being of substance but from its own proper and intrinsic being. The analogy between God and creatures is of the intrinsic attribution type. Therefore Cajetan is wrong in leaving out intrinsic attribution from his classification of analogy.

For centuries Suarez' view was an isolated one. But in recent years many Thomists have joined him in his criticism of Cajetan's version of analogy. The reaction was led by Blanche's essay “*Note sur le sens de quelques locutions concernant l'analogie dans le langage de St. Thomas d'Aquin*,”¹ in which the author tries to show that Aquinas distinguishes only between two modes of analogy: (a) analogy of many to one and (b) analogy of many to many. Their common trait is that the predication takes place according to priority and posteriority in both of them. Some years later came Gilson's epoch-making paper “*Cajétan et l'Existence*,”² in which he attacked Cajetan's Aristotelian and essentialist interpretation of Aquinas, as well as the “minor problem”³ of Cajetan's version of analogy.

This interpretation of the philosophy of St. Thomas has been “the

¹ In *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques*, (1921), pp. 52 ff.

² In *Tijdschrift voor Phil.* (1953), pp. 267–286.

³ Cf. *Le Thomisme* (5 ed.), p. 153: “Les textes de saint Thomas sur la notion d'analogie sont relativement peu nombreux, et chacun d'eux est si sobre, qu'on ne peut s'empêcher de se demander pour quelle cause cette notion a pris tant d'importance aux yeux de ses commentateurs.”

main obstacle to the diffusion of Thomism."¹ By explaining Aquinas in the light of, and according to, Aristotle, Cajetan misses the great novelty of his philosophy, the discovery of being (*esse*). To Cajetan the supreme perfection continues to be essence, not existence. He is an essentialist not an existentialist. Encouraged by Gilson's authority more and more Thomists have denounced Cajetan's version of analogy and have propounded some new interpretation of Aquinas' teaching.²

It is one of the ambitions of the present study to attempt to give some contribution to the solution of this difficult problem. From the outset, however, we want to make it clear that we do not have the least doubt that Cajetan intended to give a systematic and faithful presentation of Aquinas' doctrine of analogy. It is true that he bases his interpretation on the solitary passage of *In I Sententiarum*, Dist. 19, Q. 5, A. 2 ad 1. But throughout his *De Nominum Analogia* he gives quotations of Aquinas' various works in order to prove his agreement with Aquinas. It is not Cajetan's intentions but his results that are unsatisfactory. His classification of analogy can not exhaust all the modes of analogy mentioned by Aquinas. And, what is more, he did not understand the function of analogy in Aquinas' theological works.

In *De Nominum Analogia* Cajetan divides analogy into three main modes: analogy of inequality, analogy of attribution and analogy of proportionality. He identifies these three modes with the modes of analogy mentioned by Aquinas in *In I Sententiarum*, Dist. 19, Q. 5, A. 2 ad 1, i.e. analogy according to being and not according to intention, analogy according to intention and not according to being, analogy according to intention and according to being. For the present there is no need to question the validity and utility of a threefold division of analogy. But there are two questions which must be raised here: (1) are the three analogies of inequality, attribution and proportionality found in Aquinas' texts that we have examined? (2) can these three analogies be identified with the three analogies mentioned by Aquinas in *In I Sententiarum*? To the first question we may answer without further hesitation that there is no doubt concerning the presence in Aquinas' works of the three analogies of inequality, attribution and proportionality.³ As to

¹ "Cajétan et l'existence", *Tijdschrift voor Phil.* (1953), p. 284.

² Cf. for example, A. Maurer, "The Analogy of Genus," *The New Scholasticism* (1955), pp. 127-144; R. McInerny, "The Logic of Analogy," *The New Scholasticism* (1957), pp. 149-171; S. M. Ramirez, "En torno a un famoso texto de S. Tomas sobre la analogia," *Sapientia* (1953), pp. 166-192; Hayen, *L'Intentionnel dans la Philosophie de St. Thomas*, pp. 178 ff.

³ Besides in *In I Sent.* 19, 5, 2 ad 1 St. Thomas makes allusion to analogy of inequality in *In II Sent.* 12, 1, 1 ad 1; *In X Metaph.* Lect. 1, no 2142; *S. Theol.* I, 66, 2 ad 2; I, 88, 2 ad 4. For analogy of attribution see besides *In I Sent.* 19, 5, 2 ad 1, *De Verit.* 2, 11; 21, 4 ad 2; *C. Gent.*

the second question, before being in a position to answer it, we must reconsider the nature and function of the three analogies of *In I Sententiarum*. To keep Cajetan's order we may begin with the analogy according to being and not according to intention (*secundum esse et non secundum intentionem*). This analogy occurs when several things are considered equal in the intention of something they have in common, but this common element does not have a being (*esse*) of the same kind in them. For example, all bodies are considered equal in the intention of corporeity, but the being (*esse*) of the material bodies is different from the being (*esse*) of the celestial (or immaterial) bodies. Another example given frequently by Aquinas is that of the "form in the agent and the form in the effect."¹ Also in this case the notion (*ratio* or *intentio*) of what is in the mind of the artist is the same as the notion of the thing realized. But the form existing in the mind of the artist has a different mode of being (*esse*) from the form existing in matter. Thus, although the notion of the material house is the same as the notion of the house in the mind of the builder, the two houses have a different being (*esse*). The predication of "body" and "house," then, is univocal from the logical point of view, but analogous from the ontological point of view. It is univocal from the logical standpoint because logic studies things as they are conceived by the mind and the mind can conceive them in the same way, even when they are actually different. It is in this way that the mind conceives a generic notion, e.g. body, to be the same in all its species, although it is realized differently in each one of them. The predication is analogous from the physical standpoint, because physics considers things as they are in themselves, as they actually are according to their mode of being and not as they are conceived. The *physicus* tries to do away with all abstractions and to consider things as they really are. He cannot bring under the same genus things which have different modes of being, for example, the house in the mind of the artist and the house on the side of the street, or the picture of a man and the real man. The essential trait of analogy according to being and not according to intention is, then, that a difference in being (*esse*) gives rise to a physical analogy even where the notions are logically the same. Difference in being (*esse*) is what counts in this analogy.

Now we may ask whether Cajetan is correct in identifying his analogy of inequality with Aquinas' analogy according to being and not ac-

I, 34; *S. Tehol.* I, 13, 5; I, 16, 6; *In V Metaph.* lect. 8, *In I Eth.* lect. 7. For analogy of proportionality see *De Verit.* 2, 11 and 23, 7 ad 9; *In Divinis Nominibus* no 14; *In I Eth.* lect. 7.

¹ Cf. *De Potentia* 7, 7; *C. Gent.* I, 34.

according to intention. The essential trait of the analogy of inequality is that "the notion is exactly the same but unequally participated in,"¹ i.e. it is realized according to different degrees, e.g., "corporeity is more noble in a plant than in a mineral." Another trait of the analogy of inequality is that the notion unequally participated in is predicated according to priority and posteriority. If Cajetan's description of analogy of inequality is compared with Aquinas' description of analogy according to being and not according to intention we notice on one hand that Cajetan omits reference to the notion of being (*esse*), which occurs in the analogy according to being and not according to intention; on the other hand we find no mention in Aquinas of the two main traits of analogy of inequality, i.e. different degrees of participation in the same perfection and predication according to priority and posteriority. This immediately suggests a negative answer to our question, as to whether Cajetan's identification of his analogy of inequality with Aquinas' analogy according to being and not according to intention is correct. However, this conclusion is not unavoidable. One may still maintain that Cajetan's disregard for the notion of being (*esse*) is due to his essentialism. But it is only a matter of terminology, not of doctrine. Moreover, difference of being (*esse*), which is the main trait of Aquinas' analogy according to being and not according to intention, implies both degrees of being and predication according to priority and posteriority. Therefore Cajetan's identification of analogy of inequality with analogy according to being and not according to intention does not need to be rejected. We still doubt, however, the opportunity of raising this analogy into a distinct mode of analogy. Aquinas seems to have noticed the superfluity of this mode of analogy and in his later works he never mentions it again as a separate class. He includes inequality under one of the modes of analogy by reference as it can be seen from his use of the examples of analogy according to being and not according to intention as illustrations of modes of analogy by reference.² Cajetan is not unaware of the superfluity of this distinct classification of analogy of inequality, since he considers it as "entirely foreign to analogy,"³ yet he enumerates it as one of the three main classes of analogous terms and devotes the first chapter of *De Nominum Analogia* to it.

We may now pass to consider the problem of the identity of Cajetan's analogy of attribution with Aquinas' analogy according to intention

¹ Cajetan, *De Nominum Analogia*, 1.

² Cf. *De Potentia* 7, 7; *C. Gent.* I, 34.

³ Cajetan, *De Nominum Analogia*, 1.

and not according to being. Here again Cajetan's terminology is foreign to Aquinas. Aquinas never uses the term "attribution" as a name of a special class of analogy but he does use the verb "*attribuere*." But from his use of "*attribuere*" we cannot draw any definite conclusion about his view on analogy of attribution. For, there are cases in which he uses "*attribuere*" with reference to the attribution of intrinsic properties.¹ More illuminating is a study of Aquinas' use of "*denominatio*," a term used by Cajetan in his description of analogy of attribution, when he says that analogy of attribution "is according to extrinsic denomination only."² Aquinas several times distinguishes between intrinsic and extrinsic denomination and gives for extrinsic denomination the same example (that of the predication of "healthy") which in *In I Sententiarum* he uses as an illustration of the analogy according to intention and not according to being.³ Moreover there is substantial agreement between Cajetan's description of analogy of attribution and Aquinas' description of analogy according to intention and not according to being. Both see the essential trait of this analogy in the fact that the perfection signified by the predicate is intrinsic only to the primary analogate and is ascribed to the secondary analogates only because of some relation to the primary.⁴ There is, then, no doubt that Aquinas sometimes teaches an analogy of extrinsic denomination, i.e. of extrinsic attribution, and that the analogy according to intention and not according to being in *In I Sententiarum* is analogy of this kind. We may therefore conclude that Cajetan's identification of his analogy of attribution with the analogy according to intention and not according to being is correct.

Cajetan identifies his analogy of proper proportionality with the analogy according to intention and according to being, the last of the analogies enumerated by Aquinas in *In I Sententiarum*. Is this identifi-

¹ Cf. for example *Comp. Theol.* 27, where it is pointed out that names designating both creation and God are attributed (*attribuuntur*) to God in accordance to the order in which He is related to the things. In other words: By regarding the things in relation to God as their origin, we attribute to God the names of all perfections found in things. Here the word "*attribuere*" refers to the attribution of intrinsic properties, for – here as always – Aquinas rejects the thought that the perfections by which God is designated are extrinsic to Him. Another passage in which "*attribuere*" refers to intrinsic attribution is *De Potentia* 3, 5, where Aquinas emphasizes that anything common to several must have the same common cause. As being (*esse*) is common to all created things, it must accordingly have been attributed (*attribuitur*) to them by a cause. Cf. Klubertanz, *op. cit.*, p. 43, note 10.

² Cajetan, *De Nominum Analogia*, 2.

³ *De Ver.* 1, 4 & 5; 21, 4 ad 2; *S. Theol.* I, 6, 4; 1/2, 7, 2 ad 1.

⁴ Cf. Aquinas, *In I Sent.* 19, 5, 2 ad 1: "(analogy according to intention and not according to being occurs) when one intention refers to several things according to priority and posteriority, but has being in only one." Cajetan sees the basic characteristic of analogy of attribution in the fact that "the primary analogate realizes the perfection formally, whereas the others have it only by extrinsic denomination." (*De Nominum Analogia*, 2)

cation correct? Here again we must first establish the basic traits of Cajetan's analogy of proper proportionality and Aquinas' analogy according to intention and according to being. Cajetan defines his analogy as one in which several things "have a common name, and the notion expressed by this name is proportionally the same." He gives the example of "vision," when predicated of the eye and of the intellect.¹ Aquinas defines his analogy as one in which a common element exists "in each one of those things of which it is predicated, but this element differs according to a higher or lesser degree of perfection." His example is that of "being," when predicated of substance and accident.² The only common element in the two definitions is that in both the predication is made according to intrinsic denomination in all analogates. Is this enough to authorize the conclusion that by analogy of proportionality and analogy according to intention and according to being Cajetan and Aquinas mean the same kind of analogy? The conclusion is legitimate only on the assumption that intrinsic denomination for all analogates is found only in analogy of proportionality and in no other mode of analogy. But this is just what our lengthy analysis of the various texts in which Aquinas gives different divisions of analogy seems to have disproved. We have seen that in theology Aquinas makes extensive use of another kind of analogy, the analogy of one to another, whose essential characteristics is intrinsic denomination for all its analogates. The analogy of one to another cannot be reduced to analogy of proportionality both because it is an analogy of direct similarity and not an analogy of relations, and because its ground is efficient causality and not formal causality. While in both analogy of proportionality and analogy according to intention and according to being the predication is one of intrinsic denomination for all analogates, that similarity is not a sufficient reason to authorize the conclusion that they are the same mode of analogy. Actually there are two strong reasons for arguing that the mode of analogy called by Aquinas in *In I Sententiarum* "analogy according to intention and according to being" is not an analogy of proportionality but an analogy of one to another. (1) St. Thomas says that in analogy according to intention and according to being the same nature exists in every analogate "but according to a higher or lesser degree of perfection."³ This characteristic of being predicated according to degrees of perfection is neither for Aquinas nor for Cajetan a distinct

¹ Cajetan, *De Nominum Analogia*, 3.

² Aquinas, *In I Sent.* 19, 5, 2 ad 1.

³ Aquinas, *In I Sent.* 19, 5, 2 ad 1.

characteristic of analogy of proportionality, where something is formally predicated of each analogate according to its own nature without any reference to higher or lesser degrees of perfection. Degrees of perfection are implicit in all analogies of proportionality, but for Aquinas they are a distinct characteristic of analogy of many to one and especially of analogy of one to another.¹ (2) Aquinas' example for analogy according to intention and according to being is that of "being" when predicated of substance and accident. But we know that this is the familiar example that St. Thomas uses as an illustration of the analogy of one to another. It is the example used in *De Potentia* and *Summa Contra Gentiles* to illustrate how names of absolute perfections are predicated of both God and creatures.² Cajetan's identification of his analogy of proportionality with the analogy according to intention and according to being of *In I Sententiarum* is therefore mistaken. But in Cajetan's case the identification is understandable, since the analogy according to intention and according to being is an analogy of intrinsic denomination for all analogates and Cajetan knows only one analogy in which predication takes place according to intrinsic denomination in all analogates, namely the analogy of proper proportionality. Summing up what has been said of Cajetan's identification of his three modes of analogy with the three modes of analogy enumerated by Aquinas in *In I Sententiarum* we may conclude that this identification is correct for only one of the analogies, i.e. the identification of analogy of attribution with analogy according to intention and not according to being. The identification of analogy of inequality with analogy according to being and not according to intention is admissible only on the assumption that Cajetan's essentialistic terminology can be translated into Aquinas' existentialistic one. Finally the identification of analogy of proportionality with analogy according to intention and according to being would be rejected by Aquinas, since he recognizes other modes of analogous predication according to intrinsic denomination for all analogates, besides analogy of proper proportionality. But this identification is necessary in Cajetan's own classification of analogy since here proportionality is the only analogy in which predication takes place according to intrinsic denomination in all analogates.

Cajetan's classification of analogy then rests on a misinterpretation of an isolated text of St. Thomas. Therefore, there is reason to doubt that Cajetan's trichotomous division of analogy is an adequate classi-

¹ Cf. Aquinas *In I Sent.* 35, 1, 4; *C. Gent.* 1, 34; *De Potentia* 7, 7; *S. Theol.* 1, 13, 6.

² Cf. *De Potentia* 7, 7; *C. Gent.* 1, 34.

fication of Aquinas' modes of analogy. Cajetan claims that his division of analogy exhausts all possible modes of analogy¹ and therefore includes all the many divisions of analogy made by St. Thomas on several occasions according to the needs of the different circumstances. But our analysis of St. Thomas' works has clearly shown that in his study of the predication of the names of God his interest is centered around a mode of analogy, the analogy of one to another, which cannot be included under any of Cajetan's three modes of analogy. We conclude, therefore, that Cajetan's classification of analogy is not an adequate classification of Aquinas' modes of analogy. Before proceeding to an analysis of Aquinas' modes of analogy, we may review the reasons that require us to consider the analogy of one to another as a mode of analogy distinct both from analogy of proper proportionality and from analogy of extrinsic attribution.

Our analysis of the texts in which Aquinas develops his theory of analogy has shown that in his more mature theological works, when he deals with analogy, he has a single aim: that of finding a mode of analogy which is able to account for all the aspects of the God-creature relation. He believes that this can be achieved by the mode of analogy of intrinsic denomination. This analogy is called by Aquinas, analogy of one to another according to priority and posteriority.

In *De Nominum Analogia* Cajetan attempts to reduce the analogy of one to another (*unius ad alterum*) to one of his standard classes of analogy. He does not ignore the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic denomination² but in analogy he believes that extrinsic denomination is an essential characteristic of attribution and intrinsic denomination is an essential characteristic of proper proportionality. With this view of intrinsic and extrinsic denomination he reduces analogy of one to another either to attribution or to proportionality. Indeed, from the formal standpoint, he identifies it with analogy of attribution and, from the material standpoint, he identifies it with proper proportionality.³

Cajetan's identification of analogy of one to another according to priority and posteriority with either analogy of attribution or with analogy of proportionality seems unwarranted for various reasons. The identification with attribution overlooks Aquinas' distinction between two different ways of designating a thing because it bears a relation to

¹ Cajetan, *De Nominum Analogia* 1: "All analogous terms can be reduced to three modes of analogy: analogy of inequality, analogy of attribution and analogy of proportionality."

² Cajetan, *De Nominum Analogia* 2, no 11 & 21 (according to the English translation).

³ Cf. *De Nominum Analogia* 2, no 17 ff.

another. Aquinas recognizes a mode of analogous predication according to intrinsic denomination even in cases where a perfection is attributed to a thing because it bears a relation to another.¹ This enables him to creatures, even if, on one hand, these perfections belong to creatures because of a causal relation to God and, on the other hand, they can be ascribed to God only because He is known to be the cause of these perfections in creatures.

The identification of analogy of one to another with proper proportionality fails to see that Aquinas bases the analogy of one to another on direct similarity rather than similarity of relations. Aquinas accounts for analogy of one to another by appealing to the principle of likeness of effect to cause. He does not make any use of the proportionality aspects in his principal theological works.²

Finally, Cajetan, by reducing analogy of one to another according to priority and posteriority to either analogy of attribution or to analogy of proper proportionality, fails to grasp Aquinas' motive in assigning an exclusive position to analogy of one to another in theology. Aquinas' intention is clearly that of providing a mode of analogy which can save God's absoluteness without destroying the consistence of creation. Creation is like God, but God is never like creation. Creation and God can never be analogous by agreement with something common to both, for they would then be on the same level and could be mutually compared. It is always an analogy in which one imitates the other.³ Now this

¹ Cf. *De Veritate* 21, 4 ad 2: "Ad secundum dicendum quod dupliciter denominatur aliquid per respectum ad alterum. Uno modo quando ipse respectus est ratio denominationis... Alio modo denominatur aliquid per respectum ad alterum, quando respectus non est ratio denominationis sed causa, sicut si aer dicatur lucens a sole... et hoc modo creatura dicitur bona per respectum ad bonum." That the analogy of one to another (*analogia unius ad alterum*) cannot be reduced to analogy of extrinsic attribution is convincingly argued in Lyttkens' *The Analogy*, pp. 288 ff. It needs however to be said that there are cases in which St. Thomas considers the analogy based on a relation of efficient causality as an analogy of extrinsic denomination, for example *De Veritate* 1, 4 & 5, *S. Theol.* I, 16, 6. This is possible since it is not efficient causality as such to require intrinsic attribution but the principle of similarity between cause and effect. Aquinas, however, never speaks of an analogy of extrinsic denomination in his discussion of the mode of predication of divine names. In the predication of names of absolute perfections with respect to God he never allows an analogy of this kind (cf. *De Potentia* 7, 7; *Summa Theologica* I, 13, 2 & 6). It is only in the predication of names of absolute perfections with respect to creatures that he sometimes seems to allow a predication of extrinsic denomination.

² On this point see Lyttkens, *The Analogy*, pp. 300 ff.

³ Aquinas sometimes finds acceptable also the analogy of many to one, for example *De Veritate* 3, 2; *De Potentia* 7, 8. But in these cases God is no longer one of the many secondary analogates subject to some superior category, but the one primary analogate on which the many depends. In these cases Aquinas does not hesitate to speak of an analogy between God and creation in the form of a plurality of proportions to one and the same, since here the exclusive position of God in relation to creation is securely preserved, as in analogy of one to another.

cannot be expressed either by analogy of many to one, or by analogy of extrinsic attribution or by analogy of proportionality.¹ Analogy of many to one endangers God's absoluteness and transcendence by putting God and creation on the same level. Analogy of extrinsic attribution either destroys the consistence of creation or leads to agnosticism with respect to God and destroys His immanence in creation. Analogy of proportionality does not indicate either the causal nexus between God and creatures or God's priority over His creatures.² All these inadequacies are avoided in analogy of one to another according to priority and posteriority, since it is able to indicate at the same time the possession and the order of possession of absolute perfections by creatures and God. It is for this reason that analogy of one to another occupies such a distinct place in Aquinas.

Summing up the more important results of our investigation of Cajetan's version of Aquinas' doctrine of analogy, we have found that Cajetan's classification of analogy rests on a misinterpretation of *In I Sent.* Dist. 19, Q. 5, A. 1 ad 2; and that his trichotomous division of analogy is an inadequate classification of Aquinas' modes of analogy. In his major theological works Aquinas argues that names of absolute perfections are predicated of God and creatures according to analogy of one to another (*analogia unius ad alterum*). This is a mode of analogy that cannot be reduced to any of Cajetan's three modes of analogy, since none of them is able to fulfill the task Aquinas attributes to analogy of

¹ Cf. Lyttkens, *The Analogy*, pp. 283 ff.

² Traditional Thomists continue to consider analogy of proportionality as the only proper analogy, the only one metaphysically and theologically tenable. It is therefore a problem to them to explain why St. Thomas in the two *Summae* and *De Potentia* 7, 7 is teaching a direct analogy of one to another between God and creatures without any hint of the analogy of proportionality. They attempt to solve this problem in various ways. Most of the time they appeal to the thesis of "mixed" cases. See for example J. Maritain, *Distinguer pour unir ou les degrés du savoir* (Paris, 1946), p. 822 & 826; Garrigou-Lagrange, *God, His Existence and His Nature* (London, 1946) II, 217 note 19; p. 207; G. B. Phelan, *St. Thomas and Analogy* (Milwaukee, 1948), p. 35. Cases in which intrinsic essential likeness of creation and God seem to be spoken of as analogous, when the analogy is not one of proportionality, are always mixed cases, i.e. cases of both analogy of one to another and analogy of proportionality, meeting in the same matter. In these cases analogy of one to another is to be discounted in favor of analogy of proportionality. The necessity for this procedure is usually said to be the fact that direct analogy between God and creature destroys the absolute qualitative distinction between the two. Goergen attacks analogy of intrinsic attribution of one to another on the ground that where the predication is intrinsic for all analogates there cannot be any primary analogate (cf. *Kardinal Cajetans Lehre von der Analogie*, p. 71). The argument shows how little the author has understood the nature of the analogy of one to another based on the principle of the similarity between cause and effect. In his attempt to solve the problem of the *analogia unius ad alterum* used by Aquinas in his more mature theological works, a rather Quixotic position is taken by Manser. He cuts the knot by declaring *Summa Theologica* to be one of Aquinas' less important works, a schoolbook in which there is no reason for him to discuss any profound problem (cf. G. M. Manser, *Das Wesen des Thomismus*, Fribourg, 1931, p. 476 ff.).

one to another in his theological system. Cajetan's failures are due to his exaggerated Aristotelianism. Indeed his version of analogy is thoroughly Aristotelian. It does not take into account the long evolution and deep transformation of the notion of analogy, especially by the Neoplatonists and by Aquinas. Another cause of Cajetan's misinterpretation of Aquinas is his abstraction of the doctrine of analogy from its theological context. The *De Nominum Analogia* is a purely speculative treatise, where analogy of one to another according to priority and posteriority of intrinsic denomination can hardly be given fair consideration since it is distinctly theological. Indeed in Aquinas analogy of one to another seldom has any function other than a theological one.

The aim of this historical section has been to determine whether or not Cajetan's version of analogy, both with regard to its classification and its function, is faithful to Aquinas. We believe that sufficient evidence has been produced to conclusively prove that Cajetan misinterprets the text on which he establishes his classification, that his classification is inadequate, and that his version of Aquinas' doctrine of analogy fails to understand the theological function of analogy in St. Thomas' system. These, I believe, are the main shortcomings of *De Nominum Analogia*. But this is not all the little book has to say about analogy. Cajetan's lasting contribution to the doctrine of analogy does not consist in his division of analogy or in his predilection for analogy of proper proportionality, but in his search for the solution of the logical and epistemological problems inherent to concepts intrinsically analogous. It is with these problems that the main part (chs. 4-11) of *De Nominum Analogia* deals. In this part Cajetan shows how an analogous concept is abstracted, how it is predicated and how it functions as the middle term of a syllogism. What Cajetan says in these chapters holds good not only in the case of a concept analogous according to analogy of proper proportionality, but in the case of any analogous concept that can be called intrinsically analogous.

10. A NEW CLASSIFICATION OF AQUINAS' MODES OF ANALOGY

A new classification of Aquinas' modes of analogy is required by the very fact that analogy of one to another cannot be identified with either attribution or proportionality. But there are two ways of obtaining classifications: (1) by logical division and (2) by arbitrary grouping together. Most classifications of analogy are not obtained through systematic division from a common *fundamentum divisionis* but through:

arbitrary associations.¹ Aquinas' numerous divisions of analogy give the impression that analogy is a matter which does not admit of a systematic logical division. Nevertheless most of his divisions of analogy can be included under a division of analogy which takes as its *fundamentum divisionis* the notion of denomination. Starting, then, from the notion of denomination we may distinguish between two fundamental modes of analogy: (1) analogy according to intrinsic denomination and (2) analogy according to extrinsic denomination.² Both (1) and (2) may be subdivided again. In (1), by taking as *fundamentum divisionis* the notion of relation of efficient causality, we obtain (a) analogy of intrinsic denomination "formally" based on a relation of efficient causality between the analogates, and (b) analogy of intrinsic denomination based not on a relation of efficient causality but on a similarity of relations. In (2), by taking as *fundamentum divisionis* the notion of signification we obtain (a) analogy of extrinsic denomination according to the proper signification and (b) analogy of extrinsic denomination according to improper or metaphorical signification. In this way we have obtained four modes of analogy, enough for our present purposes. These four modes can be correlated to the traditional terminology as follows: (1) (a) the analogy of intrinsic denomination "formally" based on a relation of efficient causality between analogates equals *analogy of intrinsic attribution*,³ (1) (b) the analogy of intrinsic denomination based not on a relation of efficient causality but on a similarity of relations equals *analogy of proper proportionality*. (2) (a) the analogy of extrinsic denomination according to proper signification equals *analogy of extrinsic attribution*, (2) (b) the analogy of extrinsic denomination according to improper or metaphorical signification equals *analogy of improper proportionality* or *analogy of metaphorical proportionality*.

¹ For an interesting attempt of a systematic logical division of analogy see G. P. Klubertanz, "The Problem of Analogy of Being," *Review of Metaphysics* (1957), pp. 261 ff.

² "In general, analogies have always been divided into intrinsic and extrinsic... The distinction between predicates which mean intrinsic perfections present in the subjects of which they are predicated and predicates which are denominated of subjects for reasons of various kinds is a traditional and very simple distinction which does not need further elaboration" (Klubertanz, *St. Thomas on Analogy*, 129).

³ The name of *analogy of participation* has recently been suggested for the *analogia unius ad alterum* (cf. T. M. Flanagan, "The Use of Analogy in the *Summa Contra Gentiles*," *The Modern Schoolman* 1957-1958, p. 33). But I cannot find the name appropriate for this mode of analogy, since participation is not opposed by Aquinas to univocation but to essential predication. According to St. Thomas both univocal and analogous predication are predication through participation. On this point cf. L. B. Geiger, *La Participation dans la Philosophie de St. Thomas d'Aquin*, (Paris, 1953), pp. 123 ff. & 264 ff.; C. Fabro *La Nozione Metafisica di Partecipazione*, (Turin, 1950) *passim*; Phelan, *St. Thomas and Analogy*, pp. 18-19.

This division of analogy is able to include most of the modes of analogy mentioned by Aquinas in his many classifications of analogy. Actually if we omit the solitary classification of analogy of *In I Sententiarum* Dist. 19, Q. 5, A. 1 ad 2, for which he uses a terminology entirely abandoned in Aquinas' later works we find that all the other modes of analogy may be identified with one or the other of our four. The analogy of many to one of *In I Ethicorum*, lect. 7; *In IV Metaphysicorum*, lect. 1; *In VII Metaphysicorum*, lect. 4; *Summa Contra Gentiles* I, 34; *Summa Theologica* I, 13, 5; *In I Sententiarum* 35, 1, 4, the analogy of two to a third of *De Potentia* 7, 7 are all analogies of extrinsic attribution. The analogy of one to another of *Summa Contra Gentiles* I, 34, of *Summa Theologica* I, 13, 5, and of *De Potentia* 7, 7 is an analogy of intrinsic attribution. The analogy of many to many of *In I Ethicorum*, lect. 7, the analogy of two things having the same relation to different things of *In V Metaphysicorum*, lect. 8 and the analogy of proper proportionality of *De Veritate* 2, 11 are all analogies of proper proportionality. The analogy of symbolical proportionality of *De Veritate* 2, 11 is our analogy of improper or metaphorical proportionality.

We have thus been able to classify Aquinas' different uses of analogy in a fourfold scheme that is adequate for the purposes of the present study. These four modes are in line with Aquinas' intention of preserving God's absoluteness as well as the consistence of creation, and his intention of expressing divine transcendence as well as divine immanence. Further, these four modes are more consistent than Cajetan's systematization with Aquinas' whole teaching on analogy. We may now proceed to an analysis of the main logical differences that characterize and distinguish these four modes of analogy.

11. THE BASIC LOGICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AQUINAS' FOUR FUNDAMENTAL TYPES OF ANALOGY

Analogy, as a mode of predication, is by definition a logical problem. In this section we shall consider some features of this problem, with special regard for the differences that distinguish our four modes of analogy, some of which are semantical, some more strictly logical. Let's first consider the semantical differences.

In modern languages there is still a group of words that are imitations of natural sounds. Such are, for example, in English, *cuckoo*, *croak*, *swing*, *babble*, etc. These words are called onomatopoeic. In naturalistic theories of language, onomatopoeic words form the original nucleus of natural

language. They are words that man has learned from nature itself.¹ But the largest part of modern languages is conventional.² They consist of sounds created by man to distinguish an object from another. Philologists have shown that conventional words are first introduced to designate material objects and they are extended to non-physical objects only at a later stage of the formation of the language. It is likely that this process has taken place in the following way. After having apprehended from nature some natural words (the onomatopoeic words) man has learned to create conventional words in order to distinguish one thing from another. Then little by little man has enriched his language with new words, capable of designating more and more things. But the world is very vast and rich and the formation of an adequate language requires the creation of a large number of words. Man soon realized that the task of finding new words, i.e. new sounds, for every new object was a very difficult one. Certainly an ideal, perfect language should have had a different word for every class of objects; this would have made every ambiguity impossible. But the creation of such a perfect language was too difficult and man began to use old words for new objects. This was done in two ways: either by putting together two old words or by imposing on an old word a new use. The first procedure was used when the new object combined in itself some of the characteristics of the old objects; this may be seen for example in the introduction of the words *airplane*, *motorcar*, *television*, etc. The second procedure was used when it was found that there was some similarity between the old and the new object; this may be seen, for example, in the imposition on the word *car*, originally designating a cart, of the meanings of a cage of an elevator, an automobile, etc.³ Most of the vocabulary of philosophy, theology and science has been obtained in one of these two ways.⁴ The

¹ The view of a natural language as an adequate mirror of the world of objects is very common among scholastics, who have inherited it from Aristotle (cf. *Meta.* IV, 7). Also St. Thomas, assuming that the true meaning of the terms is to be sought in their original use, since it is in the original use that words are mirrors of things, frequently resorts to the philology of words in order to discover the essence of things. On this matter see Rousselot, *L'Intellectualisme de S. Thomas* (Paris, 1908), pp. 177 ff.

² Some penetrating analyses on the conventional nature of language may be found in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*; see § 6, 15, 37, 40, 43, 55 etc.

³ The fact that, in the imposition of new names for newly discovered objects or concepts, man does not choose names arbitrarily but selects meaningful words (as it may be seen in the choice of words like *television*, *airplane*, *motorcar*, *bicycle*, etc.) is a good argument in support of the scholastic theory that names are implicit definitions of the objects named. But this is not true of all names. It isn't true, for example, of names of individual things. Names of individual things are usually only labels. E.g. Peter is the name of my cousin but does not signify anything of his nature.

⁴ Cf. A. Biese, *Die Philosophie des Metaphorischen* (Hamburg, 1893). Biese shows how all the vocabulary we use to describe the soul, its faculties and states is taken from the external,

second procedure, however, creates a very serious problem, i.e. the problem of distinguishing between new imposition (or imposition of a new meaning) of an old word and metaphorical use of an old word. For example, when we speak of *electric current*, *vision of the intellect*, *flight of folly*, *voice of the heart*, etc., do we use the words *current*, *vision*, *flight*, *voice*, etc., metaphorically or do we impose on these words a new meaning? This distinction is important since if the words in question have acquired a new imposition they can be defined without reference to the original meaning,¹ but if they are used metaphorically they cannot be defined without reference to their proper meaning. What is more, if they have acquired a new imposition, it would be a great blunder to introduce into their definition the original meaning of the word as it can be seen in the sentence "The great bear is the brightest constellation in heaven." When a word has received two or more impositions it becomes an equivocal term and to attempt to substitute one meaning for the other is to fall into equivocation. To return to the expressions *electric current*, *vision of the intellect*, *voice of the heart*, etc., should we consider the words *current*, *vision*, *voice* as metaphorical words or as words which have received a new imposition of meaning? More generally, are the words of science, philosophy and theology the same old words used metaphorically, or are they the old words with new meanings that may dispense with the old meaning? On this question there has never been agreement among linguists. Most of them are of the opinion that scientific, philosophical and theological vocabulary is the same vocabulary of ordinary language used metaphorically. Consequently, they recommend to the scientist, philosopher and theologian that they go back to the original meaning of the term if they want to find out its true meaning.² This theory, in our view, is due to a confusion between the genetic process of scientific, philosophical and theological words and

physical world. At p. 24 he says: "Aus allen Sphären der Erfahrungswelt übertragen wir die mannigfachen Erscheinungen zur Umschreibung und Deutung des Geistigen; wir sprechen von Stimmung der Seele, von Wärme der Gesinnung, von Festigkeit des Charakters, von Lauterkeit des Herzens, von Herbheit des Sinnes, von Bitterkeit, Trockenheit, Wetterwendigkeit, von schwüler Leidenschaft, gährendem, kochendem, aufbrausendem Zorn, von rosiger Laune u.a.m."

¹ Cf. Sandmann, M., *Subject and Predicate*, pp. 55-56; Menges, M., *The Concept of Univocity*, pp. 30 ff.

² According to Isidore de Seville (*Etymologies*, lect. 1, c. 29) "the ancients have named many objects according to their nature" therefore "the knowledge of a thing is easier when one knows the etymology of its name." According to Rousselot the terminology used by Aquinas to signify the acts of the intellect, e.g. *videre*, *speculari*, *habere*, *tenere* etc. is metaphorical: "ces mots sont empruntés à l'exercice de nos pouvoirs corporels" (p. 12). Cf. Rousselot, *L'Intellectualisme de S. Thomas*, pp. 12-13, 77 etc.; Biese, *Die Philosophie des Metaphorischen*, especially pp. 23-33; M. Foss, *Symbol and Metaphor in Human Experience* (Princeton, 1949), pp. 3, 53, 56, 57 ff.

their meanings. Those who believe that the meanings of these words is to be determined by tracing them back to ordinary language assume that since they have been imposed on scientific, philosophical and theological objects because these objects bear some similarity with the objects on which the words were first imposed, they must have the same meaning. But normally this is not the case. For example, when we call automobiles "cars" because of the similarity they have with the four-wheeled objects, we do not mean by "cars" those primitive four wheels objects but the fast, modern means of transportation. As the primitive car differs from the modern car, so too the meaning of *car* in its first imposition is different from the meaning of *car* in its modern imposition. It may be objected that since it was the analogy between the two objects that suggested the new use of the term, then, in both cases, the term must mean something similar. The answer to this is that psychologically it may be true that in the early use of the new imposition most people may ascribe to the term the same old meaning and use it for the new object only as a label; but even from the psychological standpoint, the better people know the new object, the more content they will give to the new imposition of the term.¹ For instance, the word "atom" as a technical term in physics continues to mean an indivisible particle to most laymen; to the physicist, on the other hand, the original meaning of the term "atom" fades away and acquires a very different content. If this were not the case no progress in science would be possible. But since progress, at least in science, is real, since there are new discoveries, since new objects are known, it is necessary to admit that there are new concepts. But the discovery of new concepts and new objects is not always accompanied by the creation of new words to designate them. Most of the time new concepts, new objects are designated by old words. The choice of old words for new meanings, however, is not arbitrary. Usually the words selected are words previously used to designate objects which have some similarity with the objects newly discovered. This proves that with regard to scientific, philosophical and theological terms analogy is present at their origin, but usually it is an analogy concerning only secondary aspects of the objects which are designated by the common term, and this analogy gradually fades away from the

¹ In his *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein says repeatedly (see § 15, 37, 43 etc.) that names usually are nothing but labels, that naming something is like attaching a label on a thing. It seems to me that this is only partly true, for names like *television*, *airplane*, *bicycle*, etc., are full of conceptual meaning from the very beginning of their usage, and even words like *sputnik*, (which for persons ignorant of the Russian language when it was first introduced was only a label) after having been used long enough, are filled up with meaning so that they can be defined without resorting to an ostensive definition.

content of the term.¹ In truth, what photographer is interested today in the original imposition of words like *diaphragms*, *focus* and *lens*? What philosopher is any longer concerned with the original imposition of *intellect* and *understanding*, or even of *substance* and *quality*? But, what about analogous terms? Don't we have, at least here a case where a new imposition of the term does not take place when the analogous term is predicated of new classes of objects? Suarez argues that when the term "being" is extended from creatures to God no new imposition of meanings takes place; then he goes on to show that the term "being" is not analogous but univocal, for, he says, analogous terms are made to signify many different things by new impositions.² Now, we may grant to Suarez that no new imposition takes place, when one includes within the extension of a term a new instance, since imposition is the connection between words and meanings. New impositions are necessary only when new meanings are discovered and not when new instances of the same meaning are found. For instance, when one includes God or Sputnik within the extension of goodness he does not introduce a new meaning of the term "goodness" but applies the old meaning to a new case.³ This is true of all analogous terms in any of the four main modes of analogy. As to analogy of intrinsic attribution and proper proportionality, Suarez himself recognizes that the predication of being requires no new imposition of meaning. Suarez, however, believes that *being* is not an analogous but a univocal term. But all philosophers who support the theory of analogy of predication claim that the predication of *being* is the outstanding example of both analogy of intrinsic attribution and proportionality. As to analogy of extrinsic attribution, in our epistemological analysis, we have established that in this kind of analogy the predication is analogous because of a variation of meaning in the copula, while the attribute itself (which together with the copula forms the predicate)³ is not analogous but univocal. But it is of the essence of

¹ M. Sandmann, *Subject and Predicate*, pp. 55-56.

² Suarez, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, Disp. 28, sect. 3, 3: "(Nomen analogum) in hoc convenit cum aequivoco quod non una impositione positum est ad significandum multa, sed pluribus; differentia vero est quod in aequivocis casu accidit, ut unum nomen ad alias res significandas imponatur, in analogis vero prius fit impositio ad significandam unam rem, deinde per similitudinem vel per proportionem extenditur ad aliam; in praesenti vero (i.e. in praedicatione entis de Deo et creaturis) non ita est, sed unica impositione nomen entis id quod est significat, et ex vi illius convenit Deo et creaturae, quia in utroque illud commune significatum reperitur; nulla ergo potest analogiae ratio excogitari."

³ It is, however, necessary to qualify this statement. For, though both univocal and analogous concepts have unity, their unity is not the same, because the meaning of the univocal concept is exactly the same in every predication, while the meaning of the analogous concept is subject to some modification.

⁴ Sandmann, *Subject and Predicate*: "copula and attribute together form the P (predicate)

univocal terms to have only one imposition.¹ Finally, with regard to metaphorical analogy all philosophers agree that in the metaphorical use of a term no new imposition takes place, because the metaphorical meaning cannot be understood without reference to the proper meaning of the word.

The results of this excursus into the origin of language and the imposition of meanings may be summarized as follows: first we have tried to show that, in the formation of language, analogy is present in two ways: a) in onomatopoeic words analogy is present as a similarity of sounds between objects and words, b) in words which have many impositions analogy is present as a similarity between some accidental aspect of the objects designated by the original and the later impositions. After having established these facts we have argued that: a) the analogy between the meanings designated by different impositions of the same term is accidental, and in time is bound to disappear; b) analogous predication does not require new imposition of meaning.

We may now move on to consider a more strictly logical problem of analogy, namely the logical distinction between the four modes of analogous predication, especially the logical distinction between analogy of extrinsic denomination and analogy of intrinsic denomination. At first, it seems that there is no logical distinction between these two forms of analogy. If we compare a case of analogy of extrinsic denomination (e.g. "Paul is healthy," "the medicine is healthy," "the color is healthy," etc.) and a case of analogy of intrinsic denomination (e.g., "man is being," "God is being," "substance is being," etc.) we find in them the same propositional structure, i.e. a subject, a copula and an attribute; moreover the copula is the same. It takes some further analysis before noticing that the copula does not always function in the same way in the two modes of analogy. In the section on the epistemological problems of analogy we shall see that in analogy of extrinsic attribution the copula is not always used according to the same meaning but has a variety of meanings. Here, we believe, is the ground for a logical distinction between analogy of extrinsic and intrinsic denomination.

Analogy in its primary meaning is a mode of predication and as a mode of predication it can be analyzed in terms of judgments.² There

of the proposition. This has been taught with slight variations by Aristotle, Port-Royal and Christian Wolff" (p. 53).

¹ Cf. Menges, *The Concept of Univocity*, p. 38.

² This, however, as it will be shown later, does not justify Gilson's claim that analogy does not consist in concepts but in judgments. (cf. *Being and some Philosophers*, pp. 190-215). This is only partly true.

are many different kinds of judgments, but with regard to analogy they may be divided into two main groups: a) judgments which are analogous because of a variation in the meaning of the copula and b) judgments which are analogous because of a variation in the meaning of the predicate attribute. The first group is the group of analogy of extrinsic denomination; the second group is the group of analogy of intrinsic denomination. A few examples will make this clear, and, at the same time, will prove the validity of the distinction. As an example of judgments which are analogous because of a variation in the meaning of the copula let's take the analogous predication of *healthy*, e.g. "Peter is healthy," "the medicine is healthy," "the food is healthy," "the color is healthy," etc. Now the judgments connoted by these sentences are analogous. But they are analogous not because of a variation in the meaning of the concept signified by *healthy* (since our epistemological analysis will show that this concept is univocal) but because of a variation in the meaning of the copula "is," which sometimes means "belongs to," sometimes means "causes," sometimes means "signifies," etc. Obviously in regard to the principal analogate, e.g. "Peter is healthy," the copula "is" must be taken in its unqualified sense. It signifies that the perfection of health *belongs to* Peter. Not so in the secondary analogates. Indeed when we say that "the medicine is healthy" or "the food is healthy" we mean that the medicine or the food *causes* health. And when we say that "the color is healthy" we mean that the color *shows* or *signifies* health. The example of the predication of *healthy* shows, then, that in analogy of extrinsic attribution, judgments are analogous not because of a variation in the meaning of the attribute *healthy* but because of a variation in the meaning of the copula *is*. This variation of meaning in the copula is characteristic also of the other kind of analogy of extrinsic denomination, i.e. metaphorical analogy, as it can be seen in the analogous predication of *lion*, e.g. "Achilles is a lion," "that beast is a lion," etc.; where the copula "is" in the first case means "acts like" (i.e. Achilles acts like a lion), but in the second case must be taken in its unqualified sense (i.e. it signifies that the perfection of leoninity is actually, formally and intrinsically in that beast). We may then generalize and say that in analogy of extrinsic denomination judgments are analogous not because of a variation in the meaning of the predicate attribute, but because of a variation in the meaning of the copula. In this respect analogy of extrinsic denomination is logically different from analogy of intrinsic denomination, where judgments are analogous because of a variation in the meaning of the predicate attrib-

ute itself. We may take the example of the analogous predication of *being*, e.g. "substance is being," "God is being," "man is being," etc. The judgments connoted by these sentences are analogous. But they are analogous not because of a variation in the meaning of the copula "is" (which has always the same meaning: the possession of the perfection of being by the subject) but because of a variation in the meaning of the concept signified by the word *being*. This variation of meaning in the concept of being is unavoidable, when the subjects of which being is predicated are, as in our example, God, man and substance. God, man and substance are essentially different and the concept of being does not signify a partial aspect common to all of them but a perfection that pervades each one of them. The example of the predication of *being* shows, then, that in analogy of intrinsic attribution judgments are analogous not because of a variation in the meaning of the copula "is" but because of a variation in the meaning of the predicate attribute *being*.¹ We are, then, justified in concluding that there is a logical difference between analogy of extrinsic denomination and analogy of intrinsic denomination. In analogy of extrinsic denomination, judgments are analogous because of a variation in the meaning of the copula. In analogy of intrinsic denomination, judgments are analogous because of a variation in the meaning of the predicate attribute. This distinction makes clear that it is only in analogy of intrinsic denomination (i.e. analogy of intrinsic attribution and analogy of proper proportionality) that the predicate attribute is essentially analogous, i.e. it designates an analogous concept. In analogy of extrinsic denomination (i.e. analogy of extrinsic attribution and metaphorical analogy) the predicate attribute is not analogous, since it signifies a univocal concept.²

¹ There is no need to give here a more detailed analysis of the way the concept of being is modified in analogy of intrinsic attribution and in analogy of proper proportionality (which are the two main modes of analogy of intrinsic denomination). This will become clear from our epistemological analysis of the analogous concept.

² This distinction between two different kinds of analogous judgments may be used to solve the problem as to the logical nature of being (existence), i.e. whether it is a concept or a judgment. Gilson has argued that since analogy is a property of judgments and being is analogous, being is not a concept but a judgment (cf. *Being and Some Philosophers*, pp. 190-215). Now, it seems to us that this conclusion is false. It is true that judgments of existence are analogous. It is also true that existence cannot be expressed in definitions but only in propositions. This, however, is true of all analogous concepts and is no peculiarity of existence. It does not prove that we do not have a concept of existence. If the fact that existence can be expressed only in judgments were sufficient to justify Gilson's conclusion that there is no concept of existence, we should also maintain that there is no concept of cause, truth, knowledge, identity, etc. But this conclusion would be fateful to metaphysics, something which Gilson will certainly not welcome. But if judgments of existence are analogous not because of a variation in the meaning in the copula but because of a variation in the meaning of the predicate attribute as we have shown, no such danger exists. Cf. Mondin, "Triplice analisi dell'analogia e suo uso in teologia" *Divus Thomas P.* 1957, pp. 417 ff.

There are other important logical problems of analogy, as the problem of the relation between language and thought, which is frequently described as a relation of analogy,¹ the problem of the relation between analogy and univocation,² the problem of a logical definition of analogy,³ etc. But these problems have no direct bearing on the theological problems of analogy with which this study is mainly interested. We may, therefore, shelve their investigation for the time being and go on to the analysis of the metaphysical presuppositions of analogy.

¹ Cf. Revesz, *Thinking and Speaking* (Amsterdam, 1954), especially the essay by Revesz.

² On this problem conflicting statements are found both in mediaeval and modern scholastics. Aquinas maintains a priority of analogy over univocation: "in prädicationibus omnia univoca reducuntur ad unum primum non æquivocum, sed analogicum, quod est ens" (*S. Theol.* I, 13, 5 ad 1). Cajetan, on the contrary, believes that univocation precedes analogy: "omnia fere analogia proprie fuerunt prius univoca, et deinde extensione, analogia communia proportionaliter illis quibus sunt et aliis vel aliis, facta sunt" (*De Nominum Analogia*, c. 11). Among the moderns Anderson has expressed himself for the priority of analogy over univocation; but Przywara has defended the priority of univocation. Do we have here a flat contradiction, or is there some way to reconcile these apparently contradictory views? It seems to me that there is a way out, by distinguishing the psychological from the ontological level. On the psychological level univocation precedes analogy; on the ontological level analogy has a priority over univocation.

³ For an exact logical definition of analogy see I. M. Bochenski, "On Analogy", *Thomist* 1948, pp. 424-448.

CHAPTER III

METAPHYSICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS OF AQUINAS' FOUR TYPES OF ANALOGY

In this chapter we shall examine the main metaphysical presuppositions of the four Thomistic types of analogy.

There are two sorts of metaphysical presuppositions, some regard the order of knowledge, others regard the order of being; we call the former epistemological, the latter ontological presuppositions. Let's first analyze the ontological presuppositions.

1. ONTOLOGICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS

Analogy is the name of a special class of terms, the class of terms that are used neither univocally nor equivocally. Like genus and species, analogy is not immediately concerned with objects but with concepts and terms. Like genus and species, analogy is not a first but a second intention. As a second intention analogy requires foundation in reality, but it is not immediately founded in reality. Its proximate foundation is a first intention. Its correspondance with reality may be very weak and evanescent. Therefore from the fact that several things have an analogous name in common, we cannot conclude that a nature is had in common in the real order. Moreover the degree of correspondence with reality varies in the different modes of analogy. The ontological analogy required by extrinsic attribution is different from that required by intrinsic attribution and proper proportionality. But, to proceed with order, let's first consider the ontological elements common to all kinds of analogy.

A. Ontological presuppositions common to all kinds of predicative analogy

There are ontological elements, such as plurality of objects, dissimilarity and participation, that are clearly presupposed by all kinds of

analogy.¹ Other elements are common to most but not to all of them. This seems to be the case with similarity and proportionality.

All kinds of analogy require a multiplicity of objects. In intrinsic attribution we have, e.g., the painter and the painting (as in the sentences "Titian is Venetian" and "this painting is Venetian"); in proper proportionality we have, e.g., substance and accident (as in the sentences "substance is being" and "accident is being"); in extrinsic attribution we have, e.g., color and man (as in the sentences "this man is healthy" and "this color is healthy"); in metaphorical proportionality we have, e.g., Achilles and lion (as in the sentences "Achilles is a lion" and "lions are courageous"). Only where there is a plurality of objects is analogy possible, since nothing is analogous to itself.

Analogy requires moreover some dissimilarity between the objects compared. We cannot, for example, compare Peter and Paul with respect to humanity, since humanity is their essential constituent and is equally essentially present in both of them. Analogy takes place only where a perfection is not possessed in the same way but in dissimilar ways. Even when the same perfection is actually present in both objects compared as in intrinsic attribution and proper proportionality, analogy is possible only because the same perfection is distributed in different degrees (not quantitative but qualitative degrees).² Finally the dissimilarity may be such that the perfection compared exists only in one object and is ascribed to the other or others by the work of the mind. This happens in extrinsic attribution. For example, ontologically, there is no likeness between color and man. Only man is actually healthy. But the mind discovers some relation between a particular color and health and on the ground of this relation it ascribes health also to the color.

Another ontological character usually ascribed to all kinds of predicative analogy is that of similarity. But we have just seen that in analogy of extrinsic attribution there is no ontological likeness between the

¹ Cf. Goergen, *Kardinal Cajetans Lehre von der Analogie*, p. 89; Penido, *Le Rôle de l'Analogie*, p. 162 ff.

² Physical dissimilarity, as such, is not a sufficient guarantee of ontological analogy. There are dissimilarities which may still keep us in the domain of univocity. In the realm of physical objects there are many kinds of dissimilarity. Dissimilarities within the same essence do not destroy univocation. E.g., the dissimilarities between Chinese, Americans and Africans do not prevent them from belonging to the same human species, which is predicated univocally of all of them. It is only when the dissimilarity transcends the essential level that we enter into the domain of analogy, since transcendental perfections may exist according to modes essentially different. For example, being may exist in a finite and in an infinite mode. Predicamental perfections, e.g. whiteness, may exist according to different degrees, but these degrees are only accidental variations. Cf. Penido, *Le rôle de l'Analogie*, p. 161 ff.

objects compared. It is for this reason that in *In I Sententiarum* D. 19, Q. 5, A. 2 ad 1 St. Thomas calls this analogy "analogy according to intention only and not according to being."¹ The principle of the universal analogy of being is no warrant for the thesis that all modes of predicative analogy require some kind of ontological analogy. In faith, this thesis rests on a confusion of logic and ontology, and of predicamental and transcendental perfections. The principle *omne ens est simile ceteris entibus* holds only for transcendental perfections.² Some ontological likeness is required not by all modes of predicative analogy but only by intrinsic attribution and by proportionality. However, the kind of similarity required by intrinsic attribution and proportionality is different for each, as we shall see in the next section. The ontological similarity required by analogy is not a similarity of form, since similarity of form is the ontological presupposition of univocation. Actually in no one of our modes of analogy do we find a likeness of form. So, for example, being, which is the common element of man and star, is not the form of either man or star. And Venetian, which is the common character of Titian and the painting is not the form of either one of them. There is a likeness between the analogous terms but this likeness is not one of formal causality. Nor is this a quantitative likeness, such that it can be mathematically measured. Although it is a partial likeness it can neither be measured nor be abstracted, as it may be seen in our example of Venetian and being. The reason for this is that the analogous perfection is a trait which pervades the analogates in all their aspects, even their dissimilarity.³

Proportionality is another ontological character of analogy. It is usually associated with analogy of proper and metaphorical proportionality. But it is not peculiar to them. There are instances of analogies of intrinsic and extrinsic attribution that can also be turned into the form of proportionality.⁴ What is more, even univocation may be expressed

¹ Cf. also Maritain, *Les Degrés du Savoir*, p. 822; Anderson, *The Bond of Being*, pp. 127-128; McInerney, "The Logic of Analogy" *New Scholasticism* (1957), pp. 156 ff.

² Cf. Girardi, *Metafisica della Causa Esemplare*, p. 12.

³ Aquinas describes analogy as a relation between things that are partly similar and partly different (cf. *In IV Meta.* no 535). Cajetan expresses this same fact in a different but no less striking form. He says: "things which give rise to analogy are similar in the sense that the foundation of similitude in one is absolutely different from the foundation of similitude in the other. Thus the notion of one thing does not contain in itself what the notion of the other contains. For this reason the foundation of analogous similitude in either of the extremes is not to be abstracted from the extremes themselves" (*De Nominum Analogia* c.4; English Transl. p. 31). See also Mascall, *Existence and Analogy*, p. 100; Renard, *The Philosophy of Being*, p. 94.

⁴ Extrinsic attribution may be turned into proportionality when, e.g., "healthy" is predicated of color and urine; we may say that health is to urine as health is to color. This is

in terms of proportionality; thus it may be said that animality belongs to Peter in exactly the same way that it belongs to the dog Dundee.¹ But there is difference between univocal and analogous proportionality as there is difference between univocation and analogy. In univocal proportionality the relations are equal, they are exact and measurable as in mathematical proportionality. In analogous proportionality the relations are neither exact nor measurable, and they are not equal but only similar. For example, we cannot say that being belongs to Peter *in exactly the same way* that it belongs to the moon, but we can say that being belongs to Peter *in a way similar* to the way being belongs to the moon. This is especially true of analogy of intrinsic attribution and proper proportionality. Here the proportional likeness is a proportionality of dissimilars (*similitudo dissimilium*) founded not, as in the case of univocal likeness, on unity of species or genus but on diverse and unequal participation in an essential perfection proportionally common.²

Participation is another property of all modes of predicative analogy.³ But participation is no monopoly of analogy. It is also a property of univocation. We may, for example, say that both man and horse participate in animality.⁴ This seems to defeat any hope of finding in participation the solution of the problems of analogy.⁵ But the situation is not so desperate. Only a confusion between predicamental (or logical) and transcendental (or ontological or metaphysical) participation makes the notion of participation useless. However, if we distinguish between

denied by Goergen (cf. *Kardinal Cajetans Lehre von der Analogie*, p. 67); but he must take this position in order to be consistent with his view on attribution and proportionality. Analogy of intrinsic attribution is sometimes turned into proportionality by Aquinas himself, as when he says that the analogy between finite and infinite may be turned into the proportionality: the infinite is to the infinite as the finite is to the finite. See *In IV Sent.* 49, 2, 1 ad 6.

¹ Cf. Vansteenberghe, *Ontology* (London, 1952), pp. 34-35. The fact that almost every mode of predication may be expressed in terms of proportionality has convinced Suarez that proportionality is not sufficient to obtain analogy of proportionality (*Sed advertendum censeo non omnem proportionalitatem sufficere ad constituendam analogiam proportionalitatis*. Cf. *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, Disp. 28, Sect. iii, 10). This fact is probably also the reason why some philosophers, e.g. Robinson (Cf. *Review of Metaphysics* 1951-1952, pp. 466-467), consider metaphysical analogy as something trivial. See Klubertanz, o.c., pp. 83-4.

² Cf. Anderson, "Mathematical and Metaphysical Analogy," *Thomist* (1941), pp. 575 ff.

³ Cf. Phelan, *St. Thomas and Analogy*, p. 18 ff., and Penido, *Le rôle de l'Analogie*, pp. 360 ff.

⁴ For Aristotle's and Aquinas' views on this point see Fabro, *La Nozione Metafisica di Partecipazione*, pp. 145 ff.

⁵ This hope has been expressed by both Geiger and Fabro. Cf. Geiger, *La Partecipazione dans la Philosophie de St. Thomas d'Aquin*, p. 317, note 3, where he says: "Le fondement ontologique de l'analogie est la participation." The view that the solutions of the problems of analogy are to be sought in the notion of participation is stated even more vigorously by Fabro when he says: "Un'esposizione definitiva della dottrina tomista sull'analogia non può che dipendere direttamente dalla nozione tomista di partecipazione" (*La Nozione Metafisica di Partecipazione*, 2 ed., p. 189, note 2). See also J. Habel, *Die Analogie zwischen Gott und Welt nach Thomas von Aquin* (Berlin, 1928) pp. 13 & 31; F. A. Blanche, "Une Théorie de l'Analogie," *Revue de Philosophie* (1932), p. 58.

logical participation (e.g., the participation of several species in their genus, as humanity and asininity in animality) and ontological participation (e.g., the participation of an effect in its cause as the painting in the painter)¹ we may be in a position to appeal to metaphysical participation for the solution of some ontological problems of at least one mode of predicative analogy, i.e. analogy of intrinsic attribution.² On the logical level participation is univocal, i.e. it is exactly the same in all participants. For example, Peter and Dundee participate in animality in exactly the same way. On the ontological level participation is not univocal but analogous. For example, Titian and the painting do not participate in Venetianity in an equal way, but only in a similar way. In the case that the analogous perfection is a genuine transcendental property, e.g. being, the primary analogate possesses it essentially, absolutely, and therefore by identity and not by participation. Only the secondary analogate is not identical with the analogous perfection but has a limited degree of it and is, therefore, said to participate in it. For example the First Cause of being is being itself, it is identical with being. But beings that are caused are not identical with being; they share in being. In having a share, or a degree of being, they are said to participate in being. We can see now that between univocal and analogous participation there is a fundamental difference. In univocal participation the perfection participated in is not wholly possessed by any analogate: no analogate is identical to the analogous perfection. For example, as far as our experience can tell, there is no subsistent animal to whom animality belongs by identity. In analogous participation, if the analogous perfection is a transcendental, there cannot be secondary analogates without a primary, and to the primary analogate the analogous perfection has a relation of identity.³

¹ For these distinctions see Fabro, *La Nozione Metafisica di Partecipazione*, especially pp. 176

² Cf. G. Soehngen, "Analogia Entis in Analogia Fidei," in *Antwort*, p. 267 ff.; Geiger, *La Participation*, pp. 27 ff. & 65 ff.; Little, *The Platonic Heritage of Thomism*, pp. 39 ff.

³ The participation of univocal concepts in a common intention is logical; the participation of the secondary analogates in the first analogate is real, at least in analogy of intrinsic attribution. This is one of the cornerstones of St. Thomas' doctrine of analogy. In his commentary to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* he says: "Item sciendum quod illud unum ad quod diversae habitudines referuntur in analogicis, est unum numero, et non unum ratione, sicut est unum illud quod per nomen univocum designatur" (*In IV Metaphysicorum*, no. 536). Commenting on this passage McInerny says: "There is only one nature which receives the first and complete signification of the name; whatever else receives the same name refers to the first signification. This brings out the difference between things named analogically and those named univocally. The latter communicate equally in the *ratio* signified by the name: there is not some one nature which is named principally. Greater and lesser participation in the common *ratio* destroys univocation, but is of the very essence of analogy." (R. McInerny, "The logic of Analogy," *New Scholasticism* (1957), pp. 154-155. Cf. also Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas* (New York, 1956), pp. 360 ff.; Maritain, *Art and Scholasticism* (New York, 1930), pp. 30 ff.

B. Ontological presuppositions peculiar to the various kinds of analogy

a) Intrinsic attribution and causality

We have seen above that intrinsic attribution requires a real similarity between analogates and that this similarity is based on a relation of efficient causality. For example, there is analogy between the Venetian painting and Titian, because Titian is the author of the painting. But efficient causality of itself alone does not guarantee a similarity between cause and effect. For instance, we may know that an omelet has been prepared by the Chinese Chiang, but this fact gives us no assurance that the omelet is Chinese. We may have this assurance only if we can appeal to the principle of the likeness between cause and effect. Only if the Scholastic principle *omne agens agit simile sibi* is valid are we justified in believing that there is something Chinese about the food. The possibility of analogy of intrinsic attribution rests, then, on the validity of the principle of likeness between cause and effect. The validity of this principle is generally assumed by Aquinas, for whom it is self-evident that an effect is like its cause. But there is at least an instance, where we are not so willing to grant its validity, namely the case of the God-creature relation. Assuming that God is the cause of the world and of everything that is in it, if the principle of likeness between cause and effect is universally valid, we are bound to conclude that there is some likeness also between God and His creatures. But we know that creatures are finite, temporal, imperfect etc. while God is infinite, eternal, perfect etc. It seems, therefore, that without some further justification we cannot apply the principle of similarity between cause and effect also to God. Since this is essentially a theological problem we reserve its discussion for the chapter on the theological use of analogy. For the time being we may recognize for the principle *omne agens agit simile sibi* the validity that common sense ascribes to it, and we may agree with Aquinas that in so far as the principle of similarity between cause and effect is valid, also analogy of intrinsic attribution is possible.¹

¹ We say that it is possible and not that it is necessary, because efficient causality establishes different kinds of likeness between cause and effect. There are kinds of causality that normally produce a perfect likeness, as when a man generates another man. There are other kinds of causality which produce only a partial likeness as when a painter paints a picture. St. Thomas calls the first mode of causality "univocal causality" and the second "equivocal causality." Univocal causality is the ontological ground of univocation. Equivocal causality is the ontological ground of analogy. Anderson and many other Thomists exclude analogy of intrinsic attribution from metaphysics and theology because they believe that this kind of analogy is exposed to the permanent danger of lapsing into univocity, (cf. Anderson, *The Bond of Being*, pp. 116-117, 122 and Ch. 12). But no such danger exists when intrinsic attribution is based on equivocal causality (cf. Lyttkens, *The Analogy between God and the World*, pp. 331 ff.).

b) *Proportionality and real distinction*

The ontological basis of analogy of proper proportionality is a real conformity between analogates. This conformity is described by Aquinas as a *relatio convenientiae*. There are two main problems concerning the conformity required by analogy of proper proportionality: (a) the nature of this conformity: is it a conformity of natures or a conformity of relation? (b) the conditions for this conformity: in order to have a conformity of relations is it necessary to have a real distinction within the analogates or is a logical distinction sufficient?

(a) The nature of conformity required by proper proportionality. We have seen that intrinsic attribution is possible because the principle of likeness between cause and effect guarantees a similarity between analogates which are in a relation of causality. This similarity is a direct similarity. The similarity required by proper proportionality is of a very different kind. Here we no longer have a direct similarity of natures but a similarity of relations. When we say for example, that being is to the house as being is to the moon what we intend to compare are not the two beings but the relation being/house to the relation being/moon. Proportionality, then, brings out a similarity between two relations and not a similarity between two natures. For this reason St. Thomas describes proportionality as a similarity of proportions (*similitudo proportionum*) or similarity of relations (*similitudo habitudinum*).¹ He correctly uses the term *similitudo* and not *identitas* because the likeness required by proper proportionality is one of similarity rather than identity. In this, analogy of proper proportionality is distinguished from mathematical proportionality. For example, in the mathematical proportionality $2/4$ equals $3/6$ and $3/6$ equals $25/50$ etc. the relation, that of doubleness in this case, is identical in every proportion no matter how large the numbers or how wide the distance between the numbers compared. Doubleness always retains the same meaning and is, therefore, predicated of each extreme univocally and not analogously.²

¹ Cf. Aquinas, *De Veritate* 2, 11 and 23, 7 ad 9; Cajetan, *De Nominum Analogia*, no 24.

² Cf. St. Thomas, *In V Ethicorum*, no. 939-940 (in mathematical proportionality there is equality of relations); *In IV Sententiarum*, 49, 2, 1 ad 2 (in non-mathematical proportionality there is only a similarity of relations). St. Thomas sometimes gives mathematical examples to explain metaphysical and theological analogy (e.g. *In I Sententiarum* 34, 3, 1 ad 2). In fact we find it convenient to express such analogies in the form of geometrical proportions, e.g., matter/form equals potency/act; creature/participated being equals creator/unparticipated being. Such formulas must not be interpreted in the quantitative mathematical sense. For mathematical analogy differs *toto coelo* from metaphysical and theological analogy. For differences between mathematical and metaphysical analogy see also Lyttkens, *The analogy between God and the world*, pp. 46-47; Anderson, "Mathematical and Metaphysical Analogy," *Thomist* (1941) pp. 572 ff.; Anderson, *The Bond of Being*, pp. 300 ff.

(b) Does proper proportionality require a real distinction between the terms compared? – It has sometimes been said that proper proportionality is rooted in the real distinction between essence and existence.¹ This view seems to us untenable for at least two reasons. (1) In Aristotle, where the distinction between essence and existence does not enter,² there seems to be analogy of proper proportionality, for instance in the four causes and in every category of being.³ (2) Real distinction between the terms is not required by the notion of proportionality. For example the proportionality $2/2$ equals $4/4$ is as good as any other.⁴

c) *Intrinsic attribution and proper proportionality*

Before leaving the analogies of intrinsic denomination for an analysis of the analogies of extrinsic denomination it is expedient to make here some remarks concerning the value of intrinsic attribution and proper proportionality. Cajetan and the Cajetanists do not recognize intrinsic attribution. This forces them to turn analogies of natures into analogies of relations. For instance, if wisdom is predicated of God and man, according to the Cajetanists, wisdom is not predicated of both of them because in their natures there is some similarity with respect to wisdom, but because the relations Wisdom/God and wisdom/man are similar.⁵ But is this what we intend to say when we attribute wisdom to both God and man? When we say that God is wise and that man is wise we do not intend to set up a similarity between the relation of wisdom to man and the relation of wisdom to God. What we want to say is simply that wisdom belongs properly and intrinsically to both God and man and that, therefore, there is a similarity between Wisdom and wisdom.⁶

¹ Cf. e.g., Anderson, "Some basic propositions concerning metaphysical analogy," *Review of Metaphysics* (1951–1952), p. 465. In *Bond of Being* Anderson says that analogy is rooted in the doctrine of potency and act. The view that analogy of proper proportionality is based on the real distinction between essence and existence is also defended by Phelan who says that "the ultimate basis upon which such analogies (of proportionality) rest, is the proportion existing between the essence (*quod est*) and existence (*esse*) of every being that is." (Phelan, *St. Thomas and Analogy*, p. 24).

² Cf. Owens, *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute, 1957), pp. 170 ff.

³ Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1070b 25–27; 1093b 18–21.

⁴ Klubertanz gives another interesting reason. He says that analogy of proper proportionality does not require a real distinction between terms because analogy considers the relation between predicate and subject, and "this relation holds no matter what the relation between these 'terms' and what they signify, and no matter what the relation between the 'significata' themselves." (G. P. Klubertanz, "The Problem of the Analogy of Being," *Review of Metaphysics* (1957), p. 262. Cfr. Klubertanz, *St. Thomas on Analogy*, p. 99.

⁵ Cf. Cajetan, *De Nominum Analogia* (English Transl.), pp. 32, 35, 38; Anderson, *Bond of Being*, pp. 301, 305 ff.; Penido, *Le rôle de l'Analogie*, p. 000.

⁶ To put the matter in different words; when we predicate love of both God and man, we do not intend to say that there is a similarity between the relation of love to God and the

This is not to deny that it is possible to set up a proportionality between the relation of wisdom to God and the relation of wisdom to man.¹ What is questioned is the expediency of this procedure. What information does proper proportionality give us, which is not already supplied by intrinsic attribution? Intrinsic attribution *explicitly* signifies the similarity between primary and secondary analogate. The secondary analogate is an imperfect imitation of the primary with respect to the property caused by the primary in the secondary analogate. Intrinsic attribution *implicitly* expresses also that the relation of the analogous property to the secondary analogate is an imperfect imitation of the relation of the same property to the primary analogate. For example, if we say that there is analogy of intrinsic attribution between God's wisdom and man's wisdom, because man's wisdom is an imitation of God's wisdom, we implicitly disclose that the relation of wisdom to man is an imperfect likeness of the relation of wisdom to God. The only advantage that proper proportionality has over intrinsic attribution is that proper proportionality makes the likeness of relations explicit.² But, on the whole, intrinsic attribution says much more than proper proportionality.³

It has been said that proper proportionality is necessary in order to offset the tendency of intrinsic attribution to fall into univocation.⁴ According to this theory intrinsic attribution is supposed to stress the similarity between the analogates, while the function of proper proportionality is to stress their differences. This does not seem to us to be the case, at least if intrinsic attribution is conceived in the way Aquinas conceives it. When intrinsic attribution is conceived in such way that the analogous perfection is predicated of the primary analogate essentially and of the secondary analogate only by participation (and we

relation of love to man. We intend to affirm that the perfection of love belongs intrinsically to both of them. This predication, then, should be analyzed in terms of intrinsic attribution, not in terms of proportionality.

¹ The reader of Aquinas, however, knows what a sparing use he makes of proper proportionality. He sets up proportionalities only when he has at his disposal a common term (e.g. *tranquillitas, visio*) for the description of the analogous relation. It is the difficulty of determining the analogous relation and of finding a common term for it, that makes most proportionalities obscure.

² Cf. Lyttkens, *The Analogy between God and the World*, p. 289.

³ It may even be said that the procedure of proper proportionality is misleading. We are not satisfied with saying that both God and man are good; we want to know how the perfection of goodness applies to both of them. Proportionality does not explain how God and man are good. Actually it does something else. It shows there is a similarity between God and man; but this similarity is not rooted in the fact that they are both good. The similarity consists in a proportional relation of goodness to its subjects, God and man!

⁴ Cf. E. Przywara, *Polarity*, (Oxford, 1935) pp. 117-119; Mascall, *Existence and Analogy*, pp. 108 ff.; Goergen, *Kardinal Cajetans Lehre von der Analogie*, pp. 96 & 99.

have seen that this is the way intrinsic attribution is conceived by St. Thomas), any fear that intrinsic attribution destroys the difference between the primary and the secondary analogate and falls into univocation is unjustified. Intrinsic attribution stresses the likeness between analogates as much as their difference. Proportionality, then is not used because intrinsic attribution tends to destroy God's transcendence. Proper proportionality is used to help intrinsic attribution to bring out its hidden treasures, to make explicit what it contains implicitly.¹

d) *Extrinsic attribution and improper proportionality*

Analogy of extrinsic attribution and analogy of improper proportionality are by definition two modes of analogy in which the analogous predicate is attributed to the secondary analogate (or analogates) according to extrinsic denomination. In these two analogies, then, the analogous term does not designate in the secondary analogate something intrinsic to its nature.² Therefore, between the secondary and the primary analogate there cannot be either a likeness of natures (*similitudo naturae*) nor a likeness of relations (*relatio convenientiae proportionum*) of the analogous perfection to their subjects.³ Yet there must be some reason for the mind, for example, to call food "healthy" rather than "stupid" and the meadow "smiling" rather than "coward." What is the ontological ground for this operation?

(i) The ontological ground of extrinsic attribution. – The traditional view is that the ontological ground of extrinsic attribution is a relation of causality of the secondary analogate to the primary. This relation of causality, however, is not one of efficient causality but one of material causality (e.g., when being is predicated of privation or American of Formosa) or of exemplary causality (e.g., when man is predicated of the statue) or of final causality (e.g., when a missile that has not yet been shot is called inter-cosmic).⁴ Since the relation is not one of efficient

¹ For a different approach to the limitations of the analogy of proper proportionality and the ontological priority of the analogy of attribution see R. Masiello, *The Intuition of Being according to the Metaphysics of Saint Thomas Aquinas* (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1955), pp. 14, 18 ff. Masiello has developed the same views in the essay "The Analogy of proportion according to the Metaphysics of St. Thomas" *The Modern Schoolman* (1958), pp. 91–105.

² Cf. Cajetan, *De Nominum Analogia*, 2; Johannes a S. Thoma, *Logica* (ed. Marietti) II, p. 486; Penido, *Le Rôle de l'Analogie*, p. 37; Lyttkens, *The Analogy between God and the World*, pp. 338 ff.; Anderson, *The Bond of Being*, pp. 98 ff.

³ The equality of relations cannot be set up since in reality there are only three terms not four.

⁴ Cf. Cajetan, *De Nominum Analogia*, c. 2 (English Transl. no. 9). Cajetan considers as a possible ontological ground of analogy of extrinsic attribution also the relation of efficient causality. But he sees the matter from a different point of view. He is not talking about the

causality, the principle *omne agens agit simile sibi* cannot be applied and, consequently, no ontological ground is left for intrinsically ascribing the analogous property also to the secondary analogate.¹ For instance, we may say that Formosa is American insofar as she is within the range of American political influence. This influence is a real relation of America to Formosa but it is a relation which does not establish any ontological likeness between the two analogates. In analogy of extrinsic attribution, then, there is no real, ontological analogy between primary and secondary analogate, with regard to the analogous perfection. Yet, due to the real relation of the secondary to the primary analogate, the mind finds sufficient reason for ascribing also to the secondary analogate the property with regard to which the secondary analogate has some relation to the primary. The analogous property, however, really belongs only to the primary analogate.² Evidence for this is the fact that in extrinsic attribution it is impossible to construct a proportionality between the relations of the property of the primary analogate and the property of the secondary analogate. For example, it does not make any sense to say that American/Formosa equals American/United States. No American will be able to see any likeness between these two proportions. Another reason for denying that the analogous property really belongs to the secondary analogate is the fact that, if we take away the primary analogate, then the analogous property can no longer be predicated of the secondary analogate, even if the secondary analogate continues to exist.³ For example, today we can no longer say that Spain

analogy between primary and secondary analogate but about the analogy between two secondary analogates (e.g. between food and medicine because of their relation of efficient causality to health) because they have in common a relation of efficient causality to the primary analogate.

¹ No ontological ground is left for intrinsically ascribing the analogous property also to the secondary analogate, because there are only three kinds of ontological grounds for intrinsic denomination: identity of natures (which is the ontological ground of univocation), the metaphysical principle *omne agens agit sibi simile* (which is the ontological ground of intrinsic attribution) and *relatio convenientiae proportionum*. None of these three ontological grounds is present in analogy of extrinsic attribution; therefore, the analogous perfection cannot be intrinsically ascribed to the secondary analogate.

² This property of analogy of extrinsic denomination is attentively analyzed by Cajetan in *De Nominum Analogia*, c. 2, where he uses a great variety of adverbs (*formaliter, intrinsece, proprie, absolute, distincte*) to say that the first analogate is the only one to realize the idea expressed by the analogous name. He, then, concludes: "sanum ipsum animal est; urina vero, medicina et alia sana dicuntur non a sanitate eis inhaerente, sed extrinsece ab illa animalis sanitate, significative vel causaliter." (op. cit. c. 2). See also Goergen, *Kardinal Cajetans Lehre von der Analogie*, pp. 73 ff.; Anderson, *The Bond of Being*, pp. 93 ff.; Lyttkens, *The Analogy between God and the World*, pp. 338 ff.

³ In this, extrinsic attribution is clearly distinguished from intrinsic attribution of transcendental perfections, where with the destruction of the primary analogate all secondary analogates would also be annihilated. That the ground on which analogy of extrinsic attribution stands is the primary analogate and that, if the primary analogate is eliminated then

is Roman, although Spain continues to exist, since the Roman Empire has fallen. There can be no doubt, therefore, that in analogy of extrinsic attribution there is no ontological likeness between the primary and secondary analogate with respect of the analogous perfection. There is, however, an ontological ground (the relation of either material or final causality) which directs the mind to establish a logical likeness between the primary and secondary analogate.

(ii) The ontological ground of improper proportionality. — As in extrinsic attribution, so too in analogy of improper proportionality there is no ontological likeness between the natures of the primary and secondary analogate. Yet there must be a reason for the mind to set up this analogy. In the case of improper proportionality the ontological justification is not a relation of non-efficient causality, as in extrinsic attribution.¹ For instance, when we predicate "lion" of the beast and Achilles, we do so neither because the lion has generated or eaten Achilles, nor because Achilles wanted to become a lion or to ride a lion. We predicate "lion" of Achilles because there is something in Achilles' behaviour or in his way of acting that resembles the behaviour or way of acting of a lion. The ontological ground of improper proportionality is, then, a likeness of action.² It is in this similarity of action that the mind finds a sufficient reason for ascribing also to the secondary analogate a property which actually belongs properly and intrinsically only to the nature of the primary analogate. Once this attribution is made it becomes possible to construct a proportionality between the relations of the analogous perfection to the primary and secondary analogates. The resulting proportionality remains improper because the analogous perfection belongs really only to one term of the proportion. Here, as

the whole analogy breaks down, is well stated by Spinoza in the following passage: "A thing is called sacred and Divine when it is designed for promoting piety, and continues sacred so long as it is religiously used: if the users cease to be pious, the thing ceases to be sacred: if it be turned to base uses, that which was formerly sacred becomes unclean and profane. For instance, a certain spot was named by the patriarch Jacob the house of God, because he worshipped God there revealed to him: by the prophets the same spot was called the house of iniquity (cf. Amos 5, 5; and Hosea 10, 5), because the Isarelites were wont, at the instigation of Jeroboam, to sacrifice there to idols" (Spinoza, *A Theologico Political Treatise*, ch. 12). Cf. also Cajetan, *De Nominum Analogia*, c. 7 (English Transl., p. 53). Cajetan is concerned here with the relation between primary and secondary analogate in improper proportionality.

¹ For a good exposition of the similarities and differences between extrinsic attribution and improper proportionality see Goergen, *Kardinal Cajetans Lehre von der Analogie*, pp. 84–85; cf. also Anderson, *The Bond of Being*, pp. 176–177.

² Cf. Penido, *Le Rôle de l'Analogie*, pp. 43 ff.; Anderson, *The Bond of Being*, pp. 178 ff.; Goergen, *Kardinal Cajetans Lehre von der Analogie*, p. 85. That improper proportionality is rooted in a likeness of action is stated again and again by Aquinas. See, for instance, *De Malo* 16, 1 ad 3 (the likeness consists in a *similitudo operationis*), *De Potentia* 7, 5 ad 8 (the likeness consists in a *similitudo effectus*), *De Veritate* (the likeness consists in a *similitudo effectus*); cf. also *In IV Sententiarum* 45, 1, 1 quaestione. 1 ad 2; *S. Theol.* 1, 13, 6.

in extrinsic attribution, the likeness is more logical than real, though there is a real reason for the mind to construct a logical analogy.

It is sometimes held that there is more ontological ground in improper proportionality than in extrinsic attribution, i.e. that there is a better ontological justification for the mind to call Achilles a lion than to call a medicine (whose end is to procure health) healthy.¹ But, although in both extrinsic attribution and improper proportionality there is some ontological ground which directs the mind to establish an analogy between primary and secondary analogates, the mind works much more arbitrarily in constructing analogies of improper proportionality than in constructing analogies of extrinsic attribution. While we have definite rules, by which we can all decide whether an analogy of extrinsic attribution is legitimate or not, we don't have any such rule for analogy of improper proportionality. So, for example, nobody will deny that a certain kind of object is an intercosmic missile, though it will continue to stay at Cape Canaveral for several months. We can agree on this because we have a general rule, that enables us to ascribe to something a predicate, which actually belongs only to its end. No such general rule exists for analogy of improper proportionality. For this reason many times we can't agree as to whether between two beings there is a similarity of actions or not. For example, many Americans question the statement that Governor Adams is a fox. They believe that he does not act like a fox. Many other people think so. But there is no rule for deciding this difference of opinion. The ontological ground is not sufficiently open to objective investigation. Again, after hearing the same song those who enjoyed it may say: "that was a sweet melody." But those who didn't like it, will reject the expression "sweet melody," because they cannot admit that the melody affected their ears in the same pleasing way as sweet things (e.g. candy) affect their palates. It is then clear that the relation of action, which is the ontological ground of improper proportionality, is something very vague and indefinite, while the relation of material and final causality, which is the ground of extrinsic denomination, is something very definite and objectively determinable. There is, therefore, more ontological ground for analogy of extrinsic attribution than for analogy of improper proportionality.

¹ See, for instance, Goergen, *Kardinal Cajetans Lehre von der Analogie*, p. 85; Anderson, *The Bond of Being*, p. 180.

C. The image of God in man

Up to the present our attention has been concentrated on the ontological presuppositions of the four Thomistic types of analogy. Our analysis has been abstract and theoretical. It has not been concerned with the way Aquinas has actually conceived the ontological analogy between God and man. But since this is a problem that will come up again and again in Protestant theology, we cannot leave the subject without giving a brief exposition of Aquinas' theory on the resemblance that man bears to God. In doing this, we shall follow the clear exposition that he gives in the *Summa Theologica*.

Question 93 of the *Pars Prima* is entitled: "The end or term of the production of man." Aquinas divides the *Question* into nine Articles. Article One asks "whether the image of God is in man?" The answer is affirmative and says that "it is manifest that in man there is a likeness to God, copied from God as from an exemplar; yet this likeness is not one of equality, for such an exemplar infinitely excels its copy. Therefore there is in man a likeness to God: not, indeed, a perfect likeness, but imperfect."

In the reply to Objection Three St. Thomas explains that this likeness is the ground for affirming that between God and man there is a certain unity; then, he goes on to qualify this statement by distinguishing between various kinds of unity. "Now a thing is said to be one not only numerically, specifically, or generically, but also according to a certain analogy or proportion."

In this passage Aquinas obviously calls the ontological analogy that takes place between God and man "proportion," i.e. analogy of intrinsic attribution (and not analogy of proportionality), because here man is seen as an effect of divine causality.

Article Four asks "whether the image of God is to be found in every man?" Aquinas answers:

Since man is said to be the image of God by reason of his intellectual nature, he is the more perfectly like God according to that in which he can best imitate God in his intellectual nature. Now the intellectual nature imitates God chiefly in this, that God understands and loves Himself. Wherefore, we see that the image of God is in man in three ways. First, inasmuch as man possesses a natural aptitude for understanding and loving God; and this aptitude consists in the very nature of the mind, which is common to all men. Secondly, inasmuch as man actually or habitually knows and loves God, though imperfectly; and this image consists in the conformity of grace. Thirdly, inasmuch as man knows and loves God perfectly.

Article Five asks "whether the image of God is in man according to the Trinity of the Persons?" Aquinas answers that "in man there exists

the image of God, both as regards the Divine Nature, and as regards the Trinity of Persons, for also in God Himself there is one Nature in three Persons." This fact does not imply, however, that "by his natural knowledge man could know the Trinity of the Divine Persons," as the author of Objection Three tries to argue. "This argument would avail if the image of God in man represented God in a perfect manner. But, as Augustin says (*De Trinitate* XV, 6), there is a great difference between the Trinity within ourselves and the Divine Trinity. Therefore, as he says: we see, rather than believe, the trinity which is in ourselves; whereas we believe rather than see that God is Trinity."

In the remaining articles Aquinas tries to ascertain the degree of likeness that man bears to the Trinity. On this point he is much less optimistic than Augustin. The latter has seen in man a whole series of images of the Trinity. Aquinas, on the contrary, asserts: "first and chiefly, the image of the Trinity is to be found in the acts of the soul, that is inasmuch as from the knowledge that we possess, by actual thought, we form an internal word; and thence break forth into love. But since the principles of acts are the habits and powers, and everything exists virtually in its principle, therefore, secondarily and consequently, the image of the Trinity may be considered as existing in the powers and still more in the habits, for as much as the acts virtually exist therein."

Aquinas does not give any technical name to this analogy that man bears to the Trinity. If we wish to apply the name of one of our four types of Thomistic analogy to this case, we should call it an analogy of proper proportionality. Indeed the analogy in question is not "formally" based on the principle of causal similarity but on the fact that man's spiritual operations are similar to God's operation.

In conclusion, from *Question* 93 it clearly appears that Aquinas conceives man's ontological resemblance to God both as an analogy of intrinsic attribution and as an analogy of proper proportionality.

2. EPISTEMOLOGICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS¹

We turn now to the discussion of the contribution of the mind in the formation of analogous concepts. Having determined the ontological

¹ In philosophical literature the term "analogy" occurs in connection with three epistemological problems: a) *reasoning by analogy*, whereby certain terms and concepts are obtained; b) *analogy of representation*, inasmuch as concepts mirror reality only imperfectly, only in an analogous way; it is with this kind of analogy that the contemporary discussion about the ability of our mind to represent reality (cf. Emmet's *Nature of Metaphysical Thinking*, Kattsoff's

presuppositions of our four modes of analogous predication we are now in a better position to discuss the problem of their epistemological presuppositions.

There is not much of an epistemological problem with regard to the two analogies of extrinsic denomination (i.e. extrinsic attribution and improper proportionality). Our analysis of their ontological ground has shown that the analogous property intrinsically belongs only to the primary analogate and that on account of a relation of material or final causality or of a likeness of action the analogous property is ascribed also to the secondary analogates. The analogous term, then, designates a concept which has the same meaning both when applied to the primary and secondary analogates, but signifies something intrinsic only to the primary analogate. Since the concept designating the analogous property does not change meaning (e.g. when healthy is predicated of a color it still has the meaning of functioning according to the laws of a living organism; when lion is predicated of Achilles it still means a powerful beast), it is a univocal and not an analogous concept.¹ Predication according to intrinsic attribution is called analogous because of a change of meaning in the copula and not in the meaning of the concept. For example, the two propositions "Peter is healthy" and "his color is healthy" are analogous because there is a variation in the meaning of the copula, though the meaning of the attribute "healthy" is the same. In the first proposition *is* may be replaced by *has* (i.e. Peter has something that functions according to the laws of a living organism); in the second proposition *is* may be replaced by *shows* (i.e. his color shows something functioning according to the laws of a living organism). Similarly in the case of the propositions "Achilles is a lion" and "that animal is a lion," while the meaning of "lion" is the same in both of them, the meaning of *is* in the first proposition is *acts like* (a lion); the meaning of *is* in the second proposition is *has the being of* (a lion).

It is then clear that in analogies of extrinsic denomination the meaning of the concept designated by the analogous term is univocal; and that it is through a modification in the meaning of the verb "to be"

Logic and the Nature of Reality, Farrer's *Finite and Infinite*) has to do; Thomists have not ignored this problem of analogy (cf. Rousselot, *Intellectualisme de S. Thomas*, pp. 107 ff.; Gardeil, "La Structure Analogique de l'intellect," *Revue Thomiste* (1927), pp. 11 ff.), c) *analogy among concepts* which represent different objects but are designated by the same term, e.g. there is analogy between the concepts of being representing Peter, the moon, the street and the sea. In the present discussion of the epistemological problems of analogy I am concerned only with the last kind of analogy.

¹ Cf. Anderson, *The Bond of Being*, p. 123, 127 ff., 255 ff.; Maritain, *Degrés du Savoir*, p. 122; Cajetan, *De Nominum Analogia*, c. 3 (English Transl. no 23); Hayen, *L'Intentionnel selon S. Thomas d'Aquin*, p. 67.

that the univocal concept is made to apply to things in which it does not designate anything intrinsic.¹ It is because the concept designated by the analogous term is univocal that we have said that analogies of extrinsic denomination do not create any special epistemological problem. For no realistic philosopher has any difficulty in recognizing the ability of the human mind to form univocal concepts. But many realists have either denied the very possibility of analogous concepts or found it difficult to explain the nature of such concepts. The analogous concept is in fact supposed to represent something which intrinsically and properly belongs to each analogate in a different way. But how can the same concept designate analogates whose natures are so different as animals, men, angels and God (as, for example, when the concept of knowledge is applied to animal, human, angelic and divine knowledge)? Here we have a very serious epistemological problem and to this problem we now turn.

Analogous concepts are distinguished from univocal concepts inasmuch as the ontological ground of univocation and analogy is different. The ontological ground of univocation is considered to be the same in all analogates. The ontological ground of analogy is not the same in each analogate but only similar. The univocal concept represents a perfection that is absolutely of the same nature in all its univocates; hence all univocates have in the mind one and the same concept which corresponds to them adequately and perfectly (e.g. the concept of heavy perfectly and adequately designates the same perfection in all bodies, no matter whether they are living, sentient, human or just mineral bodies).² The univocal concept has this property of adequately representing some perfection of its univocates because it describes a limited non-pervasive aspect shared by many things as when we say that men, stones, mountains are *white*. Since the univocal concept represents only a partial, limited, non-pervasive perfection, it is said to be an abstraction.

The ontological ground of the analogous concept is not the same in each analogate but only similar. This is so because the analogous concept designates perfections which are intrinsic to each analogate, and these perfections are not partial aspects of the analogates but pervasive data, while the analogates themselves do not belong to the same class, i.e. they are not members of the same species or genus (this is true both with regard to intrinsic attribution and proper proportion-

¹ This difference between analogies due to a modification in the meaning of the verb and analogies due to a modification in the meaning of the predicative attribute will be more thoroughly analyzed in the next section on the logical problems of analogy.

² Cf. Cajetan, *De Nominum Analogia*, c. 4 (English Transl., no. 36).

ality when the analogous perfection is metaphysical).¹ For instance, when I say that Peter is a being, the ball is a being, the book is a being, the earth is a being, etc., if by "being" is meant the perfection by which a thing is something rather than nothing, in all my predications of being I designate the whole thing to which the perfection is attributed. Thus when I say that Peter is a being I mean that everything in Peter has the perfection of being something rather than nothing, etc. But this all-pervasiveness of the analogous perfection creates two serious epistemological problems both for analogy of intrinsic attribution and analogy of proper proportionality: a) by what operation can the human mind know a perfection which is all-pervasive? b) how can one concept alone represent each analogate with regard to a perfection which has in each of them a different realization? The problem concerning the operation by which the mind acquires analogous concepts (i.e. concepts of all-pervasive perfections) has been scholarly studied by many Thomist in recent times,² but since no Thomist questions the fact that the human mind knows all-pervasive perfections (as existence, awareness, identity, being etc.), much of their discussion tends only to establish a terminology coherent with St. Thomas' theory of knowledge. Today most Thomists agree that the operation by which the mind knows analogous concepts may be correctly called *abstraction* (but not in the Humian sense), *intuition* (but not in the Kantian sense), *separation*, *precision*, *abstractive intuition*, *imperfect abstraction*.³ All these terms have a sound Thomistic tradition and can be interpreted according to Aquinas' theory of

¹ I am indebted to Prof. Wild for some of the terminology used in this section (*data*, *pervasiveness*, *awareness* etc.). See Prof. Wild's essay "Phenomenology and Metaphysics" *Return to Reason*, where the main traits of all-pervasive data are clearly focused, (cf. especially pp. 53-54).

² Cf. Roland-Gosselin, "Peut-on parler d'intuition dans la philosophie Thomiste?" *Philosophia Perennis*, II, pp. 709-730; A. Hufnagel, *Intuition und Erkenntnis nach Thomas von Aquin*, Münster 1932; R. Jolivet, "L'intuition intellectuelle et le problème de la métaphysique" *Archives de Philosophie*, 1949; L. B. Geiger, "Abstraction et séparation d'après s. Thomas," *Revue des Sciences Phil. et Theol.* (1947), pp. 3-40; J.H. Nicolas, "L'Etre et le connaître" *Revue Thomiste* (1950), pp. 119-153; 330-359; Van Riet, "La Théorie Thomiste de l'Abstraction" *Re. Phil. de Louvain* (1952), pp. 359 ff.; P. Merlan, "Abstraction and Metaphysics in St. Thomas" *Journal of History of Ideas* (1953), pp. 284-291; Maritain, *Existence and the Existent* (1949), pp. 28 ff. note 14; R. Masiello, *The Intuition of Being according to the Metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas*, (Washington, The Catholic University of America Press, 1955); Hayen, *L'intentionnel selon s. Thomas*, pp. 58-59; Cunningham, "A Theory on abstraction in St. Thomas" *Modern Schoolman* 1958, pp. 259 ff.; Penido, *Le rôle de l'analogie*, pp. 59 ff.

³ For a defense of the use of *abstraction* see Maritain, *Existence and the Existent*, pp. 28 ff. note 14; for a justification of the use of *Intuition* by Thomists see Jolivet, "L'intuition intellectuelle et le problème de la métaphysique," *Archives de Philosophie* 1934; for the meaning of *separation* and *precision* see Geiger, "Abstraction et séparation d'après s. Thomas" *Re. Sc. Phil. et Theol.* 1947, pp. 3-40 and Cunningham, "A Theory on abstraction in St. Thomas," *Modern Schoolman* 1958, pp. 259 ff.; for the use of *incomplete abstraction* cf. Penido *Le rôle de l'analogie*, pp. 59 ff.; for the use of *abstractive intuition* cf. De Raeymaeker, *The Philosophy of Being*, pp. 35 ff.

knowledge. Recent Thomistic research, however, has contributed little to the solution of the problem concerning the operation by which the human mind acquires analogous concepts. The problem here is to show that the human mind has a power (how we call such a power does not matter) to form concepts that represent many different objects with respect to a perfection realized in each of them in a different way (e.g., the perfections of being, knowing, living etc.). But if this is the correct formulation of the first problem, it is clear that its solution is contingent upon the answer one gives to the second problem (how can one concept alone represent each analogate with regard to a perfection which has in each of them a different realization?). It is, then, more logical for us to search first for the solution of the second problem and put off for a moment the solution of the first.

It seems evident to us that there are only two ways of explaining how it is possible for one concept to represent many objects with regard to a perfection which has in each of them a different realization: either the analogous concept represents perfectly one analogate and the others imperfectly or it represents confusedly all analogates. Let's see in detail how this works in our two kinds of analogy of intrinsic denomination: proper proportionality and intrinsic attribution.¹

We have seen that in intrinsic attribution the analogous perfection belongs to both the primary and secondary analogate but belongs to the secondary analogate because of a relation of efficient causality to the first. Now, since the analogous perfection belongs to both primary and secondary analogates the concept of such a perfection represents both of them, but since the perfection is shared by them in a different way, the analogous concept cannot represent both of them adequately. Either the analogous concept is a perfect representation of the primary analogate and a vague representation of the secondary, or it is a confused representation of both of them. The first case is possible because the principle of likeness between cause and effect (on which analogy of intrinsic attribution is based) assures us that there is something in common between the concepts of the primary and the secondary analogates and, therefore, the concept of the primary analogate is in some way a representation of the secondary analogate. This is clear from our familiar example of the predication of Venetian. Assuming that one knows very little about Titian's style and the Venetian School, by seeing some of Titian's paintings he will form at least a vague idea of Titian's style. Vice versa by knowing Titian's style one will have some idea of

¹ Cfr. Klubertanz, *St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy*, p. 9, 141.

the style of Titian's paintings.¹ If both primary and secondary analogates are well known then it is possible to form an analogous concept which is a vague representation of both of them. This is our second case, in which one considers the different ways according to which the analogous perfection is participated by the primary and secondary analogates and tries to disregard them without actually excluding them. In this way he obtains a concept which in its indeterminacy can apply to both the primary and secondary analogates. This brief description of the ways in which we may acquire a concept capable of representing a perfection which is realized in essentially different ways makes it clear that in the case of metaphysical perfections and principles (i.e. perfections and principles whose immediate cause is God Himself) only the first procedure is applicable: we know how the analogous metaphysical perfection or principle is realized in the primary analogate² (the creature) and use the concept of the perfection of the primary analogate as a vague representation of the perfection of the secondary analogate (God). Since we do not have a direct knowledge of both primary and secondary analogates we cannot proceed to form a concept which represents vaguely both of them, by disregarding the different way in which the analogous perfection is realized by them.³

In analogy of proper proportionality the procedure of forming the analogous concept is substantially the same as in analogy of intrinsic attribution. As in analogy of intrinsic attribution, we have here to do with the formation of a concept which does not represent (at least in the case of analogous metaphysical concepts) a limited, separated, abstracted aspect of the analogates but a perfection which pervades them in their individuality. But how is it possible for the same concept to represent many objects, which do not share a perfection in the same way but in essentially different ways? It is clear that the same concept, e.g. the concept of life, cannot at the same time adequately represent men, lions and trees. We must then conclude that either the analogous concept represents perfectly one of the analogates and imperfectly the other analogates or it represents imperfectly all of them.⁴ The first procedure is possible because one analogate is similar to the other, and, therefore the concept representing one analogate represents also the other. Also

¹ In analogy of intrinsic attribution the primary analogate may be either the cause or the effect. It depends which one is known first. The one known first is the primary analogate.

² With regard to the order of knowledge in our case, the primary analogate is the effect. See Aquinas, *S. Theol.* I, 13, 6.

³ Cf. Lyttkens, *The Analogy between God and the World*, pp. 361 ff.

⁴ Cf. Cajetan, *De Nominum Analogia*, c. 5-6.

the second procedure is possible, by blurring the difference between the analogates.¹ Of course, in this second procedure, there is a danger of falling into univocation.² And this is really what happens if we try so to prescind from the differences between analogates as to actually exclude them from the common concept. In this case the common concept will not be a concept of a pervasive perfection but of something else. For example, in trying to form a common concept of being we may eliminate all the differences between the different realizations of this perfection and reduce it to represent only the aspect of *presence*. This is possible but this is not what we mean by *being*, for by being we mean the whole reality of the object of which we say "being," because of everything and of every aspect of everything we say that it is, that it is being. Being is a perfection that belongs to everything pervasively. We know this perfection, but we know it only insofar as it is actualized in this or that particular being. We have the concept of the being of a tree, a house, a car, a man etc., but not of being as such. We have, then, a concept of the perfection of being but this concept does not represent the perfection of being as such. Our concept of being is always a concept of some particular being.³ Moreover, since particular beings actualize the perfection of being in different ways, no concept of a particular being can be an adequate representation of being as such. So, for instance, the concept of the being of a tree cannot be an adequate representation of the being of a dog, of the being of a star etc., i.e. of all the perfections of being as they are included in being as such. For when we predicate being of many things that are not members of the same

¹ Cf. Cajetan, *ibid.* Both procedures are recognized as valid by Cajetan, but he prefers the procedure of forming an analogous concept that represents one analogate perfectly and the others imperfectly, because it has a better chance of avoiding the danger of univocation.

² Cajetan again and again calls the attention of the reader to this danger, which constantly threatens to destroy the analogous concept in its very essence. See, for example, *De Nominum Analogia*, c. 5 (nos 45-46 & 53-54 of the English Transl.).

³ Here the reader may wonder whether it is possible at all to arrive at a concept of being as such. We know that this has been the perennial quest of metaphysics. Most metaphysicians have attempted to arrive at a concept of being as such through an analysis of particular beings; but, as Heidegger has cogently shown, they have never gone beyond particular beings. Heidegger himself, however, has not been able to do better than his predecessors. In *Sein und Zeit* he attempts to arrive at a concept of being as such through an analysis of human existence. But he never gets beyond human existence, to being as such. Heidegger's attempt is another instance of the inability of metaphysics to arrive at a concept of being as such. Should we, then, conclude with Kant that metaphysics is impossible? As Christian philosopher (and, if Christianity is true, not to be a Christian philosopher is an anachronism) we cannot accept this conclusion because the Christian doctrine of Creation provides an adequate solution to the mystery of being as such. According to this doctrine, beings are called into existence by Being as such, they are an image of Being as such, and, consequently, they provide man in general and the philosopher in particular with an imperfect concept, a very imperfect idea, of Being as such.

species, as when we say that stones, houses, cars etc., are real beings, we can only apply to them a concept of being that either represents each one of them imperfectly or represents one perfectly and the others vaguely.

We can, then, conclude that both in intrinsic attribution and in proper proportionality there is a twofold procedure whereby human mind arrives at the formation of analogous concepts of analogous perfections, namely, either the analogous concept represents one of the analogates perfectly and the other analogates imperfectly, or it represents every analogate imperfectly. How can we call these two procedures? It seems to us that the procedure of forming a concept which represents one analogate perfectly and imperfectly the other analogates is a sort of vague intuition: in some way we intuit in the perfectly known analogate the other analogates. On the other hand the procedure of forming a concept which represents vaguely all the analogates seems to us to be a kind of incomplete abstraction. It is abstraction since the differences are disregarded, it is incomplete because they are not actually excluded but simply left there in a "latent" state.¹ This is our answer to the problem as to the kind of operation involved in the formation of concepts of analogous perfections (i.e. of concepts representing many different objects with respect to a perfection realized in each one of them in a different way).

To sum up the main results of our analysis of some epistemological problems of analogy, we have seen that in analogies of extrinsic denomination the analogous term does not designate an analogous but a univocal concept. It is only in analogies of intrinsic denomination that we have analogous concepts. The singular characteristic of these analogous concepts is to represent many objects with respect to a perfection that is realized in each of them in essentially different ways. Since the perfection is realized in essentially different ways (i.e.; it is an analogous perfection) the concept of this perfection cannot represent each analogate in an adequate way, but either represents all analogates imperfectly or represents one analogate perfectly and the others imperfectly. The operation involved in forming an analogous concept that represents one analogate perfectly and the others imperfectly is a sort of vague intuition; the operation involved in the knowledge of an analogous concept that represents all analogates in an imperfect way is a kind of incomplete abstraction.

There are other epistemological problems involved in the knowledge

¹ See Anderson, *The Bond of Being*, pp. 257 ff.; Penido, *Le rôle de l'analogie*, pp. 58 ff.

of analogous concepts, as those concerning the unity and value of these concepts. But they need not detain us, since much has been written about them and their solution is but a corollary of the two basic problems we have just solved.¹ We may, then, proceed to the analysis of Aquinas' theological use of analogy.

¹ Cf. Anderson, *The Bond of Being*, pp. 256 ff.; Penido, *Le rôle de l'analogie*, pp. 75 ff.; Maritain, *Preface to Metaphysics*, pp. 64-65; Gardeil, "La Structure analogique de l'intellect," *Revue Thomiste* (1927), pp. 8-13; Hayen, *L'Intentionnel selon s. Thomas*, pp. 68-70; Goergen, *K. Cajetans Lehre von der Analogie*, pp. 91 ff.

CHAPTER IV

AQUINAS' THEOLOGICAL USE OF ANALOGY

In the previous chapters we have dealt with Aquinas' doctrine of analogy in general. Some of the most important results of our investigation are the following: (1) Aquinas teaches not only analogy of inequality, analogy of proper and improper proportionality, and analogy of extrinsic attribution, as it has been generally believed after Cajetan, but also analogy of intrinsic attribution, an analogy based on the principle of similarity between cause and effect. (2) Aquinas uses analogy of intrinsic attribution in order to provide an adequate interpretation for the God-creature relationship and a justification for theological language. Aquinas' justification of theological language rests on his interpretation of the God-creature relationship. According to his interpretation of this relationship, finite reality (creatures) points to God, since it is caused by God. Being caused by God, finite reality bears some similarity to Him because every effect resembles its cause. This interpretation of the God-creature relationship authorizes the use of human language, because finite reality itself points to God.

In our discussion of the analogy of intrinsic attribution we pointed out that Aquinas' interpretation of the God-creature relationship is valid only if the principle of similarity between cause and effect stands.¹ We know that common sense assumes its validity. But in the case of the God-creature relationship this cannot be taken for granted. Aquinas is not unaware of the difficulties that beset the principle of similarity between cause and effect, especially when it is applied to the God-creature relationship. To solve these difficulties he has developed an ingenious theory around the principle that every effect resembles its cause and has taken much pain to show that the principle of similarity between cause and effect holds also in the case of the God-creature relationship. In the present chapter we shall analyze and discuss

¹ *Supra*, p. 99.

Aquinas' doctrine of the principle of similarity between cause and effect as the ground of analogy between God and creatures, Aquinas' consequent interpretation of the God-creature relationship, and his justification of theological language.

1. THE PRINCIPLE 'OMNE AGENS AGIT SIMILE SIBI'

The general meaning of the principle is clear: it says that there is no cause whose effect does not bear some similarity with it. The principle expresses a law about causal relations in general. But the ground of the principle is not as clear as its meaning. Sometime Aquinas says that the principle *omne agens agit simile sibi* is self-evident,¹ other times he tries to prove it inductively, most frequently he proves it deductively. The inductive argument is usually expressed by the concise formula: "it is inductively evident (*apparet per inductionem*) in all cases that like produces like."² It is clear that this is not an inductive but an ostensive demonstration. It is not a proof but a *manuductio*. Actually it seems that a proof of the principle of similarity between cause and effect starting from the effect is not possible; for, starting from the effect, one can prove only the need of a sufficient cause and not an exemplary cause.³

Most frequently Aquinas establishes the principle of similarity between cause and effect deductively by examining the nature of the action of the cause. His formulas for the deductive argument are either (a) "it belongs to the nature of action that an agent produce its like, since each thing acts according as it is in act,"⁴ or (b) "every agent, as such (*in quantum huiusmodi*), produces something like itself."⁵ Both formulas say the same thing, namely, that a cause or agent can act or

¹ The principle *omne agens agit simile sibi* occurs very frequently in Aquinas' works. See, for instance: *In III Sent.* 23, 3, 1, 1; *De Potentia*, 2, 2; 7, 5; *C. Gent.* II, 21, 8; 22, 5; 40, 2; 43, 8; *S. Theol.* I, 5, 3; 45, 6. The principle is also present in Pseudo-Dionysius. See *De Divinis Nominibus* 2 and 9. The principle is universally accepted by the great Scholastics, as Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great, Bonaventura and Scotus. Scotus, for instance, says that if the principle *omne agens agit simile sibi* were not universally valid one would be justified to believe that "totum universum et quodlibet in eo factum esset a musca" (*Oxonienae* L. IV, d. 12, q. 3, no. 12). On the history of the principle *omne agens agit simile sibi* see Girardi, *Metafisica della Causa Esemplare*, pp. 32-33.

² *C. Gent.* III, 69c; cf. *S. Theol.* I, 19, 2; "Videmus quod omne agens in quantum est actu et perfectum, facit sibi simile."

³ The more competent Thomists give all this interpretation to Aquinas' inductive argument. De Finance, for instance, says that the principle *omne agens agit simile sibi* "est pour S. Thomas tellement première qu'il n'en essaie même pas une démonstration. Il se contente de quelques manuductions sommaires" (*Etre et Agir*, p. 72). See also Girardi, *Metafisica della causa esemplare*, pp. 22 ff.; Penido, *Le rôle de l'analogie*, p. 135 ff.

⁴ *C. Gent.* I, 29; cf. *In III Sent.* 33, 1, 2; *De Potentia* 7, 5.

⁵ *C. Gent.* III, 107, 4.

produce an effect, only by producing something that bears some similarity to itself, since causality (ability to act) belongs to a being insofar as it is in act. Action is proportionate to a being's act, and the effect is proportionate to the action.¹ This means that a cause cannot produce effects of any sort, but necessarily produces effects according to its nature (its actuality, its form).² The nature of the effect depends on, and is proportionate to, the nature of its cause. To Aquinas this means not only that the activity of a cause is restricted to a fixed, limited sphere of effects, that it can produce only these effects and not others, that effects are proportionate to their causes, but also that effects are like their causes. Aquinas believes that a cause is responsible not only for the being of the effect (*esse effectus*) but also for its form (*forma effectus*). If a cause were responsible only for the *esse effectus* the same cause could produce effects of all sorts. But a cause can produce only some effects and not others. The reason for this is that causes are not mere external conditions of their effects but communicate to them that actuality or form which makes them these particular effects and not others.³

For all these reasons Aquinas believes that it is of the essence of efficient causality to be exemplary (i.e. it is of the essence of efficient causes to produce effects like themselves) and, consequently, it is of the essence of an effect to resemble its cause. The effect pre-exists in its cause and, in its action, the cause seeks to assimilate the effect to itself. Causes are like artists. The artist tries to reproduce in his work his preconceived model. A cause tends to produce in its effect the degree of likeness with itself that corresponds to the degree of the effect's immanence in the cause.⁴

It seems to us that the evidence adduced by Aquinas in support of the principle *omne agens agit simile sibi* is the sort of evidence a philosopher would adduce for a self-evident principle. Aquinas himself, as we have seen, sometimes says that the principle of similarity between cause and effect is self-evident. Moreover his inductive argument is simply an

¹ *C. Gent.* II, 21, 8: "Cum omne agens secundum quod actu est, oportet modum agat actionis-esse secundum modum actus ipsius rei; unde calidum, quod magis est in actu caloris, magis calefacit." See also II, 22, 3; III, 55, 1; III, 58, 2; *S. Theol.* I, 42, 6; 89, 1 etc.

² *In III Phys.* L. 4: "omne enim agens agit in quantum est actu... Unde cum unumquodque sit actu per formam sequitur quod forma sit principium movens." *De Potentia* 7, 2: "Cum proprius effectus producatur ab aliqua causa secundum suam propriam naturam et formam, diversae causae habentes diversas naturas et formas oportet quod habeant proprios effectus diversos." See also *C. Gent.* II, 15, 3; 16, 2; 21, 3 etc.

³ Cf. *De Potentia* 7, 2; *De Veritate* 27, 7.

⁴ *S. Theol.* 2/2, 123, 7: "Finis proximus uniuscuiusque agentis est ut similitudinem suae formae in alterum inducat; sicut finis ignis calefacientis est ut inducat similitudinem sui caloris in patiente; et finis aedificatoris est ut inducat similitudinem suae artis in materia." See also *C. Gent.* II, 45; *De Veritate* 5, 9 ad 9 etc.

ostensive demonstration, namely the demonstration proper of self-evident principles. Finally, with regard to his deductive arguments, the principle that every effect is like its cause is not so much a conclusion of the arguments as it is an explanation of the meaning of action and causality: since to act or to be a cause means communication of one's own actuality and perfection, to say that something is an agent or a cause is an implicit affirmation of its resemblance to the effect. Therefore, there can be no doubt that Aquinas considers the principle *omne agens agit simile sibi* as self-evident. It seems, however, that Aquinas does not consider it a first metaphysical principle but a principle deducible from other higher principles because he attempts to establish it by deductive procedures. It seems to us that Aquinas deduces the principle of similarity between cause and effect from a principle that we would call the principle of sufficient reason. The principle of sufficient reason is generally understood to regard the effect and to say that no effect is without reason. But the principle is much more inclusive. It regards not only effects but also causes. It says that nothing is without reason (*nihil est sine ratione*). Now, according to Aquinas, the principle *omne agens agit simile sibi* is an explanation of the meaning of causality. It tells the reason why something acts and why we call it a cause. But this is at least part of what we want to say when we say that a cause has a sufficient reason for acting. Therefore, although Aquinas does not explicitly deduce the principle *omne agens agit simile sibi* from the principle of sufficient reason because the terminology *principle of sufficient reason* is unknown to him, he does so implicitly when he considers it an explanation of the meaning of action and causality.

We may now ask whether Aquinas is right in considering the principle *omne agens agit simile sibi* as self-evident. Is it not in conflict with the principle of spontaneity of nature? It seems to us that there is no necessary conflict between the two principles. The principle of similarity between cause and effect does not deny the spontaneity of nature. It does not deny that a cause may evolve and produce more perfect effects. It merely says that effects are proportionate to their causes, since causes produce something like themselves. The principle *omne agens agit simile sibi* neither denies evolution within the cause nor within the effect, but denies that evolution takes place in the very act of causation, i.e., in the passage of the perfection from the cause to the effect so that in the effect there is more perfection than in its cause.¹

¹ In classical philosophy this is absurd because the perfection of the effect that is not found in its cause is unaccounted for, i.e. it comes from nothing. Only in a Hegelian system, where

2. RESTRICTIONS TO THE PRINCIPLE OMNE AGENS AGIT SIMILE SIBI

Aquinas understands the term *causa*, as it occurs in the formula *omne agens* (i.e. *omnis causa*) *agit simile sibi*, in a rather narrow sense. He maintains that the principle is valid only in this restricted meaning of cause. The most important restrictions he prescribes to the meaning of the term *causa* and, therefore, to the principle *omne agens agit simile sibi* are three: (i) Cause, as it occurs, in this principle means only causes *per se* not causes *per accidens*.¹ Therefore the principle of similarity applies only to causes *per se*. For instance, a musician need not generate a musician, because he does not generate as musician but as man. With regard to generation, the fact that he is a musician is only a *causa per accidens*.² (ii) Cause does not mean instrumental but only principal causes.³ For the instrumental cause acts by the power of the principal cause and, consequently, tends to assimilate the effect not to itself but to the principal cause.⁴ For instance when a student in writing his exam makes use of a fountainpen, the student is the principal cause and the fountainpen is the instrumental cause of the exam. Therefore the principle of similarity applies only to the student. The exam bears a similarity to the student's mind rather than to his fountainpen. It is possible, however, to talk also of a similarity of the effect to the instrumental cause, since the effect does not proceed only from the principal cause but also from the instrument. For instance, the way the student's exam is written depends on the kind of pen he uses. In general it is correct to say that insofar as the effect proceeds from the principal cause it is like the principal cause and insofar as it proceeds from the instrumental cause it is

being comes from non-being, is it possible to conceive evolution in such a way that the effect can be more perfect than its cause. With such a Hegelian concept of evolution the principle *omne agens agit simile sibi* is certainly incompatible. But, even without the principle of similarity between cause and effect, Hegel's phenomenology is able to preserve something very similar to Aquinas' doctrine of analogy. The three stages of Aquinas' doctrine of analogy, i.e. the *via affirmationis*, the *via negationis* and the *via eminentiae*, bear a strong similarity to the three stages of Hegel's doctrine of evolution, i.e. thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Aquinas, as most ancient philosophers, conceives the universe and the laws of nature in a rather static way, but not to such a degree as to exclude dynamism and progress from nature. See on this point De Finance's excellent work, *Etre et Agir dans la philosophie de Saint Thomas* (Paris, 1945).

¹ A cause is said to be *per se* or natural when it produces an effect according to its proper end. A cause is said to be *per accidens* or accidental when there attaches either to it or to its effect some characteristic or event that is incidental, something not included in the scope of assimilating the end to itself.

² Cf. *De Malo* 1, 3 ad 2, ad 14, ad 15; *S. Theol.* I, 13, 1; *In V Meta.* no. 789 etc. For a good classification of *causa per accidens* see Girardi, *Metafisica della Causa Esemplare*, pp. 26-27.

³ A cause is said to be principal if it acts by its own native power. A cause is said to be instrumental if it acts by the power of the principal cause that employs it.

⁴ Cf. *De Malo* 4, 3; *In IV Sent.* 1, 1, 4, 1 ad 3; *S. Theol.* III, 62, 1.

like the instrumental cause.¹ (iii) A cause assimilates the effect to itself only insofar as it is cause of the effect; it fails to assimilate the effect to itself to the degree the effect is the result of the action of other causes. For example, mud under the action of the sun becomes at the same time hot and dry. The sun as the cause of heat makes the effect like itself only with respect to heat. Dryness is not the proper effect of the action of the sun but of the matter on which the sun acts. A similar example is that of the egg, which under the action of fire becomes at the same time hot and hard. Heat is due to the efficient cause, i.e. fire, hardness is due to the matter of which an egg is made.² In general, then, it is correct to say that the likeness of an effect to its cause is proportionate both to the degree of influence of the agent on the effect and to the degree of receptivity of the nature of the effect.³

By prescribing these three important restrictions to the use of the principle *omne agens agit simile sibi* Aquinas shows that when he says that every agent produces something like itself, he does not really mean all agents but only primary and *per se* agents. It is also clear that when he teaches that all effects are like their causes he is not saying that one can form a clear picture of its cause merely by knowing that something is an effect. Actually Aquinas believes that there is no instance in which an effect equals the perfection of its cause. No effect can be a perfect image of its cause. This is impossible both when the cause is God and when the cause is a creature. When the cause is God, His effect being necessarily a finite creature cannot equal Him, because it has only a finite power of imitating the infinite perfection of its cause.⁴ When the

¹ *S. Theol.* I, 45, 5; III, 62, 1 ad 2; *De Veritate* 26, 1c etc.

² Aquinas deals with the problem of the proper effect of primary and secondary causes especially in *De Potentia*, 7, 5 ad 8. Aquinas says that "an effect includes something whereby it is like its cause, and something whereby it differs therefrom: and this by reason of its matter or something of the kind. Take, for example, a brick hardened by fire; the clay is heated by the fire and thus becomes like the fire; then it is condensed and hardened, and this is due to the nature of the material. Accordingly if we ascribe to the fire that wherein the brick is likened to it, it will be ascribed to it properly in a more eminent degree and with priority: because fire is hotter than the brick: and it is hotter in a more eminent way, since the brick is hot by being made hot, while the fire is hot by nature. On the other hand if we ascribe to the fire that wherein the brick differs from the fire, it will be untrue, and any term that signifies this condition of dissimilarity cannot be said of fire unless metaphorically. Thus it is false to say of fire, the most subtle of bodies, is dense. It can, however, be described as hard on account of the violence of its action, and the difficulty to quench it. Accordingly in creatures there are certain perfections whereby they are likened to God... And there are in creatures certain perfections wherein they differ from God..."

³ In *De Causis*, L. 12: "Hoc modo causa est in effectu, et e converso, secundum quod causa agit in effectum, et effectus recipit actionem causae. Causa autem agit in effectum per modum ipsius causae; effectus autem recipit actionem causae per modum suum: unde oportet quod causa sit in effectu per modum effectus, et effectus sit in causa per modum causae." See also *S. Theol.* I, 49, 1c; 105, 1 ad 1.

⁴ The only case in which God operates something equal to Himself is in the generation

cause is a creature, it can never produce an effect equal to itself, because no creature is the total cause of any effect.¹ For Aquinas, then, the principle *omne agens agit simile sibi* means only that when the agent is primary and *per se* there is some likeness between cause and effect. Aquinas, however, does not content himself with this vague meaning of the principle. He believes that it is possible to determine a little more precisely what the likeness between cause and effect consists in. According to him this further determination is possible by distinguishing between univocal and equivocal causality.

In *De Potentia* Aquinas describes univocal and equivocal causality as follows:

The form of the effect is in the natural agent inasmuch as the agent produces an effect of like nature, since every agent produces its like. Now this happens in two ways. When the effect bears a perfect likeness to the agent, as proportionate to the agent's power, then the form of the effect is in the agent in the same degree: thus it is in univocal agents, for instance fire generates fire. When, however, the effect is not perfectly likened to the agent, as being impropportionate to the agent's power, then the form of the effect is not in the same degree in the agent but in a higher degree: this is the case in equivocal agents, for instance the sun generates fire.²

With respect to the degree of likeness that causes bear to their effects, they are, then, divided by Aquinas into two main classes, the class of univocal causes and the class of equivocal causes.³ A cause is said to be univocal when the likeness it bears to its effect is specific; namely, cause and effect are alike insofar as they both belong to the same species. Such is the case, for instance, in animal generation. For example a dog is a univocal cause, because the puppies belong to the same species of the dog. One important feature of univocal causes is that they can be less perfect than their effects, since they are not the total cause of their effects. For this reason St. Thomas sometimes goes as far as to say that

of the Word. But according to Aquinas in this case we cannot properly use the term cause. The Father is not the cause but the principle (*principium*) of the Son.

¹ According to Aquinas creatures are not causes of the *esse* but only of the *feri* of their effects. A creature can only establish a limited similarity. First, because a finite cause, whose action is based on a particular perfection, can produce but particular aspects not the whole perfection of the being of its effect (cf. *De Potentia* 3, 1). Second, because the perfection of a finite cause, being limited to a genus or to a species, does not contain the effect except insofar as the effect agrees with its cause in genus and species (cf. *C. Gent.* II, 21, 8).

² *De Potentia* 7, 1 ad 8; cf. *S. Theol.* I, 105, 1 ad 1.

³ Aquinas, sometimes, divides causes into three classes: univocal, equivocal, and analogous (cf. e.g., *In I Sent.* 8, 1, 2; *S. Theol.* I, 13, 5 ad 1). It seems, however, that equivocal and analogous causes do not form two distinct classes. Actually according to Aquinas' own principles no absolutely equivocal action is possible. Equivocity is a logical not an ontological category. See Girardi, *Metafisica della Causa Esemplare*, p. 55: "Ne concluderemo quindi che la causalità" equivoca ed analogica non vanno intese come due tipi distinti di causalità."

they are not causes in the proper sense but only instrumental causes.¹ Finally, since univocal causes belong to the same species as their effects, they cannot be the cause of the species but only of individuals within the species. Univocal causes, then, presuppose a cause of the species to which they belong, and this can only be an equivocal cause. This shows clearly that according to Aquinas equivocal cause has ontological priority over univocal cause and that the most equivocal of all causes has an absolute priority over all univocal and equivocal causes.²

A cause is said to be equivocal when it does not bear a specific but either a generic or an analogous similarity to its effect.³ A case of generic similarity is the similarity of the sun to the fire. A case of analogous similarity is that of the sun to hot clay. With respect to both effects, i.e. fire and clay, the sun is an equivocal cause and not a univocal cause, because it does not bear a specific similarity to them. This, however, seems to create a serious problem for the principle *omne agens agit simile sibi*. For, we have seen that the principle of similarity between cause and effect is true only if effects are precontained in their causes. But, in the case of equivocal causes, it seems that in the effect there are perfections, i.e. its specific perfections, that are not contained in the cause. If this is so the principle of similarity between cause and effect breaks down. According to Aquinas, however, it is not true that the specific perfections of equivocal effects are not contained in their causes. They are contained in their causes, but only virtually since it is of the nature of equivocal causes to be more perfect than their effects. In equivocal causality, then, the effect retains some likeness to the cause with respect to its specific perfections insofar as the effect is found in the equivocal cause virtually.⁴ Moreover, the analogous perfections of equivocal effects cannot be attributed to the equivocal cause according to the same *ratio*. Analogous perfections can be attributed to the equivocal cause only if the *ratio*, namely the mode according to which they are possessed by the effect, is disregarded. Only the perfection as such can be attributed to the equivocal cause, since the analogous perfection is possessed by the equivocal cause in a more eminent way.⁵ Of course, that the perfections, both specific and analogous, of the effect are possessed by the cause in

¹ Cf. *S. Theol.* I 104, 1; *C. Gent.* II, 21.

² Cf. *S. Theol.* I, 13, 5 ad 1; 104, 1; *De Potentia* 7, 7 ad 3; *De Veritate* 10, 13 ad 3; and *Boetii de Trinitate*, 1, 4 ad 4.

³ The division of similarity into specific, generic and analogous goes back to Aristotle. See, for example, *Metaph.* 1016b, 34–1017a, 3; *De Partibus Animalium* 645b, 27.

⁴ Cf. *C. Gent.* I, 29 & 31; *In I Sent.* 8, 1, 2; *S. Theol.* I, 105, 1 ad 1.

⁵ Cf. *S. Theol.* I, 4, 2;

a more perfect way is true only of primary and *per se* causes and not of accidental and instrumental causes.¹

3. THE LIKENESS BETWEEN GOD AND THE WORLD, AND THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE

We can now consider Aquinas' application of the doctrine of the similarity between cause and effect to the God-creature relationship, and his understanding of the analogy of intrinsic attribution as an interpretation of theological language.

According to Aquinas the most important instance of the principle *omne agens agit simile sibi* is God, because He is the primary and *per se* cause. As primary and *per se* cause God brings out effects like Himself.² God, however, is not a univocal but an equivocal cause, since every creature must fall short of the perfection of divine goodness.³ Therefore He contains the perfections of His effects either virtually or eminently⁴ rather than specifically. Since God contains all the perfections of His creatures, man can use the names of the perfections of the creatures to describe God's perfections. But because the perfections of the creatures are only present in God either virtually or eminently man must impose some qualification to his language when he applies it to God.⁵ According to Aquinas the qualifications concerning the perfections that are possessed by God virtually are different from the qualifications concerning the perfections that are possessed by Him eminently. The names of perfections that are in God only virtually cannot be predicated of God properly, but only metaphorically. This is the case of all the names of perfections that belong to the specific nature of creatures and to their proper actions. For instance, the names *lion*, *repentance*, *hand* etc. are names that can be predicated of God only metaphorically. Metaphorical predication is used in theology especially to express God's dynamic attributes, i.e. the perfections relative to God's external action, (*actio ad extra*). We can express some of God's actions only by using names like *repentance*, *punishment*, *anger*, etc. But these names are not predicated

¹ Cf. *In IV Sent.* 1, 1, 4, 1 ad 3; 14, 4, 2 ad 2; *De Veritate* 26, 8 ad 1; *De Malo* 4, 1 ad 15; *S. Theol.* 1/2, 66, 6 ad 3; 83, 1 ad 2; 2/2, 148, 3 ad 2.

² *In I Sent.* 3, 1, 3; *C. Gent.* 1, 29; *S. Theol.* 1, 4, 2 etc.

³ *C. Gent.* 1, 29 & 31; III, 97, 2; *In I Sent.* 8, 1, 2; *S. Theol.* 1, 13, 5.

⁴ *In I Sent.* 8, 4, 3; *De Potentia* 7, 5 ad 5; 9, 7 ad 2; *S. Theol.* 1, 13, 3; 105, 1 ad 1.

⁵ See, for example, *S. Theol.* 1, 13 2 where St. Thomas says that "our names express God, so far as our intellects know Him. Now since our intellects know God from creatures, it knows Him as far as creatures represent Him (i.e. imperfectly)... Therefore the aforesaid names signify the divine substance, but in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent it imperfectly." See also *S. Theol.* 1, 13, 2 ad 2; *C. Gent.* III, 49, 3 etc.

of God as names of perfections that constitute His divine nature, but because God in His relations to man acts in ways that resemble repentance, punishment, anger. Metaphor as an analogy based on similarity of action can be used in theology, whenever God's action bears some similarity to the action of some creature. Actually, in the Bible, metaphorical analogy is used more frequently than any other mode of predication.¹

The names of perfections that are in God eminently are predicated of God properly with respect of the perfection predicated (*perfectio praedicata*) and metaphorically with respect of the mode of predication (*modus praedicandi*). This is the case of all analogous perfections. What is important here is, first of all, Aquinas' distinction between analogous and specific perfections, and, secondly, his distinction between *res praedicata* and *modus praedicandi*. We must examine these two distinctions in detail.

(a) *Distinction between specific (or mixed) and analogous (or simple) perfections*

Is a distinction between analogous and simple perfections possible? – Aquinas believes so. He frequently distinguishes between names of mixed (specific) and simple (analogous) perfections. He says that some names denote a perfection taken precisely under its specific mode of finite realization. These are names of perfections that can be realized only in a creature. Such perfections are not simple but mixed. For example the word "sensation" signifies knowledge in its specific mode of realization in an organic faculty. Names of mixed perfections can be predicated of God only metaphorically.² Other names, however, denote a perfection independently of any specific mode of realization. These are names of simple perfections and can be predicated of God properly. For example, the word "knowledge" does not imply any limitation either to human or angelic knowledge: it is not restricted to any particular mode of realization and can, therefore, be predicated of God properly. There are only a few names of simple perfections. Besides knowledge, Aquinas' classification includes being, truth, beauty, goodness, person, life and few others.³ But he never provides a general criterion for names

¹ Cf. *In I Sent.* 45, 4; *S. Theol.* I, 13, 3 ad 1; 19, 11; *C. Gent.* I, 30. See also Anderson, *The Bond of Being*, p. 173; Penido, *Le rôle de l'analogie*, pp. 103 ff., and Klubertanz, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

² *S. Theol.* I, 13, 3 ad 1; *In I Sent.* 22, 1, 2; *C. Gent.* I, 30. According to Aquinas all specific perfections, even angelic perfections, can be predicated of God only metaphorically (cf. *In I Sent.* 34, 3, 2 ad 3).

³ Cf. *De Veritate* 2, 1; *S. Theol.* I, 13, 3 ad 1; 19, 11. Though Aquinas never provides a general criterion for names of simple perfections I believe that the distinction between names essentially analogous and names accidentally analogous offers the ground for a simple

of simple perfections. He seems to believe that this is not possible and that one has to decide case by case.¹

(b) *Distinction between mode of signification and thing signified*

According to Aquinas names of simple perfections can be predicated of God properly, but only with respect to the thing or perfection signified, not with respect to the mode of signification. But, is this distinction between *res significata* and *modus significandi* possible? Aquinas believes that the distinction is possible because, though we take all our names from creatures, in many cases we do not identify the perfection signified by them with the perfection realized by creatures. For example, we take the name "science" from man but we do not identify the perfection signified by science with the human way of knowing. We can conceive of some more perfect realization of the perfection of science, although our imagination is incapable of visualizing it. Therefore the distinction between *res significata* and *modus significandi* is possible; we are able to read off from creatures those aspects that are identical with their finite realization from the perfections as such.² Of course this is possible in the case of simple perfections, because only simple perfections are not restricted to a specific mode of realization. In the case of simple perfections, then, we can attribute to God the perfections in an absolute sense.³ But this is a difficult enterprise because we do not have any concept of a simple perfection in an absolute sense. We do not have, for example, any concept of science as such, of truth as such, of goodness as such. Since our knowledge is essentially dependent on creatures we cannot understand the meaning of the name of any perfection without

criterion. As I have shown in my logical analysis of analogy there are two kinds of analogous judgments, namely judgments that are analogous because of a variation of meaning in the copula and judgments that are analogous because of a variation of meaning in the predicative attribute. Only judgments of the second group are essentially analogous, because their predicate attributes are essentially analogous names, while the predicate attributes of the judgments of the second group are names only accidentally analogous. This distinction between judgments essentially analogous and judgments accidentally analogous provides the following criterion for names of simple perfections: names of simple perfections are all and only those names that function as predicate attributes of essentially analogous judgments whose subject is God. However, to be satisfactory, this criterion needs the following restriction: the predicate attribute must be a concept that applies to being as such, namely a concept that applies to the whole realm of reality. Therefore I can use the criterion safely only if I have an absolute certainty, based on the very nature of the concept that it applies to anything that is real, therefore also to God. See my paper "Triplice analisi dell'analogia e suo uso in teologia" *Divus Thomas* (1957), pp. 419 ff.

¹ Cf. E. Winance, "Essence divine et connaissance humaine chez St. Thomas" *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* (1957), p. 193.

² In *I Sent.* 22, 1, 2; *De Veritate* 1, 2; *De Ente* c. 6; *De Potentia* 1, 3; *C. Gent* 1, 30 & 34; *S. Theol.* 1, 13, 3 ad 1; 19, 11 etc.

³ In *I Sent.* 45, 1, 4; *De Veritate* 2, 1; *S. Theol.* 1, 13, 3.

thinking of some particular mode of realization of the perfection in a creature. Perfections taken absolutely cannot be conceived but only affirmed by a human mind. Therefore when we attribute to God a simple perfection we can do that only with an implicit reference to some finite mode of realization. The finite mode is always co-signified, it is always meant *in obliquo*.¹ And the finite mode is meant negatively, namely by denying it; while the simple perfection (in an absolute sense) is meant positively, i.e. by affirming it. Affirmation and negation are inseparable when man seeks to predicate something properly of God. In theology the *via negativa* and the *via affirmativa* must go together. Later we shall examine in detail Aquinas' teaching on the affirmative and negative ways.² But we must first complete our exposition of his teaching on the attribution to God of names taken from human language.

All names, in their mode of signification, apply primarily and properly to creatures, only secondarily and metaphorically to God. But names of simple perfections, with respect of the perfection signified, apply primarily to God and only secondarily to creatures. The reason is that with regard to the mode of signification the primary analogue is always a creature, but with regard to the perfection signified, in the case of simple perfections, the primary analogue is God. For example, with respect of the perfection signified by the name "beauty," the primary analogue is God. In fact, God is the most beautiful of beings and the cause of all beauty. God's beauty is without alteration or vicissitude, without increase or diminution: it is not like the beauty of things, which all have a particularized beauty (*particulatam pulchritudinem et particulatam naturam*). He is beautiful by Himself and in Himself, absolutely beautiful. He is exceedingly beautiful (*superpulcher*), because there is pre-existent in a superexcellent way in the perfectly simple unity of His nature the fountain of all beauty. The beauty of the creature is nothing but a similitude of the divine beauty shared among things (*ex divina pulchritudine esse omnium derivatur*).³

¹ In *I Sent.* 22, 1, 2 ad 1 & ad 3.

² *Infra*, p. 244.

³ In *Divinis Nominibus* IV, Lect. 5 & 6; cf. also *S. Theol.* I, 13, 6 & ad 6. Aquinas' teaching on this point, i.e. that with regard to the mode of signification creature is the primary analogue and with regard to the perfection signified God is the primary analogue, cannot leave any doubt that the analogy used here by Aquinas is the analogy of intrinsic attribution. Only in analogy of attribution it is possible to speak of primary and secondary analogates. In analogy of proportionality there is no primary and secondary analogate: Only analogy of intrinsic attribution is capable to bring out this important feature of theological language, namely that with respect to the mode of signification analogous concepts have a creature as primary analogate and God as secondary analogate: they are an adequate representation of a created perfection, and a vague, inadequate representation of a divine perfection.

So far we have considered only Aquinas' doctrine of the attribution to God of names of perfections. There are two more classes of names with which Aquinas concerns himself in order to fix their correct use in theology. They are the class of the names of negative attributes (e.g. infinity, eternity, simplicity etc.) and the class of names of imperfections (e.g. sin, blindness, stealing etc.). In brief, Aquinas' view is that names of negative attributes in their proper meaning can be used only for God; in their metaphorical meaning, they can be used also for creatures.¹ Names of imperfections, on the other hand, can be used only for creatures: they cannot be predicated of God either properly or metaphorically.²

To summarize, Aquinas' doctrine on the applicability of human language to God consists in the distinction of four classes of names, which have essentially different properties with regard to their applicability to God. The four classes of names are: (1) names of simple perfections, (2) names of mixed perfections, (3) names of negative perfections, (4) names of imperfections. Their properties are the following: (1) names of simple perfections, with regard to their mode of signification are used properly for creatures and only metaphorically for God; with regard to the perfection signified they are predicated primarily of God and secondarily of creatures; (2) names of mixed perfections are used properly for creatures, and can be predicated of God only metaphorically; (3) names of negative perfections are used properly for God, and can be predicated of creatures only metaphorically; (4) names of imperfections can be used only for creatures: they cannot be predicated of God either properly or metaphorically.³ An interesting feature of

¹ *De Veritate* 5, 8 ad 3; *C. Gent.* I, 30.

² *In I Sent.* 34, 3, 2 ad 2.

³ This fourfold classification of names with respect to their applicability to God is clearly implied in the following passages: (i) quaedam nomina creaturarum non nominant tantum id quod creatum est sed etiam defectum culpae annexum; sicut nomen diaboli nominat naturam deformatam peccato: et ideo talibus nominibus non possumus transumptive uti ad divina (*In I Sent.* 34, 3, 2 ad 2); (ii) quaedam nomina significant perfectionem receptam secundum talem modum participandi (i.e. includunt in sua significatione imperfectum modum participandi). Talia nomina nullo modo dicuntur de Deo proprie; sed tamen ratione illius perfectionis possunt dici de Deo metaphorice, sicut sentire, videre et huiusmodi; (iii) quaedam nomina significant principaliter perfectionem exemplatam a Deo simpliciter (i.e. significant perfectionem aliquam absolute). Talia nomina proprie dicuntur de Deo, et prius sunt in ipso quantum ad rem significatam, licet non quantum ad modum significandi, ut sapientia, bonitas, essentia et omnia huiusmodi (*In I Sent.* 22, 1, 2); (iv) quaedam nomina exprimunt cum perfectione modum quo inveniuntur in Deo. Modus autem supereminetiae quo in Deo dictae perfectiones inveniuntur per nomina a nobis imposita significari non possunt nisi per negationem, sicut cum dicimus Deum aeternum vel infinitum, vel etiam per relationem ipsius ad alia, ut cum dicitur prima causa vel summum bonum; non enim de Deo capere possumus quid est, sed quid non est. Talia nomina de solo Deo dicuntur, sicut summum bonum, primum ens et alia huiusmodi. Nec creaturae communicari possunt (*C. Gent.* I, 30. Cf. *De Veritate* 5, 8 ad 3).

this classification is that the distinction between *modus significandi* and *res significata* is possible only in the names of the first class, namely the names of simple perfections. It is only these names that can be used properly both for creatures and for God. The names of the other three classes, where the distinction between mode of predication and thing signified is impossible, can be predicated properly only of God (names of negative perfections) or only of creatures (names of mixed perfections and names of imperfections).

As it can be gathered from the present exposition, Aquinas considers the class of names of simple perfections as the most important class for theological language. He rejects Maimonides' doctrine teaching that negative attributes are the best names of God. According to Aquinas, negative attributes can have a meaning only with reference to affirmative attributes. Negative attributes are the complement of affirmative attributes. In affirmative attributes emphasis is laid on the affirmation of the *res significata* and the negation of the *modus significandi* is only co-signified. In negative attributes emphasis is laid on the negation of the *modus significandi*, while the *res significata* is only co-signified. But affirmative attributes come first, because negation presupposes affirmation.¹

4. NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE THEOLOGY

Since our knowledge of any perfection is necessarily a knowledge of a particular mode of realization of the same, man may always take either a negative or a positive attitude with regard to the attribution to God of the name of any perfection. He may deny or he may affirm it. According to Aquinas the first attitude is always correct.² The second is correct only if the perfection is simple and the affirmation is restricted to the thing signified (*res significata*). The negative and the positive attitude (*via negationis et via affirmationis*), however, should not be separated, because they are not two ways that lead to God from two different directions, as America can be reached both from the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans. The negative and the positive ways are rather like the wheels of a bicycle. As a bicycle cannot go if the two wheels don't go together, so too there cannot be any sound theology if the negative and positive ways are not used together. The positive way alone leads to anthropomorphism, to idolatry, to blasphemy. The negative way

¹ For Aquinas' criticism of Maimonides see especially *De Potentia* 7, 5 and *S. Theol.* I, 13, 2. For an excellent study of Maimonides' doctrine on negative attributes see H. A. Wolfson's "Maimonides on Negative Attributes" in *Louis Ginzberg Jubilee Volume*, pp. 411-446.

² In *I Sent.* 22, 1, 2 ad 1; *C. Gent.* 1, 30.

alone leads to agnosticism and atheism. It is then clear that in Aquinas the negative way is not a form of agnosticism but a way of expressing the transcendence of God's perfection, which is recognized to be beyond any concept man may form either from material or spiritual beings. Human concepts of perfection, because of their very origin, always maintain an implicit reference to the limited modes from which they are abstracted only imperfectly. Human concepts never positively signify the divine mode of perfection. It is for this reason that they can always be excluded from God. Even the perfection of all perfections, being (*esse*), cannot be predicated of God *sic et simpliciter*. It must be excluded from God with respect to the mode in which it is realized in creatures (*secundum quod est in creaturas*).¹ In the *Commentary to the Sentences* Aquinas gives the following enumeration of the steps of the negative way (*via remotionis*):

We deny firstly anything corporeal about Him and secondly anything intellectual or mental, at least in the respects in which this element is found in living creatures, as, for instance, goodness and wisdom. And then there remains in our intellect only that God is and nothing further. Finally we remove even the idea of "being" itself, insofar as this idea of "being" is present in creatures, and then God remains in a dark night of ignorance, and it is in this ignorance that we come closest to God in this life, as Dionysius (*De Divinis Nominibus*, vii) says. For in such mists, they say, does God dwell.²

Although the *modus significandi* must always be excluded from God and, in the case of mixed perfections the perfection itself must be denied, there are names that can and must be affirmed of God with respect to the *res significata*. These are the names of simple perfections. The *res praedicata* by these names belongs to both God and creatures but belongs to God eminently (*eminenter*). This eminence is threefold, i.e., of universality, plenitude and unity. In God there are assembled all the perfections scattered in many finite beings. In God each perfection is free from all imperfection. In God each perfection constitutes one and same reality.³ The eminent way according to which God's perfections are realized cannot be conceived by man. It can only be asserted. God always remains beyond man's comprehension (*supra intellectum*).⁴

¹ *In I Sent.* 8, 1, 1 ad 4.

² *Ibid.* See also *In I Sent.* 34, 3, 2; *C. Gent.* I, 14.

³ *In I Sent.* 8, 4, 2; 35, 1 2 ad 5; *C. Gent.* I, 30; *S. Theol.* I, 13, 4; to stress the eminence of God's perfections sometimes Aquinas makes use of the Pseudo-Dionysian terminology of *super-esse*, *super-sapiens* etc. See, for instance, *In I Sent.* 4, 2, 1 ad 2; 8, 1, 2; *In Divinis Nominibus* IV, Lect. 5 & 6.

⁴ *In I Sent.* 2, 1, 3 ad 2; see also *In Divinis Nominibus* I, Lect. 3, no. 83: "Hoc enim est ultimum ad quod pertingere possumus circa cognitionem divinam in hac vita, quod Deus est supra omne id quod a nobis cognitari potest."

The *modus* of His being is absolutely unknowable.⁴ Hence the exclamation of Aquinas, shortly before his death, with reference to his unfinished *Summa*, containing the best of his knowledge of God: "What rubbish it is!" (*Mihi videtur ut palea*). Such is the value of all knowledge of God when it is of a human fashion and speaks with a human voice.

5. ANALOGY OF INTRINSIC ATTRIBUTION AND ANALOGY OF PROPER PROPORTIONALITY

The most important result of the first three chapters of this study was the conclusion that Aquinas teaches not only analogy of inequality, analogy of proper and improper proportionality but also analogy of intrinsic attribution. This is now fully confirmed by our analysis of Aquinas' interpretation of the God-creature relation. In fact we have

⁴ In *I Sent.* 3, 1, 1; 13, 1 ad 4; *De Veritate* 2, 1 ad 9; *C. Gent.* 1, 30; III, 49; *S. Theol.* 1, 3, 4 ad 2; 13, 8 ad 2. Since God is absolutely unknowable Aquinas prefers the negative way to the affirmative, as the safer of the two. In the *Commentary to the Sentences* (I, 34, 3, 2) he says that "convenientissimus modus significandi divina fit per negationem" and in the *Summa C. Gent.* (I, 14) "est via remotionis utendum, praecipue, in consideratione divinae substantiae." See also *De Veritate* 10, 1 and *Summa Theol.* 1, 2, 1 proem. Of course, these statements, concerning the negative way, are to be taken with a grain of salt. They do not mean that man has no knowledge of God, since Aquinas definitely teaches that man knows God's existence and also, though very faintly, His essence. They mean that man does not know the mode of God's essence (man has some knowledge of the *res significata* but he ignores the *modus significandi*). There is, however, no agreement among Thomists as to the meaning of Aquinas' *via negativa*. Some apply the *via negativa* to imperfections, mixed perfections, and to the mode of signification of the names of simple perfections, but not to the *res significata* by names of simple perfections. They believe that man has some positive concept of the *res significata* by such names as truth, goodness, wisdom etc. Others apply the *via negativa* to all concepts without distinction. Man has no concept of the eminent way according to which God's perfections are realized. These perfections can only be affirmed without being conceptualized. The positive and eminent way is not a matter of concepts but of judgments. It seems to me that the texts we have examined favor the second interpretation rather than the first. Gilson is a strong supporter of this interpretation. But I cannot agree with some language used by him, for instance, the following sentence: "when we speak of essence, goodness... we are doing nothing more than repeating about him (God): he is *esse*" (*Le Thomisme*, 5 ed., 155). For, it seems to me that when we say that God is good, act,... we do not merely say that He exists. We say that He is goodness, causality, actuality, or, reciprocally, that goodness, actuality do really exist in God (cf. *In De Trinitate* 1, 4 ad 10). In these predications it is not only the factuality of existence that is affirmed, but a qualitative existence. It seems to me that when Gilson says that when we speak of essence, goodness, we are doing nothing more than repeating about God: He is *esse*, he is biased to the notion of existence. But if it is true that with reference to God all predication is analogous then this is the case not only of attributive predication but also of existential predication. Moreover if the distinction between *modus significandi* and *res significata* applies to all human concepts then the work of negative theology is not to be used only for attributive but also for existential predicates (*In I Sent.* 8, 1, 1 ad 4). This is no mystery when it is remembered that all human predication about God is inadequate. For *in humanis*, in general, when predication is existential it is not essential and when it is essential it is not existential. But any predication concerning God must be at the same time essential and existential. Therefore, when we talk about God all our predications, both essential and existential must be purified, (cf. *In I Sent.* I, 4 exp. text.; 33, 1, 2; *C. Gent.* I, 30; *S. Theol.* I, 13, 12 ad 2).

seen that Aquinas conceives the likeness between creature and God as a direct likeness based on the principle of similarity between cause and effect. And we know that direct likeness based on the principle *omne agens agit simile sibi* is the essential trait of analogy of intrinsic attribution. Analogy of proper proportionality is rarely used by Aquinas, and only in his early works. It is entirely abandoned in his mature works. He arrived at this complete divorce of proportionality both because proportionality is vitiated by serious internal difficulties when applied to God¹ and, more important, because proportionality is inadequate to express at the same time God's transcendence and immanence. Proportionality is certainly able to express God's transcendence, but fails to adequately express His immanence, since it cannot express the dependence of the finite on divine causality. In analogy of proper proportionality there are no primary and secondary analogates. All analogates are primary. For these reasons Aquinas came to the conclusion that analogy of proper proportionality cannot give an adequate interpretation to the God-creature relation, and dropped it entirely in his great *Summae*.

Aquinas believes that an adequate interpretation of the God-creature relation can be provided by analogy of intrinsic attribution. Analogy of intrinsic attribution is able to signify both that *there is a likeness* between primary and secondary analogate, and that *the secondary analogate is an imperfect imitation* of the primary. Intrinsic attribution is able to stress the likeness between analogates as much as their difference. It says that the analogous perfection is predicated of the primary analogate essentially and of the secondary analogate by participation.

Many Thomists are suspicious of the theological possibilities of intrinsic attribution because they believe that intrinsic attribution is exposed to univocity, anthropomorphism and idolatry. But this is not the case. Certainly, there is a sort of intrinsic attribution that is unable to escape the dangers of univocity and idolatry, namely intrinsic analogy *duorum ad tertium*. But in Chapter Two we have seen that Aquinas constantly warns against its use in theology. However, the case is entirely

¹ One of the difficulties that seems to preclude analogy of proper proportionality from theology is that when we try to set up a proportionality between God and creatures, e.g. human existence is to human essence as divine existence is to divine essence, there seems to be no similarity between the two proportions; because the relation between the elements of the divine proportion is only logical (since there is no distinction between essence and existence in God) while the relation between the elements of the human proportion is real (since there is a real distinction between essence and existence in man). For an attempted answer to this difficulty see, for instance, Anderson, *The Bond of Being*, pp. 304 ff. and Klubertanz, *op. cit.*, p. 99 ff.

different with intrinsic attribution *unius ad alterum*. Intrinsic attribution *unius ad alterum* cannot expose divine transcendence to any danger since it stresses both the similarity and the dissimilarity of creatures to God at the same time. In intrinsic attribution *unius ad alterum*, negative and positive theologies are joined together as polar sides. God's transcendence is protected by negative theology; His immanence is guaranteed by positive theology. Positive theology expresses God's immanence through the element of similarity; negative theology gives expression to God's transcendence through the element of dissimilarity that separates creatures from God.

In his doctrine of analogy of intrinsic attribution, Aquinas has elaborated an adequate tool for the interpretation of the God-creature relationship, and consequently, an adequate tool for theological language.¹

¹ In Chapters Six and Seven we shall see that in some respects Aquinas' analogy of intrinsic attribution is a more adequate tool than Tillich's symbolism and Barth's analogy of faith. Aquinas' analogy of intrinsic attribution is more adequate because it is applicable not only to the dimension of revelation and grace but also to the dimension of creation and nature. Moreover Aquinas' analysis of the distinction between *modus significandi* and *res significata* is more satisfactory than Barth's analysis of the distinction between form and content or Tillich's analysis of the distinction between literal and symbolic meaning. It is by means of these distinctions that Barth, Tillich and Aquinas try to safeguard both God's transcendence and immanence and to give an adequate interpretation of theological language. But, through a detailed analysis of the distinction between *modus significandi* and *res significata*, Aquinas has arrived at a fourfold classification of names with respect to their applicability to God, that we shall not find either in Barth or in Tillich. The weakness of Aquinas' doctrine of analogy is that it is couched in a philosophical language very difficult for the modern reader and is based on philosophical principles that the modern mind, very sceptical towards philosophical reason, has great difficulty in accepting.

CHAPTER V

ANALOGY IN PROTESTANT THEOLOGY FROM LUTHER TO KIERKEGAARD

After Aquinas, with regard to analogy, Catholic theologians are generally more concerned with the correct interpretation and systematization of his teaching than with a new study of the problem. Consequently a history of analogy in Catholic theology can be easily traced through the study of Aquinas' commentators. Something of this kind has been done in the previous chapters.

In the present chapter we shall attempt to give a sketchy outline of the teaching of the most eminent Protestant theologians on analogy and its use in theology. To our knowledge no systematic historical study of the doctrine of analogy in Protestant theology has yet been done. This may explain in part the many drawbacks in the present chapter: the stigma of a pioneer work.

1. MARTIN LUTHER

One of the basic traits of Luther's thought is his constant aversion to any rationalization of Revelation, i.e., to any use of reason in the understanding of the Word of God. Naturally we cannot expect from him a systematic study of theological language and of its philosophical presuppositions. In his writings we find, however, many fragmentary statements on this subject, whose comparative study seems to authorize the following conclusions:

(1) *"There is a double knowledge of God: general and particular. All men have the general knowledge, namely, that there is a God, that he created heaven and earth, that he is just, that he punished the wicked. But what God thinketh of us, what his will is towards us, what he will give or what he will do, to the end that we may be delivered from sin and death, and be saved, (which is the true knowledge of God indeed), this they know not. As it may be that I know some man by sight whom*

yet, indeed, I know not thoroughly, because I understand not what effect he beareth towards me."¹

(2) *The general, natural knowledge, that which is acquired by the philosopher, does not give us any true knowledge of God.* "Philosophy understands naught of divine matters."² "Many philosophers and men of great acumen have also engaged in the endeavor to find out the nature of God; they have written much about Him, one in this way, another in that, yet all have gone blind over their task and failed of the proper insight."³ "No human wisdom had been able to conceive what God is in himself, or in his internal essence. Neither can anyone know or give information of it except it be revealed to him by the Holy Spirit. For no one knoweth, as Paul says (I Cor. 2 : 11), the things of man save the spirit of man which is in him; even so the things of God none knoweth save the Spirit of God. From without, I may see what you do, but what your intentions are and what you think I cannot see. Again, neither can you know what I think except I enable you to understand it by word or sign. Much less can we know what God, in his own inner and secret essence is... God's actual divine essence and his will, administration and works — are absolutely beyond all human thought, human understanding and wisdom; in short, they are and ever will be incomprehensible, inscrutable and altogether hidden to human reason. When reason presumptuously undertakes to solve, to teach and explain these matters, the result is worthless, yea, utter darkness and deception."⁴

(3) *In the present situation of man a natural knowledge of God is no longer possible since there is no analogy between man and God.* The "image of God" in which man was originally created is no longer there. It has been lost by sin. "Memory, mind and will, we do most certainly possess; but wholly corrupted, and most miserably weakened; nay, (that I may speak with greater plainness), utterly leprous, and unclean. If these natural endowments therefore constitute the image of God, it will inevitably follow, that Satan also was created in the image of God; for he possesses all these natural qualities; and to an extent and strength, far beyond our own. For he has a memory and intellect the most powerful, and a will the most obstinate. The image of God therefore is something far

¹ M. Luther, *Commentary on Galatians*, transl. by E. Middleton (London: 1839), pp. 318 & ff. Cfr. *Epistle Sermon, Trinity Sunday* in *The J. N. Lenker Edition of Luther's Works*, vol. IX, § 2 & ff.

² M. Luther, *Table-Talk*, transl. by W. Hazlitt (Philadelphia: 1915), § XLVIII.

³ M. Luther, "The Magnificat" in *Works of Martin Luther* (Philadelphia: The United Lutheran Publication House, 1915-1932), vol. III, p. 167.

⁴ M. Luther, "Epistle Sermon, Trinity Sunday" in *The J. N. Lenker Edition of Luther's Works*, vol. IX, § 6 & ff.

different from all this. It is a peculiar work of God. If there be those however who are yet disposed to contend, that the above natural endowments and powers do constitute the image of God; they must of necessity confess, that they are all leprous and unclean... That image of God in which Adam was created was a workmanship the most beautiful, the most excellent, and the most noble, while as yet no leprosy of sin adhered either to his reason or to his will... After the fall however, death crept in like a leprosy, over all the senses. So that now, we cannot reach the comprehension of this image of God by our intellect, nor even in thought."¹

(4) *God and Revelation can be rightly known only by faith ('sola fide').* "No one can rightly understand God or his Word who has not received such understanding directly from the Holy Spirit".² The meaning of words like "just," "wise," "omnipotent," when applied to God, can be understood only with the help of faith. "For were his justice such as could be adjudged as just by the human understanding it were manifestly not divine, and would differ in nothing from human justice."³ "Therefore only Christians can intelligently speak of what the Godhead essentially is, and of his outward manifestation to his creatures, and his will toward men concerning their salvation. For all this is imparted to them by the Holy Spirit, who reveals and proclaims it through the Word."⁴

(5) *The knowledge of God acquired by faith, however, does not go beyond the analogy of extrinsic attribution.* "Note this fact carefully, that when you find in the Scriptures the word God's justice, it is not to be understood of the self-existing, immanent justice of God...; but according to the use of the Holy Writ, it means the revealed grace and mercy of God through Jesus Christ in us by means of which we are considered godly and righteous before him. Hence it is called God's justice or righteousness effected not by us, but by God through grace, just as God's work, God's wisdom, God's strength, God's word, God's mouth, signifies what he works and speaks in us."⁵ Even for the man of faith "God remains inscrutable in his nature and majesty"⁶. "In order that there may be place for faith, all the things that are believed must be hidden away."⁷

¹ M. Luther, *Commentary on Genesis*, transl. by H. Cole (Edinburgh: 1958), p. 90.

² M. Luther, "The Magnificat" in *Works of Martin Luther*, vol. III, p. 127.

³ Quotation in R. Otto, *The Idea of the Holy* (New York 1958), p. 101.

⁴ M. Luther, "Epistle Sermon, Trinity Sunday" in *The J. N. Lenker Edition of Luther's Works*, vol. IX, § 6.

⁵ M. Luther, "Gospel Sermon, First Sunday in Advent" in *Lenker Edition*, vol. X, § 37.

⁶ M. Luther, *Bondage of the Will*, Transl. by H. Cole (London 1823), p. 158.

⁷ Quotation in R. Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, p. 101.

"He is an unspeakable being, above and outside everything we can name and think. Who knows what that is, what is called 'God'? It is over body, over spirit, over everything we can say, hear and think."¹ "To aim at His perfect comprehension is dangerous work, wherein we stumble, fall and break our necks."²

Why can't our knowledge of God and our theological language go beyond analogy of extrinsic attribution even after Revelation? The reason is that the change operated by the Word of God in the faithful is an extrinsic and not an intrinsic one. The justice that faith brings to man does not transform him but is only imputed to him. The old man does not die, but continues to live side by side with the just (*simul iustus et peccator*). "The blessedness of grace is that the sin which remains in us is not imputed unto us, but we are accounted righteous before God... How much soever, therefore, the remnants of sin within us may turn and rage at times, we are nevertheless, still accounted righteous before God; and sin is not imputed unto us, by reason of our faith, which keeps up a continual resistance against flesh."³ This is the reason why on the logical and epistemological level Luther teaches that Revelation only brings a power of extrinsic attribution to our knowledge of God and to theological language: it is because on the ontological level Revelation only establishes an analogy of extrinsic attribution between God and man.

At this point it is worthwhile to draw a brief comparison between Aquinas' and Luther's doctrines of analogy. They differ on two fundamental points: (1) according to Aquinas man never loses his "image of God," not even after the original sin; whereas according to Luther man is wholly deprived of it by original sin; (2) the implication for theological language of their ontological views of sinful man is that, without God's grace, according to Luther, man cannot reach any true description of divine nature and, even with His grace, cannot go beyond an extrinsic analogy; while on the contrary, according to Aquinas, man

¹ Quotation in P. Tillich, *History of Christian Thought*, p. 203.

² Martin Luther, *Table-Talk*, § CXVIII.

³ Luther, *Preface to the Epistle of Paul to the Romans*. In the *Commentary to the Galatians* we read: "Omnis qui credit in Christum iustus est, nondum plene in re, sed in spe. Coepit enim iustificari et sanari sicut homo ille semivivus. Interim dum iustificatur et sanatur, non imputatur ei, quod reliquum est in carne peccatum, propter Christum qui, cum sine omni peccato sit, iam unum cum christiano suo factus, interpellat pro eo ad patrem... Perniciose errant et fallunt qui baptisatis et poenitentibus nullum peccatum tribuunt, sed tantum infirmitatem et fomitem et morbum naturae, praesertim dum in seipso non esse peccatum garriunt, quod in Deo reputante et ignoscente tantummodo non esse peccatum debuerant dicere" (p. 495). Luther goes on to affirm that the faithful who believes in Jesus Christ is "simul iustus et peccator" (Luther, *Comm. in Gal.*; Weimar edit., II, q. 497).

can reach true knowledge of God, of His essence and of His operations, both in the condition of sin and in the condition of grace: in both states the language that he applies to God can go beyond the analogy of extrinsic attribution and reach both intrinsic attribution and proportionality.

What reasons led Luther to the assertion of such an extremely limited analogy between God and man, an analogy that devoids theological language of much of its meaning? We believe that they are two: his nominalistic concept of God,¹ and his pessimistic view of man.

2. JOHN CALVIN

In Calvin's writings we do not encounter any systematic treatment of analogy, but his theory may be reconstructed out of the following statements:

(1) *Man is endowed with a twofold knowledge of God*: a natural knowledge based on the revelation that God makes of Himself in nature and man, and a supernatural knowledge based on the revelation that God makes of Himself in Jesus Christ.² In nature God is manifested to us essentially as the Creator, but in the countenance of Christ He is the Redeemer.³

(2) *Limits of natural knowledge*: natural knowledge of God comes to us through the *opera Dei*, by which Calvin means all the creative and providential activity of God. "We know God, who is invisible, only through His works."⁴ God reveals Himself in nature, in the course of natural processes and in the history of humanity. "Thus he has revealed Himself in the design of the universe, allowing Himself to be recognized every day, so that men cannot open their eyes without seeing the traces of His presence."⁵ "There is nothing so obscure and contemptible, even in the smallest corners of the earth, that some marks of the power and wisdom of God may not be seen in them."⁶ Especially "in the splendors

¹ Ockham, the founder of the nominalistic school, taught that God's existence cannot be philosophically demonstrated and that His essence is unknowable. In his *Correspondence* and in the *Table-talks* Luther declares to be a member of Ockham's school (*factions occamice*). The same is attested by Melancthon: "Gabrielem et Cameracensem pene ad verbum memoriter recitare poterat. Diu multumque legit scripta Occam. Huius acumen anteferebat Thomae et Scoto" (Preface to the second vol. of Luther's Works in *Corpus Reformatorum*, VI, 159). At the University of Erfurt where Luther studied for his M.A. the *Via Moderna* (that of the nominalistic school) prevailed. When Luther, newly ordained priest, was sent for a year and a half to study theology, his text-books were Gabriel Biel's commentaries on the *Sentences* and other Nominalist writers.

² Calvin, *Institutio Christianae Religionis*, I, 2, 1.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Calvin, *Argument to Commentary on Genesis*, in *Corpus Reformatorum* XXIII, p. 7.

⁵ Calvin, *Instit.* I, 5, 1.

⁶ Calvin, *In Ps* 19, 1, C.R. XXXI, p. 194.

of the heavens there is presented to our view a lively image of God."¹ According to Calvin then there is in the universe a mirror in which it is to be seen the *effigies Dei*, the image of God. But man in particular is a masterpiece produced by the omnipotence, goodness, and wisdom of God. He is endowed with capacities from which we may infer divinity. "In the beginning the image of God was conspicuous in the light of the mind, the rectitude of the heart and the soundness of all the parts of our nature."² "In the mind of man is His true image."³ Man in his created state of purity in virtue of bearing the *imago Dei* was capable of the knowledge of God. But the knowledge that he could acquire of God from the contemplation of nature and of himself did not go beyond an analogy of extrinsic attribution. For in nature and man God reveals not His *essentia*, which no man can see, but His *virtutes*. "Even had man remained free from all blemish, his condition was too lowly for him to reach to God without a mediator."⁴ God's nature is incromprehensible because it transcends man in every respect. "The divine nature is infinitely exalted above the comprehension of our understanding."⁵ With respect to God the Creator we only know that He is good, wise, powerful, etc. (i.e. His *virtutes*). And by these *virtutes* we know not what God is in Himself, but what He is like towards us (i.e. we obtain an analogy of extrinsic attribution: we say that God is good, wise, omnipotent, because His works are good, wise, omnipotent.) God gives us "a description not of what He is in Himself, but of what He is towards us, that our knowledge of Him may consist rather in a lively perception than in vain and aery speculation."⁶

(3) *After the Fall, without the help of Revelation, no true knowledge of God is possible either from the contemplation of nature or of man.* The cause of this situation is the corruption that has ensued upon the sin. After the Fall the image of God in man was not "utterly annihilated and effaced" but was corrupted in such a way that God can now be known only by the special, supernatural illumination of the soul by the Word and the Spirit. Man, being out of harmony with God and with His creation, can no longer perceive the revelation of God which is the true meaning of the universe.⁷ The knowledge of God which we may acquire from His works and deed is subjective and unreal. "What we describe as God, apart

¹ Ibid. p. 195.

² Calvin, *Instit.* I, 15, 3; cfr. I, 5, 6.

³ Calvin, *In Act* 17, 22. C. R. XLVIII, p. 408.

⁴ Calvin, *Instit.* II, 12, 1.

⁵ Calvin, *In Ps.* 86, 8. C. R. XXXI, p. 794.

⁶ Calvin, *Instit.* I, 10, 2.

⁷ Calvin, *Instit.* I, 6, 2; I, 11, 1; I, 15, 4.

from the Biblical Revelation in Jesus Christ, is nothing but one idol".¹ As a result of sin our language loses its power of analogy and becomes utterly equivocal. "Thus in vain do so many lights shine in the universe; they cannot illuminate for us the honor of the Creator."² After the Fall "no man can have the least knowledge of true and sound doctrine, without having been a disciple of Scripture."³ "God alone is an adequate witness to Himself and cannot be recognized except through His own testimony."⁴ Hence we must understand Him "in the guise in which he has revealed Himself to us."⁵ This means that we may not seek God "elsewhere than in His holy word, nor think of Him except in the terms which His word illuminates for us, nor speak of Him except in so far as our words are taken from His word."⁶ We find God nowhere else except in the Mediator. "For since Christ is the sun of righteousness we see nothing if we look outside His reality; it is He too who opens the eyes of our spirits."⁷

(4) *The limited power of Revelation*: God's true nature remains inscrutable even after the Revelation in Jesus Christ. "For how can the infinite essence of God be defined by the narrow capacity of the human mind?... Wherefore let us freely leave to God the knowledge of Himself."⁸ The knowledge of God's essence is a mystery, a secret known only by God. Hence the *cognitio Dei Redemptori*, made available by Jesus Christ does not reveal what God is in Himself but God's will towards us. "For the apprehension of faith... chiefly consists in our understanding what is His will towards us. For it is not of so much importance for us to know what He is in Himself as what He is willing to be to us."⁹ But even with regard to the *virtutes Dei* names like strong, just, holy, prudent are not applied to God according to an intrinsic analogy (i.e. an analogy of what He is in Himself) but according to an extrinsic one: they "describe God now in one way, now in another according to His works."¹⁰ There is, however an exception to this rule: the names Father, Son and Holy Ghost. To speak of God the Father, God the Son and God the Holy

¹ Calvin, *Instit.* I, 4, 1; cfr. I, 5, 12.

² Calvin, *Instit.* I, 5, 14. Students of Calvin's thought are generally inclined to interpret it as excluding the possibility of a natural theology after the Fall. Cfr. for instance, T. H. L. Parker, *The doctrine of the Knowledge of God* (London 1952), p. 27 ff.; W. Niesel, *The Theology of Calvin* (Philadelphia 1956), p. 40 ff.

³ Calvin, *Instit.* I, 6, 2; cfr. I, 11, 1.

⁴ Calvin, *Instit.* I, 13, 21.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Calvin, *In Act.* C.R. XLVIII, p. 209.

⁸ Calvin, *Instit.* I, 13, 21.

⁹ Calvin, *Instit.* III, 2, 6.

¹⁰ Calvin, *Instit.* I, 13, 17.

Ghost, means something other than observing that "God is strong, righteous and wise."¹ "These words, Father, Son and Holy Ghost, assuredly indicate real distinctions."² It is precisely because these descriptions designate something real in God that we are in a position to distinguish Him from the vain phantoms, from all idols. But because the ground of analogy here is very weak (for relations in God are so different from ours) this intrinsic attribution cannot improve to a great degree our understanding of God.³

Let us now attempt a brief comparison between Luther's and Calvin's doctrines of analogy. They manifestly agree on all the major points: the twofold knowledge of God, the corruption of the Image of God after the Fall, the *Analogia fidei*, the character of extrinsic attribution of both natural and revealed knowledge of God. Both Calvin and Luther teach a twofold knowledge of God, one based on the image of God in nature and man, the other based on the revelation in Jesus Christ. Calvin, however, with regard to the natural knowledge, stresses more than Luther its symbolic character. For both Luther and Calvin the image of God in man is so corrupted by sin that a natural knowledge of God becomes impossible forever. After the Fall true knowledge of God can be achieved only in so far as our words are taken from His Word. Neither in Luther nor in Calvin do we find trace of *analogia entis* after the Fall. They both assert that an analogy is established by Revelation (*analogia fidei*) but it is an analogy freely chosen by God Himself. Even after Revelation our theological language remains closed within the domain of extrinsic attribution. Both Calvin and Luther consider God's essence as wholly inscrutable. The idea of *Deus absconditus* is as native to Calvin's theology as to Luther's, with whom it is generally associated.⁴

3. A. QUENSTEDT

In the Reformation there are other important figures (f.i. Melanchton and Zwingli) whose theological thought ought to be analyzed in order to obtain a complete picture of the history of the Protestant doctrine of analogy. But for the understanding of its development the study of Luther and Calvin is sufficient. We pass, therefore, from the age of

¹ Calvin, *Instit.* I, 13, 4.

² Calvin, *Instit.* I, 13, 17.

³ Cfr. Calvin, *Instit.* I, 13, 2.

⁴ See T. H. L. Parker, *The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God* (London 1952), pp. 11-12, 109 ff.

Reformation to the age of Orthodoxy. The immediate wave which followed the Reformation period is the period usually called Orthodoxy.

Orthodoxy in Protestant theology plays the same role played by Scholasticism in Catholic theology. As Scholasticism is the systematization and consolidation of the ideas of the Church-Fathers, likewise Orthodoxy is the systematization and consolidation of the ideas of the Reformation.

One of the most brilliant systematizers of Protestant Reformation thought is A. Quenstedt. His major work is the *Theologia didacticopolemica*. We shall follow his exposition of the doctrine of analogy in order to have a typical interpretation of the teaching of the Reformers on this point.¹

Quenstedt first states the following thesis: "Essence, substance, spirit and the other attributes, which are predicated of both God and creatures, are not predicated of them either univocally or equivocally but analogously."² Then he goes on to explain the meaning of univocal, equivocal and analogous predication. In univocal predication several things have in common both the name and the perfection signified by it in the same way (*aequaliter*). Now this predication cannot take place in the case of God and His creatures, because that which a creature has in common with God belongs to it relatively to God's action, and consequently such perfections are primarily in God and only secondarily in creatures.³

In equivocal predication several things have in common the same name but not the perfection signified. Now this cannot be said to be the case of God and His creatures because then any knowledge of God from creatures would be impossible.⁴

In analogous predication several things have in common both the same name and the perfection signified by it, though in a different way (*inaequaliter*). This is the case of the predication of the attributes of God: they designate a perfection which belongs to both God and His creatures.⁵

Being familiar with the Cajetanistic division of analogy into *analogia inaequalitatis*, *proportionalitatis*, and *attributionis*, Quenstedt goes on to specify that when we predicate the same name of God and creatures we don't have an analogy of inequality or of proportionality but of attribution.⁶

¹ Such it is considered by K. Barth. See *Kirchliche Dogmatik* 2/1, p. 269.

² A. Quenstedt, *Theologia didactico-polemica* (Wittenberg 1685), I, ch. viii, sect. 2, q. 1.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

So far so good. Quenstedt's interpretation is in full agreement with our interpretation of the Luther and Calvin doctrines of analogy. But Quenstedt, borrowing from Suarez' terminology, then goes on to say that it is not an analogy of extrinsic but of intrinsic attribution.¹ Now this is just the opposite of what we have been saying in the previous pages. Which of the two interpretations is the correct one? We should doubt the correctness of our reading of Luther and Calvin if we were alone to see the things in this way. But it is not so. A scholar of the authority of Karl Barth shares our own view and considers Quenstedt's interpretation erroneous.² But how could as keen a theologian as Quenstedt misinterpret the Reformers on this fundamental point? We believe that it happened in this way. As many other philosophers and theologians of his time, Quenstedt makes use of Suarez' terminology but not very intelligently, i.e. without making the necessary adaptations. For Suarez, as a Catholic theologian is in a position to interpret the analogy between God and creatures as an analogy of intrinsic attribution, whereas Quenstedt, as a Protestant theologian, as a disciple of Luther and Calvin, is not.

4. SÖREN KIERKEGAARD

The Age of Enlightenment follows the Age of Orthodoxy. During this period we assist to the break down of speculative theology in two opposite directions: rationalism and fideism, two movements which have a common origin: Kant's criticism of theology and revelation; more precisely, theological rationalism has its roots in the *Critique of pure Reason* and in *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*, where Kant asserts the superiority of natural religion over revealed religion; whereas fideism arises out of the *Critique of Practical Reason* and the *Critique of Judgment*, where Kant shows that the only means of access to the sphere of Transcendence is practical reason and the feeling of the Absolute.

The two great representatives of these theological movements, rationalism and fideism, are Hegel and Schleiermacher. But we shall not pause to study their views on the God-creature relationship because this is not conceived by either Hegel or Schleiermacher in such a way as to leave room for a doctrine of analogy and supernatural revelation. Indeed by conceiving the God-creature relationship as a necessary one Hegel annihilates that element of difference (between God and His

¹ *Ibid.*

² K. Barth, *Kirchliche Dogmatik* 2/1, pp. 269-271.

creatures), that is essential to both analogy and revelation. The situation is not very different in Schleiermacher's theology, where the element of distance required by analogy and revelation is also eliminated, this time not by reason (as in Hegel's system) but by the feeling of absolute dependency, a feeling which is immediately aroused by the reflections of God in nature.

In reaction to the Hegelian and the Schleiermacherian conception of the God-creature relationship,¹ Kierkegaard propounds a view of such relationship in which God's absolute transcendence is so asserted as not to destroy every ground for an analogy between Him and His creatures. Because of the strong impact exercised by Kierkegaard on contemporary Protestant theology a study of his doctrine of the God-creature relationship from the standpoint of analogy is certainly rewarding. His teaching can be summarized as follows:

(1) God is separated from man and every other creature by an infinite, absolute qualitative difference. "*Between God and man there is an eternal, essential, qualitative difference*, which no one without presumptuous thinking can allow to vanish in the blasphemous assertion that God and man are indeed differentiated in the transitory moment of temporal existence, so that man within this life ought to obey and worship God, but in eternity the difference must vanish in the essential equality, so that God and man would become equals, just like the king and his valet. Thus between God and man there is and remains an eternal, essential, qualitative difference."²

(2) The infinite qualitative difference, before the Fall, did not prevent man from having a positive relationship to God, since "every man is

¹ For Kierkegaard's repeated criticisms of Hegel's and Schleiermacher's views on religion see the *Index of Names* in the Italian edition of the *Journals* (Kierkegaard, *Diario*, transl. by Fabro; Brescia: Morcelliana, 1951, vol. III, pp. 472-476). In the other works we generally find direct attacks only on Hegel, but indirect attacks on Schleiermacher are also frequent, e.g. when Kierkegaard condemns the static view of religion, or the immediate relationship to God.

² Kierkegaard, *On Authority and Revelation*, transl. by Lowrie (Princeton 1955), p. 112. Similar statements in *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* 195 & 369; *Attack upon Christendom* 255. In the *Journals* (Italian transl. by Fabro I, p. 381) Kierkegaard declares that the confusion of idealism consists in only positing a quantitative difference between the finite and the Infinite and, consequently in having done away with the immense abyss of the qualitative difference between God and man. Some students of Kierkegaard (e.g. Melchiorre, "Il principio di analogia come categoria metafisica nella filosofia di Kierkegaard," in *Giornale critico della filosofia italiana* 1955, p. 57; Collins, *The Mind of Kierkegaard*, p. 150) have maintained that the infinite qualitative difference is due to the original sin, and, therefore, it did not exist before sin: before the Fall there was an *analogia entis* between God and man. But we are unable to see how this interpretation can be harmonized with the clear and categorical statement of *On Authority and Revelation* just quoted.

created in the image of God."¹ This image of God, however, does not consist in an immediate, direct likeness, "as between God and a human being... there is an absolute difference. In man's absolute relationship to God this absolute difference must therefore come to expression, and any attempt to express an immediate likeness becomes impertinence, frivolity, effrontery, and the like. Precisely because there is an absolute difference between God and man, man will express his own nature most adequately when he expresses this difference absolutely. Worship is the maximum expression for the God-relationship of a human being, and also for his likeness with God, because the qualities are absolutely different."² As on the ontological level there is a very slight analogy between God and man, so too on the epistemological level man can acquire a knowledge of God which bears a very weak analogy to His reality. This is so because man knows God from creation, which is an indirect manifestation of God. "He is in the creation, and present everywhere in it, but directly He is not there... Nature is, indeed the work of God, but only the handiwork is directly present, not God. Is not this to behave, in His relationship to the individual like an elusive author who nowhere sets down his result in large type, or gives it to the reader beforehand in a preface?... Or is not God so unnoticeable, so secretly present in His works, that a man might very well live his entire life, be married, become known and respected as citizen, father, and captain of the hunt, without ever having discovered God in His works?... The immediate relation to God is paganism... All paganism consists in this, that God is related to man directly, as the obviously extraordinary to the astonished observer. But the spiritual relationship to God in the truth, i.e., in inwardness, is conditioned by a prior irruption of inwardness, which corresponds to the divine elusiveness that God has absolutely nothing obvious about Him, that God is so far from being obvious that He is invisible. It cannot immediately occur to any one that He exists, although His invisibility is again His omnipresence."³ "God is a highest conception not to be explained in terms of other things, but explainable only by exploring more and more profoundly the conception itself. The highest principles for all thought can be demonstrated only indirectly (negatively)."⁴

(3) With the Fall the image of God becomes corrupted, the slight vestige of divinity with which man was originally endowed melts away.

¹ Kierkegaard, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, 233 note, Cfr. *Edifying Discourses I*, 100-103.

² *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, p. 369.

³ O.c. pp. 218-219.

⁴ O.c. p. 197.

In his pride man does no longer recognize God's absolute difference and loses the *imago Dei*, whose essence is this very recognition. Instead of being related to God as a worshipper man now becomes an idolater, who believes in an immediate relationship to God.¹ Sin is this very pride of immediacy, whose bitter fruit is the excavation of a new abyss between God and man, much deeper than that of the infinite qualitative difference. "If the distance is infinite between God, who is in heaven, and thee, who art on earth, infinitely greater is the distance between the Holy One and thee, the sinner."² Actually "sin is the one thing that cannot be predicated of God, whether by the *via negationis* or the *via eminentiae*. If, in the same way as one says that God is not finite, one were to add that He is not a sinner, it would be blasphemy."³ Not only sin cannot be predicated of God, but everything belonging to man, being contaminated by sin,⁴ is to be excluded from God. Of man we can say that he thinks, that he exists. This cannot be said of God: "God does not think, he creates; God does not exist, He is eternal."⁵ Because of sin an absolute heterogeneity between God and man, between the human mind and eternal truth takes place also on the epistemological level. "The inwardness of sin... is the greatest possible and the most painful possible distance from the truth, when truth is subjectivity".⁶ After the Fall reason is no longer in a position to reach a true knowledge of God, at the most it can give an abstract definition of Him, as when it calls Him "the first unmovable principle."⁷ In brief, after the Fall man finds himself in a mere negative relationship to God both on the ontological and on the epistemological level: no analogy, no *imago Dei* can exist.

(4) A positive relationship, a likeness, an analogy between man and God is reestablished by the Word of God, by Jesus Christ. – "The dread of possibility, (which constitutes the essence of sin), holds him (man) as its prey, until it can deliver him saved into the hands of faith. In no other place does he find repose, for every other point of rest is mere nonsense, even if in men's eyes it is shrewdness."⁸ In Faith, in the

¹ O.c. p. 219 and 369.

² Quoted by H. R. Mackintosh, *Types of Modern Theology*, p. 237.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Sometimes Kierkegaard goes so far as to identify existence with sin: "We may finally reach the stage of identifying existence with evil" (*Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, p. 295; see p. 470, 517).

⁵ *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, p. 296; cfr. 293.

⁶ O.c. p. 240.

⁷ *Journals* IV, A, 157; Italian Transl. by Fabro I, p. 184.

⁸ *The Concept of Dread*, p. 141. Similar statements may be found in the *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, p. 412: "The individual can do absolutely nothing of himself, but is as nothing

Word of God, in Jesus Christ man is recreated by God, who "annihilates the unlikeness that exists between them,"¹ by making Himself understood and loved. Especially, in love is realized the new analogy between God and man, because God's "nature is love."² "Moved by love, God is thus eternally resolved to reveal Himself. But as love is the motive so love must also be the end; for it would be a contradiction for God to have a motive and an end which did not correspond. His love is a love of the learner (man), and His aim is to win him. For it is only in love that the unequal can be made equal, and it is only in equality or unity that an understanding can be effected."³

What kind of analogy does faith operate in the faithful, according to Kierkegaard? Is it only an analogy of extrinsic attribution or does it transform his being so deeply as to establish in him an analogy of intrinsic attribution? Kierkegaard's teaching on inwardness, on reduplication, imitation, on truth as subjectivity seems to favor the interpretation of those scholars who find in him a doctrine of analogy of intrinsic attribution. But there are many reasons for suspecting the validity of this interpretation: (a) notwithstanding a very sharp criticism of Luther's and his followers' aesthetic religious attitude, in his heart, Kierkegaard remains very Protestant.⁴ Now we know that according to the Reformers, faith establishes an analogy of extrinsic and not intrinsic attribution between God and the believer. (b) Kierkegaard's teaching on inwardness, imitation, reduplication cannot be cited in support of a doctrine of analogy of being or of analogy of intrinsic attribution, because inwardness, imitation, reduplication to him means suffering, lack of being, non-being, not increase of being, divine grace or some other ontological quality.⁵ (c) With regard to the epistemological level he ascribes, indeed, to the believer the acquisition of a true knowledge of God, the gaining of eternal truth, but these are vague before God; for here again the negative is the mark by which the God-relationship is recognized, and self-annihilation is the essential form for the God-relationship." In *Crucial Situations* (O. 24) it is said that all the eloquence in the world cannot convict man of sin. God alone can do that.

¹ *Philosophical Fragments*, p. 19.

² *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, p. 122.

³ *Philosophical Fragments*, p. 19. Melchiorre sums up Kierkegaard's teaching on this point as follows: "La dialettica della salvezza è quella che muove da una singolarità equivoca, base d'ogni egoismo, ad una singolarità analogica, fondata sull'amore. Per questo appunto venne Cristo: "per abolire l'egoismo e mettere l'amore: amiamoci l'un l'altro" (Melchiorre, "Il principio di analogia come categoria metafisica nella filosofia di Kierkegaard," in *Giornale critico della filosofia italiana* 1955, p. 65).

⁴ For his attacks upon Catholicism, always inspired to a Protestant conception of Christianity, see "Cattolicesimo" in the *Terminological Index* of the Italian edition of the *Journals*.

⁵ On this point see the section of the *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* entitled "The essential expression" (pp. 386-468).

statements. When he is more specific he does not assign to man much more than a purely negative knowledge of God.¹ Here and there we also encounter statements of positive content, e.g., "God is Love," "God is a person," "God is spirit." But we have found similar statements in Calvin and Luther also, to whom they did not mean more than an analogy of extrinsic attribution. On the basis of these reasons we are inclined to interpret Kierkegaard's teaching as affirming that the *analogia fidei* is nothing more than an analogy of extrinsic attribution.²

Now, before passing to the study of the two most influential Protestant theologians of our time, we should reserve some attention to the two major representatives of the Liberal School, Ritschl and Harnack. But we shall have occasion to say something on their teaching on the God-creature relationship when we deal with Barth's theological development. For this reason we shall not pause to study their doctrines now, and will immediately pass to an analysis of Tillich's doctrine of religious symbolism.

¹ Mackintosh, *Types of Modern Theology*, p. 239.

² In our opinion that which is new in Kierkegaard is not so much a theological speculation imbued with Catholicism (as it is sometimes affirmed, e.g. by Fabro, in *Dall'essere all'esistente*, Ch. VI, "L'ambiguità del cristianesimo kierkegaardiano"), since his speculation is essentially Protestant, as the earnestness with which he asserts that speculation does not suffice to make a good Christian. "The inquiring, speculating and knowing subject raises a question of truth. But he does not raise the question of subjective truth, the truth of appropriation and assimilation. The inquiring subject is indeed interested, but he is not infinitely and personally and passionately interested." (*Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, p. 23).

TILLICH'S DOCTRINE OF RELIGIOUS SYMBOLISM

Paul Tillich was born in Brandenburg in 1886 and was educated in the German universities. His early academic career was set against the German scene; but since 1933 he has been in America at the Union Theological Seminary of New York. Since September 1955 his work continues at the Harvard Divinity School, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Today Tillich is one of the most prominent Protestant theologians. In America his influence is stronger than that of any other Catholic or Protestant theologian.¹ His major work is *Systematic Theology*.² However, after the reading of this difficult work the student of Tillich's thought may feel lost in a maze, wondering as to which is the architectonic principle of his system. Fortunately for the student of Tillich's theology, Tillich himself, in an essay, has opened his mind to us. In his "Reply to Interpretation and Criticism" the reader finds the revealing statement: "The center of my theological doctrine is the concept of symbol."³ The reader who is anxious to find a clue to the understanding of the difficult theological system of the great German theologian will certainly stop at this sentence, he will read it again and will underline it. He will then turn to the other writings of Tillich's and try to discover

¹ "This man (Tillich) is most significant for theology in the contemporary West. It can be maintained without rashness that he is the most impressive figure in today's Protestant theology, which is distinguished by many great names both in Europe and America" (G. Weigel, "The Theological Significance of Paul Tillich," in *Cross Currents* 1956, p. 141). "Through his lectures and writings Tillich undoubtedly exerts a seminal influence on American Protestantism. His fame is at a peak. Even in the most unexpected quarters the urge to speak a Tillichian language is strong." (G. H. Tavard, *Paul Tillich and the Christian Message*; New York: Scribners, 1962, p. 164).

² Chicago, University Press, 1951 and 1957. The third volume has not yet appeared. The other basic works for the understanding of Tillich's theology are as follows: *The Protestant Era*, Chicago: University Press, 1948; *The Courage to Be*, New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1952; *The Shaking of the Foundations*, New York: Scribners, 1953; *The New Being*, New York, Scribners, 1955; *The Dynamics of Faith*, New York: Harper, 1956.

³ P. Tillich, "Reply to Interpretation and Criticism," in *Theology of P. Tillich*, ed. G. W. Kegley (Macmillan, 1952), p. 333.

their meaning by interpreting them in the light of this clue. Elsewhere the reader will find other statements that will strengthen his hope that this clue is the right one, like the statement, "the *direct* object of theology is found only in religious symbols," and the statement, "Theology is the conceptual interpretation, explanation and criticism of the symbols in which a special encounter between God and man has found expression."¹ Now the student of Tillich's system can no longer doubt that symbolism is the key to Tillich's theological thought. Now he feels reassured, because with the clue of the doctrine of symbolism many of Tillich's views become clear and also the doctrines of correlation, estrangement, New Being, etc., disclose their meanings.

Tillich has briefly summarized his doctrine of symbolism in an essay which appeared thirty five years ago in German.² But he became aware of the centrality of the doctrine of symbolism in his theological system only after the publication of the first volume of his *Systematic Theology*. He has since tried to make up for the lack of a systematic presentation of the doctrine of symbolism in the introductory section of *Systematic Theology*, in several occasional writings³ and especially in *Dynamics of Faith*, a splendid *summula* of Tillichian thought. Today Tillich's student has at his disposal sufficient material for the reconstruction of a well developed theory of symbolism, both in its general principles and its detailed applications to theology. To this reconstruction we now turn. But first we briefly review the long history of the doctrine of symbolism from Philo to Tillich.

1. HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE OF SYMBOLISM

The term "symbol" comes from the Greek word "*symbolon*". Its general meaning in Greek is that of "a sign by which one knows or infers a thing."⁴ Aristotle uses the term "symbol" to denote the relation

¹ P. Tillich, "Theology and symbolism" in *Religious Symbolism*, ed. F. E. Johnson (Harper, 1955), pp. 107-108.

² The article first appeared in 1928 in *Blätter für Deutsche Philosophie* B. I, H. 4. It first appeared in English in 1940 with the title *The Religious Symbol* in *The Journal of Liberal Religion* Vol. II (1940), pp. 13-33. It has been recently reedited in *Daedalus* 1958 (Summer), pp. 3-21.

³ See especially "Theology and Symbolism" in *Religious Symbolism*, ed. F. E. Johnson (Harper, 1955), pp. 107-116; "Religious and our Knowledge of God," *The Christian Scholar*, XXXVIII (1955), pp. 189-197; "Existential Analysis and Religious Symbol" in *Contemporary Problems in Theology*, ed. H. A. Basilius (Detroit: Wayne University Press, 1956), pp. 35-55. In these essays Tillich treats of the religious symbols in general. In our opinion the best exposition of the doctrine of religious symbolism and its application to the fundamental theological problems is contained in *Dynamics of Faith* (New York: Harper, 1957).

⁴ Cf. Liddle-Scott, *Greek-English Lexikon*, "σύμβολον".

between spoken words (or written words) and mental concepts,¹ and between mental concepts and physical objects: in speaking and thinking man has to use symbols in place of things "which cannot be made to appear themselves in our midst."²

The systematic use of the concept of symbol in theology began with Philo. Philo distinguishes between two kinds of meaning: literal or obvious meaning and allegorical or symbolical or underlying meaning. With regard to the interpretation of statements made in the Bible about God he sets down the rule that no anthropomorphic expression about God is to be taken literally; statements like "God walks," "God repents," etc., are to be understood allegorically or symbolically. In general, however, Philo refused to apply to all the narratives of the Sacred Books the allegorical interpretation at the expense of the literal interpretation.³ In the history of religious homiletics, ever since its beginnings both in Judaism and Christianity, there has been besides the symbolic interpretation of scriptural texts also a symbolic interpretation of facts observed in nature. With Clement of Alexandria this latter kind of interpretation is placed on a par with the former kind, and the two are united to form the symbolic interpretation. According to Clement, material things as observed by us in nature, have an outward and an inner meaning. Physical things have a spiritual meaning, a religious significance, since they participate in the perfections of the Creator. God is the archetype, physical things are images of this archetype.⁴ Religious philosophers, then, have always used the concept of symbol in two ways, one to express the hidden meaning of the Sacred Books, and the other to express the hidden meaning of observed material things. The concept of symbol is used more or less extensively by all the Church Fathers and Scholastic theologians. Among the great Scholastics who have made use of the symbolical interpretation as a theological method, Maimonides and Bonaventura deserve special mention. Maimonides uses symbolism mainly in order to express the hidden meaning of Biblical statements about God. Bonaventura uses symbolism especially to express the hidden meaning of observed material things.⁵

¹ Cf. *De Interpretatione*, I, 16a, 4 ff. According to Aristotle the relation between words and concepts is conventional: "We have already said that a noun signifies this or that by convention. No sound is by nature a noun: it becomes one becoming a symbol. Inarticulate noises mean something - for instance those made by brute beasts. But no noises of that kind are nouns" (*De Interpretatione* II, 16a, 27 ff.).

² Cf. *De Sophisticis Elenchis* I, 1, 165a, 6-7.

³ Cf. H. A. Wolfson, *Philo*, I, pp. 115-138.

⁴ Cf. *Enciclopedia Cattolica*, "Simbolo e Simbolismo."

⁵ For Maimonides see *The Guide for the Perplexed*, especially Part I; for Bonaventura see Gilson, *La Philosophie de Saint Bonaventura*, especially ch. vii, "L'Analogie Universelle."

After many centuries of nominalism and rationalism, two mental attitudes which have little sympathy for symbolism, interest in symbols has revived during the last fifty years, especially through the writings of Cassirer, Urban, Niebuhr, Morris, Whitehead and Tillich.¹ Although a general theory of symbols is for the most part still in the speculative stage, Tillich has developed a theory of symbols capable of dealing with any kind of theological problem. We will first summarize Tillich's doctrine of symbols in general, and then his application of symbolism to theology.

2. TILlich's DOCTRINE OF THE SYMBOL IN GENERAL

(a) Definition of symbols

Tillich defines a symbol as something pointing beyond itself.² This definition of symbol brings out its "figurative quality," which is one of its essential qualities.³ But the definition is not specific enough, for not only symbols but also signs are things pointing beyond themselves. An adequate definition of symbol must therefore bring out the essential difference that distinguishes a sign from a symbol.⁴ According to Tillich, the essential difference consists in the fact that a sign does not participate in any way in the reality, power and meaning of that to which it points, whereas a symbol participates in the reality, power and meaning of the thing symbolized.⁵ For example, the letters of the alphabet as they are written (e.g. an "A" or an "R") are signs: they do not participate in the sound to which they point.⁶ The flag is a symbol:

¹ E. Cassirer, *Die Begriffsform im Mythischen Denken* (Berlin, 1922); *Language and Myth* (New York, 1946); W. M. Urban, *Language and Reality*, (New York, 1939); R. Niebuhr, "The Truth in Myths" in *Nature of Religious Experience*, Essays in honor of D. C. Mackintosh, pp. 117-136; C. Morris, *Signs, Language and Behaviour* (New York, 1946); A. N. Whitehead, *Symbolism, its Meaning and Effect* (New York, 1927).

² "Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God," p. 189; see also "Theology and Symbolism," p. 108; *Dynamics of Faith*, p. 41.

³ "Religious Symbol," *Daedalus* (Summer, 1958), p. 3.

⁴ In the past the distinction between sign and symbol has always been vague. The terms "sign" and "symbol" have frequently been used interchangeably. Symbol has been used for things pointing beyond themselves without participating in the thing signified (cf. Aristotle, *De Interpretatione* 16a). Sign has been used for things pointing to something wherein they participate (cf. Aquinas, *S. Theol.* III, 60, 2 & 4). In modern thought symbol is more frequently used for things which participate in the object to which they point; sign is generally used for things which point beyond themselves by convention. For an excellent Neo-Thomistic discussion of the concepts of sign and symbol see J. Maritain's "Signe et Symbole" in *Quatre Essais sur l'Esprit*, pp. 59-124.

⁵ Cf. "Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God," pp. 189-190; "Theology and Symbolism," p. 109; *Systematic Theology*, I, p. 177; II, p. 9; *Dynamics of Faith*, p. 42, etc.

⁶ This should not mislead the reader into thinking that Tillich conceives the relation between language and reality to be conventional, for this is not the case. With slight change

it participates in the power of the king or nation for which it stands. A symbol, then, may be defined as something pointing to something else and participating in the reality, power and meaning of the thing to which it points. There are three corollaries of this definition of symbol: 1. Symbols have an innate, inherent power within themselves. Signs are impotent in themselves.¹ 2. Signs are arbitrary products, symbols are not.² 3. Signs may be replaced, symbols cannot. Signs are interchangeable at will. They do not arise from necessity, for they have no inner power. Symbols, however, do possess a necessary character. They cannot be exchanged. They can only disappear, when, through dissolution, they lose their inner power.³

In a symbol two main aspects are distinguishable. These aspects are called by Tillich some times *empirical* and *transcendent*,⁴ other times *literal* and *self-transcending*,⁵ and other times *ordinary* and *hidden*.⁶ The empirical or literal or ordinary aspect is the material which forms the symbol. The transcendent, or self-transcending or hidden aspect is the symbol considered in its figurative function. For example, smoke is a symbol of fire. The empirical aspect of smoke is the gaseous product of burning organic materials. The transcendent aspect of smoke is its pointing to fire. Here it is important to note that smoke is not identical with fire either in its empirical or in its transcendent aspect. In general, the symbol is distinct from the thing signified both in the empirical and in the transcendent aspect.

It seems to us that in his study of the nature of symbols Tillich does not insist enough on the twofold aspect of symbols. He is not clear on the relation between empirical and transcendent aspect. Sometimes he seems to consider the two aspects as two levels of meaning of the same reality.⁷ Other times he seems to conceive them as two different realities.⁸ The result of this ambiguity is that when he considers the two

through the years Tillich has always maintained that words are symbols rather than signs. See, for example, *S. Theol.* II, p. 19, "The Religious Symbol," p. 4; *Protestant Era*, p. 61; "Religious Symbols and the Knowledge of God," p. 190, etc.

¹ "The Religious Symbol," pp. 3-4.

² *Ibid.*; cf. *Dynamics* p. 42; *Protestant Era*, p. 69.

³ "The Religious Symbol," p. 4; *Dynamics*, pp. 42-43; "Religious Symbol and Our Knowledge of God," p. 192, etc.

⁴ "The Religious Symbol," p. 17.

⁵ *Systematic Theology*, II, p. 9.

⁶ *Systematic Theology* II, p. 9. It is important to notice that these are two aspects of the same reality. It is the same reality considered either in its literal or in its symbolic meaning. In its literal meaning it signifies itself; in its symbolic meaning it points to something else.

⁷ See, for example, *Interpretation of History*, p. 225, where the profane and the holy are conceived as two "attitudes" of man towards the same reality. Also the relation between philosophy and theology is conceived in this way. See *Systematic Theology* I, pp. 22 ff.

⁸ See, for example, *Systematic Theology* I, p. 108 ff. In his recent writings, especially *Systematic*

aspects as two levels of meaning of the same reality, the objective independence and distinct reality of the thing symbolized is better safeguarded; but when he conceives the two aspects as two realities, the independent reality of the thing symbolized tends to be absorbed into the transcendent dimension. It is this ambiguity that gives a flavour of pantheism to Tillich's doctrine of religious symbolism. We will come back to this crucial point of the Tillichian doctrine of symbolism later. For the moment it is enough to have underlined one of the fundamental ambiguities of his doctrine.

(b) *Function of symbols*

Tillich assigns to symbols two functions, which he calls *main* and *basic*,¹ but we would rather call them *subjective* and *objective* functions.² The basic or objective function of symbols is the opening up of levels of reality which otherwise are hidden and cannot be grasped in any other way. All arts create symbols for a level of reality which cannot be reached in any other way. A picture and a poem reveal elements of reality which cannot be approached scientifically. In the creative work of art we encounter reality in a dimension which is closed for us without such works.³ The main or subjective function of symbols is the opening up of levels of the soul, levels of our interior reality. Symbols open up dimensions and elements of reality, which otherwise would remain unapproachable, only by unlocking dimensions and elements of our soul which correspond to the dimensions and elements of reality.⁴ "So every symbol is two-edged. It opens up reality and it opens up the soul."⁵

Theology II, where Tillich openly discloses his Platonic heritage (pp. 21 ff.), he tends to abandon the first view of the relation between transcendent and empirical aspect. He proclaims with decision the transcendent reality of the object symbolized. This view is the view of classical theology, of which Bonaventura in this respect is probably the best representative.

¹ "Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God," pp. 190-191. Of course these two functions are not exclusive to symbolic knowledge. Existential analysis has recently shown that most of our sensory and intellectual knowledge is two-sided; it reveals both subject and object in the same act.

² The terms "subjective" and "objective" are not foreign to Tillich's terminology. In *Dynamics of Faith* p. 96 he distinguishes between two sides of faith "a subjective and an objective side." In *Systematic Theology I*, pp. 75 ff. he distinguishes between *subjective* and *objective* function of reason.

³ *Ibid.* and also *Dynamics* p. 42; "Theology and Symbolism," p. 109.

⁴ "Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God," p. 191; see also *Dynamics*, pp. 42-43: "A great play gives us not only a new vision of the human scene, but it opens up hidden depths of our being. Thus we are able to receive what the play reveals to us in reality. There are within us dimensions of which we cannot become aware except through symbols, as melodies and rhythms in music."

⁵ "Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God," p. 191.

(c) Division of symbols

Tillich never elaborates a systematic division of symbols. He gives several enumerations, mostly based on either the material of which symbols are made or the end for which they are used. The first is the most frequent. According to this enumeration symbols are works of art, pictures, poems, plays, melodies, words, etc.¹ According to the enumeration based on the end for which symbols are used, symbols are either cognitive or practical.² Another vague division contrasts symbols with sign-symbols. Sign-symbols are defined as "things... like candles, water... cross (which) were originally only signs, but in use became symbols."³ In "The Religious Symbol" Tillich distinguishes between symbols which give "expression to an invisible thing which has no existence except in its symbols, as for example, cultural creations like works of art, scientific concepts and legal forms" and symbols which give expression to a thing which exists in itself independently of the symbol, as for example, a flag used as the symbol of a king.⁴ In our opinion the last of these divisions is erroneous, because it contradicts the very essence of a symbol, which is that of pointing beyond itself. But the symbols of the first branch of Tillich's last division are supposed to point to something "that has no existence except in its symbol." This must be firmly denied, otherwise the very notion of symbol volatilizes.⁵

(d) Theories of symbol

In his classification of the theories of symbol Tillich distinguishes between negative and positive theories. The characteristic of the negative theories is that they deny that the symbol has an objective reference and attribute to it merely a subjective character. A definite subjective state and not the actual facts referred to in the symbol is expressed in the symbol.⁶ The characteristic of the positive theories is that they assert that the selection of the symbols is not unrelated to the objective reference of the symbols, but rather has an essential relation to it.⁷ Tillich takes account of the good points of the negative theories. He recognizes,

¹ Cf. "Religious Symbol and our Knowledge of God," p. 191; *Dynamics*, pp. 42-43; "The Religious Symbol," p. 4.

² *Dynamics of Faith*, pp. 117 ff. For the same division here Tillich uses also the terminology: intuitive and active, or mythical and ritual.

³ "Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God," p. 196.

⁴ "The Religious Symbol," pp. 4-5.

⁵ I believe that the source of Tillich's error is a failure to make a distinction between the different levels of reality to which symbols may point. Symbols may point to something which is only mentally real, or to something physically real, or to something spiritually real.

⁶ "The Religious Symbol," p. 5.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 8.

for example, that these theories have shown that the psychological and social situation is decisive for the selection of symbols.¹ But on the whole he considers the negative theories as "especially dangerous for religious symbols, since the latter... intend to express a reality and not merely the subjective character of a religious individual."² Tillich's classification of the theories of symbol shows that, at least in intention, he professes a positive theory of symbol, namely, a theory that recognizes the *objective reference* of the symbol.³

(e) *The origin of symbol*

As we have seen, symbols arise necessarily, since they have a necessary character.⁴ They are what they are in themselves, not by human will; because they participate in the "object" to which they point and are not merely subjective creations. They are not created but chosen by the user of the symbol.⁵ Symbols, however, being instruments of knowledge, always require a relation to some knowing subject, to some user of the symbol, otherwise they are not actual but only potential symbols. It is then in the very nature of an actual symbol to have both a subjective and an objective reference. The objective reference is its participation in the object to which it points. The subjective reference is its relation to the user of the symbol. Tillich, who, as we have seen, professes a positive, i.e., objective theory of symbol, maintains both the subjective and the objective reference of the symbol.⁶ But sometimes he uses an unguarded language, that gives the impression that he teaches a negative, i.e., a subjective theory of symbol.⁷ He says, for example, that symbols are "*creations of the human mind*," that they "*are created... by the collective unconscious*."⁸ This language is not necessarily in conflict with Tillich's objective theory of symbolism, which maintains that the symbol participates in the object symbolized,

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 5.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 6. Since Tillich seems to have no aversion for the terminology "objective" and "subjective", I would suggest to call the negative theories *subjective* and the positive theories *objective*. Cf. Tillich "Mythus und Mythologie," *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Tübingen, 1930), p. 364, where Tillich describes his theory of myth as *symbolical-realist*.

⁴ Cf. "The Religious Symbol," p. 4; *Dynamics of Faith*, pp. 42-43; "Religious Symbol and our Knowledge of God," p. 192, where we read: "Symbols are born out of the womb which is usually called today the 'group unconscious' or 'collective unconscious'... It is not invented intentionally; and even if somebody would try to invent a symbol, as sometimes happens, then it becomes a symbol only if the unconscious of a group says 'yes' to it."

⁵ *C. Dynamics*, p. 43 and 58.

⁶ See, for example, "Religious Symbol and our Knowledge of God," pp. 190-191; *Dynamics of Faith*, pp. 42-43; "Theology and Symbolism," p. 109; "The Religious Symbol," pp. 5 ff.

⁷ "The Religious Symbol and our Knowledge of God," p. 193.

⁸ "The Religious Symbol," p. 4.

since there are cases in which the user of the symbol is also the creator of the symbol. For example, the flag is both created and used by the nation represented by the flag. But to say in general that religious symbols are creations of the collective unconscious is to speak the language of a subjective theory of symbolism.¹

(f) *The truth of symbols*

In *Dynamics of Faith* Tillich offers *adequacy* as the criterion of truth for symbols.² Since symbols have two sides,³ a subjective and an objective side, to have truth in symbols there must be adequacy with respect to both sides. A symbol is adequate in its subjective side if it opens up in the soul a level of reality that corresponds to the level of reality to which the symbol points. A symbol is adequate in its objective side if it points to a dimension of reality which cannot be known otherwise. Adequacy as a criterion of truth for symbols is fully consistent with Tillich's view that symbols are two edged. In his writings, however, there are many passages that cannot but puzzle the reader. Frequently he identifies the adequacy of the subjective side with the actual acceptance of the symbol.⁴ The fact that a symbol is actually accepted is sufficient to make the symbol subjectively true. Symbols that are alive are true. Symbols that are dead are false.⁵ It is no longer a question of correspondence between subjective and objective levels opened up by a symbol. The objective level is entirely disregarded. Here we have a

¹ The identification of the user of the symbol with the creator of the symbol, and, therefore, the identification of the user of the symbol with the "object" symbolized, is a characteristic of subjective theories of symbol. Such are the theories professed by many sociologists of primitive communities, who study the religious symbols of a community in order to have a better understanding of the community, and not in order to have a better knowledge of God. In dealing with "historical" symbols Tillich sometimes seems to maintain a subjective theory of symbol. He accepts or rejects "historical" symbols as religious symbols only on the ground that they have been accepted or rejected by the collective unconscious, independently as to whether any historical event did actually happen, i.e., independently as to whether the "historical" symbols were produced by the "object" to which they point or not. For example, the symbol of the "Virgin Birth" was for many centuries a good religious symbol although based on "a most obviously legendary story," ("The Religious Symbol and our Knowledge of God," p. 196). So too polytheistic gods were good religious symbols for polytheistic communities although based on legendary ground (ibid. 192). See also *Dynamics*, p. 45-46. In re-editing the essay "The Religious Symbol" in *Daedalus* (Summer, 1958) Tillich has largely checked the subjective bent of his theory of symbol. Passages like "religious symbols have no basis either in the empirical order or in the cultural order of meaning. Strictly speaking they have no basis at all. In the language of religion, they are objects of faith" have been eliminated. For a similar criticism of the subjectivistic bent of Tillich's doctrine of symbols see G. H. Tavad, *Paul Tillich and The Christian Message*, pp. 57-58.

² *Dynamics of Faith*, pp. 96-97 together with 42-43; cf. "The Religious Symbol and our Knowledge of God," p. 196; "Existential Analysis and Religious Symbols," p. 55.

³ Sometimes Tillich calls the sides "functions," cf. p. 123.

⁴ Cf. *Dynamics of Faith*, pp. 96-97; "The Religious Symbol," p. 4.

⁵ *Dynamics of Faith*, pp. 96-97.

wholly subjective criterion of truth, according to which symbols that are alive are true, symbols that are dead are false. But this criterion is not only in conflict with Tillich's professed "objective" theory of symbol. In our view the statement "symbols that are dead are false" is meaningless. Symbols that are dead are neither true nor false. They are not symbols at all. False symbols are symbols that are alive but subjectively do not open up the dimension of reality that corresponds to the objective dimension of reality opened up by them. In conclusion, only the criterion of adequacy in the sense of correspondence, rather than in the sense of acceptance, is consistent with Tillich's "objective" theory of symbol.¹

3. TILlich's DOCTRINE OF THE RELIGIOUS SYMBOL

The religious symbol is a sub-species, a kind of symbol. As a kind of symbol it shares all the essential qualities of a symbol: it points beyond itself, it participates in the "object" signified, it opens up new dimensions of the soul, it is not an arbitrary product, etc. Everything that Tillich says of the symbol in general applies also to the particular class of the religious symbol. In order to avoid tiresome repetitions, we consider only those points that seem necessary to give an adequate presentation of Tillich's doctrine of the religious symbol. Especially, we shall focus on the relation between religious symbols and the principle of correlation, between theology and philosophy, since it is our contention that Tillich's doctrine of religious symbolism is a consequence of the principle of correlation, which is the basic principle of Tillich's philosophy.

Tillich distinguishes between two ways of dealing with religious symbols, a philosophical and a theological way.² The philosophical way deals with religious symbols abstractly, the theological way deals with religious symbols concretely. Philosophy asks the question as to what religious symbols mean. Theology deals with religious symbols insofar as they are symbols for us. Theology does not explain the meaning of religious symbols in general but shows how in the actual case a religious

¹ The rejection of the reduction of adequacy to acceptance will not compel Tillich to adopt a criterion of truth of empirical verification. His recognition of different dimensions of objective reality enables him to protect the religious dimension from empirical criticism. What matters in Tillich's case is to give priority to the objective side of the symbol. Only a recognition of the priority of the objective side will save his theory of symbolism from subjectivism and idealism. In a private conversation Tillich has told me that now he no longer uses the criterion of acceptance as a criterion of truth for symbols. Yet in his recent edition of "The Religious Symbol" (*Daedalus*, Summer 1958 cf. p. 4) he still preserves it.

² Cf. *Systematic Theology* I, pp. 9-10; pp. 20-25; II, pp. 30-31; *The Protestant Era*, pp. 84-89

symbol belongs to our final concern.¹ In dealing with religious symbols the philosopher tries to maintain a detached objectivity; he tries to remain general and abstract in his concepts; he tries to abstract from concrete and special elements and to create generally valid concepts concerning religious symbols. The theologian, quite differently, is not detached from his object but is involved in it. He looks at the religious symbol with passion, fear and love. This is not the *eros* of the philosopher or his passion for objective truth; it is the love which accepts saving, and therefore, personal truth. The basic attitude of the theologian is commitment to the content of the religious symbol he expounds. Detachment would be a denial of the very nature of this content. The attitude of the theologian is "existential." He is involved in the concrete situation.²

But no study of the religious symbol can be wholly abstract, nor can it be wholly concrete. According to Tillich, it is impossible to deal with religious symbols either purely philosophically or purely theologically because the two approaches are correlated and, therefore, inseparable. Here Tillich's principle of correlation must be briefly stated.

(a) *The principle of correlation*

Students of Tillich are usually tempted to think that the principle of correlation holds only between philosophy and theology. They fall into this erroneous reduction because in his *Systematic Theology* Tillich illustrates the principle of correlation by showing how it works in the case of the relation between philosophy and theology.³ But the correlation between philosophy and theology is only an instance of a universal principle which, according to Tillich, holds between the infinite and any finite reality. Faith and reason, history and revelation, philosophy and theology, art and ultimate concern, science and faith, man and God are all instances of the principle of correlation. There is no reason without faith, no history without revelation, no philosophy without

¹ *Protestant Era*, pp. 85-87, *Dynamics of Faith*, pp. 90 ff.

² *Systematic Theology* I, pp. 22-23; *Dynamics of Faith*, 90 ff.

³ Another frequent misinterpretation of Tillich's principle of correlation is to confuse correlation with polarity. But polarity is not a relation of interdependence, but a relation of tension. "Tension refers to the tendency of elements within a unity to draw away from one another, to attempt to move in opposite directions" (*Systematic Theology* I, p. 198). Elements in correlation, on the contrary, tend to move in the same direction. Moreover, polarities are not in a relation of correlation because polarities can disintegrate "through the breaking of the ontological tensions and the consequent destruction of the ontological structure." *Op. cit.*, p. 199. For example, finite individualization "produces a dynamic tension with finite participation; the break of their unity is a possibility" (*Ibid.*). But the break is impossible between elements that are in a relation of correlation: the separation can never be complete.

theology, no art without ultimate concern, no science without faith, no man without God and vice versa.¹

In the case of philosophy and theology the correlation is conceived as an interdependence of philosophical questions and theological answers.² According to Tillich, philosophy makes an analysis of the human situation out of which the existential questions arise, and theology provides the answers to the questions implied in the human situation.³ Between question and answer, consequently between philosophy and theology, there is separation, since the question cannot come from theology and the answer cannot come from philosophy. "The answers cannot be derived from the questions, that is from an analysis of human existence. They are 'spoken' to human existence from beyond it. Otherwise they would not be answers."⁴ On the other hand "man cannot receive answers to questions he has never asked."⁵ This separation between philosophy and theology, however, is never complete. To some extent philosophy is always imbued by theology and theology by philosophy. "Every philosopher is a hidden theologian."⁶ He is a theologian in the degree to which his existential situation and his ultimate concern shape his philosophical vision. He is a theologian in the degree to which his intuition of the universal *logos* of the structure of reality as a whole is formed by a particular *logos* which appears to him on his particular place and reveals to him the meaning of the whole.⁷ On the other hand, the theologian is to some extent always a hidden philosopher, because, when dealing with his ultimate concern, he presupposes in every sentence the structure of being, its categories, laws and concepts. The theologian cannot escape the question of being any more easily than can the philosopher.⁸ The principle of correlation, then, holds between philosophy and theology. Correlation here means not only mutual interdependence, but also mutual interpenetration of philosophy and theology. The reason for this mutual interpenetration is that both philosophy and theology deal with being itself, the ultimate reality. It is true that the philosopher, in his study of ultimate reality, is detached

¹ Cf. *Protestant Era*, pp. 83 ff.; *Systematic Theology* I, pp. 64, 67-68, etc., and especially *Dynamics of Faith*, pp. 74-94.

² *Systematic Theology*, I, p. 60.

³ *Systematic Theology* I, pp. 62-64.

⁴ *Systematic Theology* I, p. 64.

⁵ *Systematic Theology* I, p. 65; cf. II, 13: "In this method, question and answer are independent of each other since it is impossible to derive the answer from the question or the question from the answer."

⁶ *Systematic Theology* I, p. 25; cf. *Protestant Era*, pp. 88-89.

⁷ *Systematic Theology* I, p. 25.

⁸ *Systematic Theology* I, p. 21; cf. *Protestant Era*, pp. 88-89.

while the theologian is involved. But this is a difference which is not maintained in the actual life of the philosopher and theologian. It cannot be maintained, because the philosopher is a human being with an ultimate concern, hidden or open. And the faithful one is a human being with the power of thought and the need for conceptual understanding.¹

Tillich's reader here probably wonders whether the correlation of philosophy and theology is an interdependence of two different attitudes (detached and involved) towards the same reality (being itself) or primarily an interdependence of two different dimensions of reality (immediate and ultimate) and only secondarily an interdependence of the attitudes that correspond to the two levels of reality. Tillich actually teaches both views. But it seems to us that we should take the second view as Tillich's basic teaching. This interpretation is also required by Tillich's doctrine of symbolism which, as we have seen, teaches that two levels of knowledge correspond to the *two dimensions* of reality. Finally this interpretation is confirmed by his rejection of naturalism as a theological method. According to Tillich correlation is at the same time an alternative to naturalism or monism and to supernaturalism or dualism. Naturalism considers theology as a branch of philosophy. Supernaturalism rejects any relation between the two. Against naturalism, the principle of correlation maintains that theology is not a creation of philosophy: philosophy and theology are spheres of knowledge and deal with two different dimensions of reality. Against supernaturalism, the principle of correlation holds that philosophy and theology are not two separate universes of objects but two dimensions of the same reality; therefore they are necessarily interrelated.²

Other instances where the principle of correlation holds are history and revelation, science and faith, art and ultimate concern, man and God. They are all carefully analyzed by Tillich, but for our present purposes it will be enough to touch upon the correlation between history and revelation, and the correlation between man and God.

History and revelation are distinct but not entirely separated. They are distinct because history deals with a dimension of reality different from that of revelation. History deals with the dimension of factual truth. Revelation deals with the dimension of ultimate concern. Since history and revelation deal with two different dimensions of reality, neither the truth of revelation can be made dependent on the truth of

¹ *Dynamics of Faith*, pp. 90-91; cf. also *Protestant Era*, pp. 85-88.

² *Systematic Theology* I, pp. 64-66; II, pp. 6-8.

history; nor the truth of history can be made dependent on the truth of revelation. Yet history and revelation are not entirely separated because history, in dealing with the dimension of facts, is always guided by an ultimate concern. On the other hand, revelation can and must interpret the meaning of facts from the point of view of man's ultimate concern.¹

The most important instance of the principle of correlation is the correlation of God and man. All the other correlations are a consequence of this.² Strangely enough, however, Tillich never deals systematically with the divine/human correlation as such.³ But the occasional references to it are so multiple that there can be no doubt about his views on this point. In *Systematic Theology* I, he concisely affirms that "the divine-human relation is a correlation" and explains it as a relation of question and answer.⁴ More frequently he explains the divine/human correlation in terms of finite and infinite.⁵ In the second volume of *Systematic Theology* he explains it in terms of essential unity and existential estrangement.⁶ According to Tillich the divine human correlation has three moments: a moment of union, a moment of estrangement and a moment of reunion.⁷ In the moment of union God and man are one: the elements of the correlation are united.⁸ The union of God and man is broken in the Fall. In the Fall God and man are separated: man is in a state of estrangement from God; he loses his infinity, he is no longer essentially what he ought to be.⁹ Even in the Fall, however, though estranged from God, man is not entirely cut off from Him: man can never be completely separated from God.¹⁰ In the moment of

¹ *Dynamics of Faith*, pp. 85-89.

² This is explicitly stated of the correlation between philosophy and theology, which we have seen to consist in a relation of question and answer. Tillich explicitly says that "man is the question" (*Systematic Theology* I, p. 62) and that "God is the answer" (p. 64).

³ Although the last two chapters of *Dynamics of Faith* where the various manifestations of the divine human correlation are examined may be considered as a systematic analysis of the same.

⁴ "Man is the question" (*Systematic Theology* I, p. 62); "God is the answer" (p. 64); cf. *Systematic Theology* II, p. 13.

⁵ Here are a few passages in which the divine human relation is expressed in terms of finite and infinite: "man is infinitely concerned about the infinity to which he belongs, from which he is separated and for which he is longing. Man is totally concerned, about the totality which is his true being and which is disrupted in time and place" (*S. Theol.* I, p. 14); "although man is actually separated from the infinite, he could not be aware of it if he did not participate in it potentially" (*S. Theol.* II, p. 9); "man is finite, excluded from the infinity to which he belongs" (*Ibid.* p. 31); "in the complete reunion with the divine ground of being... the finite is taken into the infinite" (*Dynamics of Faith*, p. 103).

⁶ See especially pp. 21-44; cf. also *Systematic Theology* I, pp. 252 ff.

⁷ This is true also of all the other correlations.

⁸ Cf. *Systematic Theology* I, pp. 251 ff.; *Dynamics of Faith*, p. 103.

⁹ See *Systematic Theology* II, pp. 39-47.

¹⁰ *Systematic Theology* II, pp. 14, 33, 45 etc.

reunion the estrangement of man and God is overcome. This takes place in revelation which is the experience wherein God grasps the human mind and reconciles it with Himself.¹

This, in its main lines, is Tillich's teaching on the principle of correlation. According to Tillich, as we have seen above, correlation, as an expression of the relation of God and man (and as an expression of the relation of the ground of being and every finite reality) has some advantages over the rival principles of naturalism and supernaturalism. He is ready to admit, however, that the principle of correlation may also have some drawbacks.² It seems to us that it has two main weaknesses. It is unable to safeguard God's transcendence: by making God and man interdependent, correlation denies the infinite distance between the two. Moreover, the principle of correlation seems to be incapable of giving an acceptable interpretation of the doctrines of Creation and Fall. Of course Tillich teaches God's transcendence³ and does not identify Creation with Fall.⁴ But neither the doctrine of God's transcendence nor the doctrine of the distinction between Creation and Fall are consistent with the principle of correlation. For according to this principle the correlative elements are mutually interdependent. Therefore, if God and man are in a relation of correlation they too are mutually interdependent, and there is no longer an infinite distance between the two, although Tillich's definition of correlation and transcendence may allow him to say this. Finally, when God and man are not in a correlation of union, they must be in a correlation of disunion, namely of estrangement; and this seems to make Creation and Fall really equivalent, though logically distinct.⁵

Another brief consideration is in order here. What is the relation between the principle of correlation and the principle of symbolism?

¹ *Dynamics of Faith*, pp. 78-79.

² Cf. *Systematic Theology* II, p. 16. There is, however, a major drawback that Tillich is not willing to admit, i.e., the ontological use of the principle of correlation for the relation of God and man, as we have suggested above. He maintains (in a letter that he kindly wrote to us) that "correlation is a method of approach not an ontological concept." We do not doubt that such is his intention; but what he says, especially in *Systematic* II, does not convey this message.

³ From the point of view of content (not of method) God's transcendence is one of the central doctrines, if not the central doctrine of Tillich's theology. God is frequently said to be beyond the elements of the correlations: "God is beyond finitude and infinity" (*Systematic Theology* I, p. 144); "God is beyond freedom and destiny" (*Ibid.*, p. 185); "God transcends essence and existence" (*Systematic Theology* II, p. 34); cf. also *Systematic Theology* I, p. 61; 271; II, p. 7, 13, 22 etc.

⁴ Cf. *Systematic Theology* I, p. 256; II, pp. 43-44.

⁵ In Tillich's interpretation of the doctrines of Creation and Fall there is much evidence that a method of correlation cannot make a *real* distinction between Creation and Fall. See *Systematic Theology* II, p. 44.

This is a topic about which Tillich has not expressed himself. However, on the whole, it is clear that in *Systematic Theology* the principle of correlation is assumed as the guiding principle and symbolism plays only a subordinate role.¹ And it is logically so. For, where correlation is the fundamental principle of reality, as in Tillich's system, symbolism is its necessary consequence. Where the finite is correlated to the infinite in such a way that every finite participates in the infinite and everything points to the ground of being, it is natural that anything is capable of being a symbol of the ultimate, a medium for the revelation of the ultimate. Symbolism, in this view of reality, does not need any further justification. It is required by the principle of correlation.²

(b) *The basic propositions of the doctrine of the religious symbol*

We may now turn to the exposition of Tillich's doctrine of religious symbolism.

The first proposition the reader should notice in studying Tillich's doctrine of the religious symbol is that it is a theological and not a philosophical doctrine, i.e., it is the doctrine of a theologian, not of a philosopher; it is a doctrine asserted in the circle of faith and not the product of philosophical reason. This is frequently stated by Tillich in unambiguous terms.³ The reader should take the author's intention seriously even if the content of his teaching seems to point otherwise. He should judge Tillich's doctrine of the religious symbol as a theological doctrine rather than a philosophical teaching.⁴

The second basic proposition of the doctrine of religious symbolism is the statement that God is the ground of being, the matrix of everything.⁵

¹ Cf. *Systematic Theology* I, p. 60.

² Tillich himself usually gives this justification for the principle of symbolism. See, for example, *Systematic Theology* I, p. 118; *Dynamics of Faith*, p. 58; *Interpretation of History*, pp. 98, 106-107; 222. Frequently Tillich gives other justifications, that in my opinion are only secondary and, sometimes, rather *ad hominem*, as for example, when he says that "man's ultimate concern must be expressed symbolically, because symbolic language alone is able to express the ultimate" (*Dynamics of Faith*, p. 41); or when he says that omnipotence, omnipresence, providence, etc., "become absurdities and contradictions when taken literally." "Existential analysis of the religious symbol", p. 49; see also "Religious symbol and our knowledge of God," p. 194.

³ Also the principle of correlation, on which the principle of symbolism rests, "is a theological assertion" (*Systematic Theology* I, p. 8). In *Dynamics of Faith* (p. 99) Tillich declares that all what is said there about faith and religious symbols "is derived from the experience of actual faith"; see also pp. 58-59.

⁴ Cochrane, who classifies *Systematic Theology* as a systematic philosophy, as "a book which is not a witness to Christ but to 'being itself,'" disregards Tillich's intention entirely. See Cochrane, *Existentialism and God*, p. 91 and ff.

⁵ Cf. *Systematic Theology* I, pp. 110, 112, 116-117, 140, 147, 155-158, etc. Also this statement is theological. Sometimes Tillich seems to give philosophical arguments for it. See, for

The third basic proposition is the statement that, since God is the ground of being, everything participates in Him.¹

The fourth basic proposition is the statement that, although everything participates in God, nothing is identical with God. Since nothing exhausts the power of God nothing can be taken as a literal manifestation of His being. God as the true ultimate transcends the realm of finite reality infinitely. Therefore no finite reality can express Him directly and properly. Finite reality can only be a symbol of God, a medium of His revelation.²

The fifth basic proposition is the statement that, although everything is a potential symbol of God, nothing becomes an actual symbol without God's action. It is not up to man to turn finite reality into actual religious symbols "for God is manifest only through God."³

The sixth basic proposition is the statement that God has become actually and continuously manifest in human history, first in preparatory symbols, finally in the symbol of Jesus as the Christ.⁴ Jesus as the Christ, then, is the final symbol but not the only religious symbol. For God has manifested Himself through many other religious symbols.⁵

example, *Systematic Theology* I, p. 118; *Interpretation of History*, pp. 222 ff.; *Dynamics of Faith*, p. 58. Actually they are not arguments but assertions about God, the ground of being, that can be made only after God has revealed Himself. The most reason can do is to experience its finitude and the shock of nonbeing, which is a condition to the experience of the ground of being. Cf. *Systematic Theology* I, pp. 110 ff.; *Dynamics*, pp. 99-100 & 10-11.

¹ Cf. "Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God," pp. 192-193, *Systematic Theology* I, p. 118; II, p. 9; *Dynamics of Faith*, p. 58.

² *Dynamics of Faith*, pp. 44-45; *Systematic Theology* I, p. 118 ff.

³ *Systematic Theology* II, p. 16. A similar formulation is found also in *Dynamics of Faith*, where it is said that "in relation to the ultimate we are always receiving and never giving. We are never able to bridge the infinite distance between the infinite and the finite from the side of the finite" (p. 105). See also *Systematic Theology* I, p. 64; "Die Idee der Offenbarung," *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* (1927), p. 406. The fifth proposition, then, states that nothing becomes an actual symbol without God's action: it is not the task of man to turn finite reality into actual symbols "for God is manifest only through God." This proposition, together with Tillich's objective theory of symbolism require that symbols have both a subjective and an objective side, and exclude the view that symbols are man's creations. But, as already pointed out in the section on symbolism in general, Tillich occasionally teaches that man himself is the creator of religious symbols, and frequently seems to disregard the factual aspect, especially in historical events. This tendency to subjectivism is constantly present also in his theory of the religious symbol in general, and in his teaching of Jesus as the Christ in particular. See *infra*, p. 137-8.

⁴ Cf. *Systematic Theology* I, pp. 133 ff.; II, 88 ff., etc.

⁵ Cf. *Systematic Theology* I, p. 137, where Tillich says that "the event which is called 'final revelation' was not an isolated event. It presupposed a revelatory history which was a preparation for it and in which it was received. It could not have occurred without having been expected, and it could not have been expected if it had not been preceded by other revelations which had become distorted. It would not have been the final revelation if it had not been received as such, and it would lose its character as final revelation if it were not able to make itself available to every group in every place." According to Tillich "the center of history divides the whole process into preparatory and receiving revelation" (*Op. cit.*, p. 133). The bearer of the receiving revelation is the Christian Church. The bearer of preparatory

But God's revelation in the symbol of Jesus as the Christ is the decisive, fulfilling, unsurpassable revelation, that which is the criterion of all the others. Jesus as the Christ is the criterion of all the other symbols because in him the symbol has the power of negating its finitude without losing itself. Jesus as the Christ overcomes his own finite conditions by sacrificing them. In doing so he affirms that he is the bearer of the final revelation. He becomes completely transparent to the infinite, the mystery he reveals. He is able to surrender himself completely because he possesses himself completely. And he possesses and therefore surrenders himself completely because he is united with the ground of being and meaning without separation and disruption.¹ "The acceptance of the cross, both during his life and at the end of it, is the decisive test of his unity with God, of his complete transparency to the ground of being... Jesus of Nazareth is the medium of the final revelation because he sacrifices himself completely to Jesus as the Christ."²

The best symbolical representation of the infinite or unconditioned in Tillich's view is the Cross. Christ on the cross is the supreme picture of a historical person denying his own claim to existence for the sake of the unconditional demand in which he is caught up. Especially on the Cross, Christ becomes the vehicle of revelation, the symbol in which the final revelation takes place.³ The Cross has two outstanding characteristics, maintenance of unity with God and complete self-denial. On the Cross Christ cries: "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" and promptly adds: "Father into thy hands I commend my spirit." (Mt. 27.46; Lk. 23.46). It is here that we have a man like ourselves, who, when all his hopes and dreams are blasted irrevocably, is yet so intimately united to God that he can go on accepting the divine demand. Here we have God making himself transparent in a man, and man united to God. This is the God-man. Jesus as the Christ is the model, the ideal symbol for all mankind. "He represents to those who live under the conditions of existence what man essentially is and therefore ought to be under these conditions."⁴ In this way he "bridges the infinite gap between the infinite and the finite"; he brings about the reunion between God and man.⁵ The effectiveness of the symbol of the

revelation is not only the Jewish people of the Old Testament but "all the religious cultures (still) outside the Church" (p. 144). Cf. *Protestant Era* pp. XIX, 46-47; *Dynamics of Faith*, pp. 48, 58, 70, etc.

¹ *Systematic Theology* I, pp. 133 ff.

² *Systematic Theology* I, p. 136.

³ Cf. *Systematic Theology* I, 135 ff.; II, pp. 158 ff.; *Dynamics of Faith*, pp. 104, 125.

⁴ *Systematic Theology* II, p. 93.

⁵ *Ibid.* and 112.

Cross consists in its universal character: it represents a universal situation. This situation is twofold: (1) all things conditioned and finite come under judgment and must pass away; (2) the unconditioned transforms the finite into something new and unconditioned. The Cross is a normative symbol because it provides a criterion for the judgment of other symbols. It affirms that any symbol is relatively true or false in proportion as it expresses or fails to express both maintenance of unity with God and complete self-denial.

Here Tillich's reader may ask what is the validity of the proposition which affirms that Jesus as the Christ is the criterion of religious symbols. We have seen that in Tillich's system symbolism is a consequence of the principle of correlation. It is therefore logical to seek for the justification of this criterion in the principle of correlation. Symbols, according to Tillich, are finite materials of the second moment of correlation, when the finite and the infinite are separated. They are media for the realization of the third moment, the moment of the reunion of the finite and the infinite. The third moment is realized when the finite surrenders its finitude to the infinite in order to let the infinite become manifest. This has perfectly happened only in one religious symbol, the symbol of Jesus as the Christ. Only Jesus as the Christ has *surrendered*; i.e. has sacrificed his finitude entirely.¹ In doing so he has become completely transparent to God. Other religious symbols have realized the revelation of God more or less adequately in proportion to their imitation of the symbol of Jesus as the Christ.

It seems to us that in a Christian theory of symbolism based on the principle of correlation, like Tillich's theory, Jesus as the Christ is rightly the criterion of all religious symbols. But the language used by Tillich, especially in his discussion of the Symbols of the Cross in terms of the correlation of the finite and infinite, raises some difficulties. In his discussion of the Symbol of the Cross he says that the reconciliation of finite and infinite has taken place in Jesus as the Christ because Jesus has suffered and has sacrificed his finitude in order to let the infinite become transparent: through the death of Jesus the Christ is revealed.² Here the language, "surrendered, sacrificed," seems to suggest that it is only through the *annihilation* of the finite that estrangement is overcome and reunion takes place. But if the finite is annihilated it is no longer possible to talk of a reconciliation, of a reunion of the finite and the infinite. The words "surrendered," "sacrificed," therefore, cannot mean

¹ *Systematic Theology* I, pp. 133 ff.; II, p. 93.

² *Systematic Theology* I, pp. 133 ff.

annihilation. They are to be understood in such a way that the reality of the finite is not annihilated in the reunion of the finite and the infinite. The words *to surrender*, *to sacrifice finitude* are to be interpreted to mean only *to move finitude into the background, to hide it*, in order to let infinity come to the foreground, and become manifest. As in estrangement the infinite is hidden in the finite, so too in reunion the finite is hidden in the infinite.¹ This interpretation is consistent with the principle of correlation which requires the distinction of the components but not in such a way that they are both placed on the same level. Rather, correlation is apt to give a religious interpretation to the finite-infinite relation only insofar as it recognizes the priority of the infinite over the finite and condemns as estrangement the attempt to place the finite before the infinite.

Another important proposition concerning Jesus as the Christ is Tillich's statement that the results of historical research about religious symbols, especially about the symbol of Jesus as the Christ, are irrelevant to the belief in religious symbols, to the belief in the symbol of Jesus as the Christ.² The truth of faith cannot be made dependent on the historical truth of the stories and legends in which faith has expressed itself.³ The historical Jesus is only a probability,⁴ and to make faith dependent on such probability is to make faith impossible. But faith is not exposed to this difficulty, because although faith may be mediated through historical events it does not imply factual assertions, and it is therefore not exposed to critical analysis by historical research.⁵

Now, it seems to us, that Tillich as a philosopher of history, who classifies all the results of historical research as probable,⁶ is justified in considering the historical Jesus as a probability. This is consistent with Tillich's doctrine of the degree of certainty of historical symbols in general. But the statements, "faith does not imply history" and "faith is not exposed to the critical analysis of historical research"⁷ are in conflict with Tillich's doctrine of the correlation of faith and history and create serious difficulties to an objective theory of historical religious

¹ See *Systematic Theology* I, p. 255: "Before creation man is hidden in the divine ground of being." Cf. *Dynamics of Faith* p. 126; "Die Idee der Offenbarung", *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* (1927), p. 146.

² Cf. *Systematic Theology* I, 130; I, pp. 101 ff.; *Dynamics of Faith*, pp. 86-88, etc.

³ *Systematic Theology* II, p. 108; *Dynamics of Faith*, p. 87.

⁴ *The Interpretation of History*, p. 265; cf. *Systematic Theology* II, pp. 101 ff.

⁵ *Systematic Theology* I, p. 130; c. "The Religious Symbol and our Knowledge of God," p. 196.

⁶ Cf. *Systematic Theology* II, pp. 104 and 114.

⁷ *Systematic Theology* I, p. 130; II, p. 108; *Dynamics of Faith*, p. 87; "The Religious Symbol and our Knowledge of God," p. 196.

symbols. In the second volume of *Systematic Theology* he declares that "if the factual element in the Christian event were denied, the foundation of Christianity would be denied" and confidently adds that "methodological skepticism about the work of historical research does not deny this element."¹ Earlier he had said:

Jesus as the Christ is both a historical fact and a subject of believing reception. One cannot speak the truth about the event on which Christianity is based without asserting both sides... If theology ignores the fact to which the name of Jesus of Nazareth points, it ignores the basic Christian assertion that essential God-Manhood has appeared within existence and subjected itself to the conditions of existence without being conquered by them. If there were no personal life in which existential estrangement had been overcome, the New Being would have remained a quest and an expectation and would not be a reality in time and space. Only if existence is conquered in *one* point – a personal life, representing existence as a whole – it is conquered in principle, which means "in beginning and in power". This is the reason that Christian theology must insist on the actual fact to which the name Jesus of Nazareth refers.²

This relation between history and faith is clearly stressed also in *Interpretation of History* where Tillich says that: " 'Christ and history' is the combination of two concepts, neither of which can be treated completely without reference to their connection. At some point Christology meets the concept of history, and at some point the analysis of the nature of history inevitably leads to the question of Christology."³ History cannot do without revelation, without faith, without an ultimate concern. Faith, revelation, theology cannot dispense with history. Only this teaching is consistent with Tillich's objective doctrine of the religious symbol and with his principle of correlation. We have seen above that the religious symbol always has a subjective and an objective pole and that, according to the principle of correlation, history and faith (and faith and reason), although distinct, are never entirely separated. Moreover, according to Tillich, in Christianity the third moment of correlation, namely the moment of reunion or reconciliation, has taken place. It is therefore impossible that for a Christian the results of an unbiased historical research should be different from the factual elements presupposed by Christian faith. Nor can the Christian dispense with historical research because the faithful is a human being, a rational animal. He does not operate according to his nature if he does not use his reason. And Tillich, who is usually so sensitive to the activity of creatures and who makes such activity correlative to God's activity, certainly does not need such an elimination of reason when historical

¹ *Systematic Theology* II, p. 107.

² *Systematic Theology* II, p. 98.

³ *The Interpretation of History*, p. 242; see also pp. 243 ff. and "A reinterpretation of the doctrine of the Incarnation" *Church Quarterly Review* vol. 147 (Jan.-March 1949).

truth is in question.¹ Therefore the occasional passages in which Tillich teaches a dualistic view of faith and reason, of history and revelation, and encourages the believer to dispense with reason and history; and the passages where he suggests a subjectivistic view of the symbol of Jesus as the Christ are to be considered as inconsistent with the central teaching of his system.

(c) *Function of the religious symbol*

As pointed out in the section on symbols in general, the function of a symbol is a twofold revelation, a subjective and an objective revelation.² This is true also of the religious symbol. The objective revelation of the religious symbol is the opening up of the depth of objective reality, the ground of being; the subjective revelation is the opening up of subjective reality, the depth of the soul. The best analysis of these two functions of the religious symbol made by Tillich is contained in the first volume of *Systematic Theology* in the chapter on "The reality of Revelation." There Tillich says that religious symbols, insofar as they reveal the ground of being (i.e. in their objective function), are "miracles"; and insofar as they reveal the depth of the soul, they are "ecstasies." To quote Tillich himself:

Revelation always is a subjective and an objective event in strict interdependence. Someone is grasped by the manifestation of the mystery: this is the subjective side of the event. Something occurs through which the mystery of revelation grasps someone; this is the objective side. These two sides cannot be separated. If nothing happens objectively, nothing is revealed. If no one receives what happens subjectively, the event fails to reveal anything. The objective occurrence and the subjective reception belong to the whole event of revelation. Revelation is not real without the receiving side, and it is not real without the giving side. The mystery appears objectively in terms of what traditionally has been called 'miracle'. It appears subjectively in terms of what has been sometimes called 'ecstasy'.³

¹ The elimination of the historical element in Jesus would be particularly dangerous in Tillich's system. Because according to the principles of correlation and symbolism it is through the historical Jesus that the New Being becomes manifest. Therefore, if the historical reality of the symbol becomes questionable, then the manifestation of the object symbolized becomes doubtful. (Cf. *Systematic Theology* II, p. 115). Nobody will accept as a symbol what is recognized to be mere fiction, even if it is the creation of an unconscious community. It is therefore necessary to maintain that historical truth has at least a negative relation to faith, namely it makes impossible to be ultimately concerned with what is known to be mere fiction. Hence between faith and history there cannot be complete indifference and separation. It is because they are not separated but interpenetrated that we must witness to a constant struggle between faith and reason with regard to historical events; reason condemning statements of faith that seem to conflict with its evidence; faith repudiating views of reason in conflict with its doctrine. Cf. D. Emmet "Epistemology and the Idea of Revelation," in *Theology of P. Tillich*, pp. 212-213.

² *Supra*, p. 123.

³ *Systematic Theology* I, p. 111, cf. p. 117: "revelation is the manifestation of the depth of reason and of the ground of being."

This is true of all religious symbols, but is perfectly realized only in the symbol of Jesus as the Christ, because only in him are the giving and the receiving side, the subjective and the objective revelation, perfectly joined. Only in Jesus as the Christ are the miracle (the Christ) and the ecstasy (the Church) in exact correspondence.¹

(d) *Division of the religious symbol*

In the section on symbolism in general we saw that Tillich has never arrived at a systematic classification of symbols. This is not true of the religious symbols. In fact he has attempted several systematic classifications and has arrived at a dichotomous division of religious symbols.

In *Theology and Symbolism* Tillich distinguishes three levels of religious symbols, which he calls transcendent, sacramental and liturgical. On the transcendent level lie those symbols which point to the whole itself, as God and His attributes. To the sacramental level belongs the appearance of the holy in time and space. To the liturgical level belong those signs which are elevated to symbolic power, e.g., special objects, special gestures, special garb, including water, light, odors, colours and sounds.²

In *The Religious Symbols and Knowledge of God* the liturgical level is combined with the sacramental level. In this way Tillich obtains a dichotomous division of all the religious symbols. In this division the first class is constituted by the transcendent symbols (God, divine attributes, divine actions, etc.) the second class is constituted by the immanent symbols (the appearances of the divine in time and space, the sacraments, etc.).³

In this classification of the religious symbols one thing should not be

¹ This is well said both in the first and second volumes of *Systematic Theology*. In the first volume it is said that "the final revelation, like every revelation, occurs in a correlation of ecstasy and miracle. The revelatory event is Jesus as the Christ. He is the miracle of the final revelation, and his reception is the ecstasy of the final revelation." (p. 136) In the second volume Tillich insists that "Jesus as the Christ is both a historical fact and a subject of believing reception. One cannot speak the truth about the event on which Christianity is based without asserting both sides... Only their unity creates the event upon which Christianity is based. According to later symbolism, the Christ is the head of the Church, which is his body. As such, they are necessarily interdependent" (pp. 98-99).

² "Theology and Symbolism," pp. 114-115. Also in *Dynamics of Faith* Tillich distinguishes three levels of religious symbols: (1) God, (2) divine attributes and (3) manifestations of the divine in things and events, in persons and communities, in words and documents (see *Dynamics of Faith*, pp. 45-48). This threefold classification departs from that of "Theology and Symbolism" inasmuch as here no distinction is made between the liturgical and the sacramental level.

³ "The Religious Symbol and our Knowledge of God," pp. 114-115. In "The Religious Symbol" (pp. 14 ff.) Tillich distinguishes two main levels of religious symbols, which he calls the level of the objective religious symbol and the level of the transcending religious symbol.

overlooked, that is, the inclusion of concepts and words among religious symbols. From the previous analysis of Tillich's doctrine of symbolism one may have received the impression that he considered as religious symbols only objects and events, not concepts and words. But from his classification of religious symbols we learn that this is not the case. The concepts of God and His attributes and the divine names are also symbols. This is an important point in Tillich's doctrine of symbolism, because it is on the ground that divine concepts and names are symbols that he argues that they are not to be taken literally but symbolically or metaphorically.¹

(e) *Dangers of symbolism and task of theology*

Religious symbols are constantly threatened by the dangers of literalism and mysticism.

Literalism understands symbols in their immediate meaning. It uses the symbolic material, taken from nature and history, in its proper sense not in its symbolic meaning. It identifies the symbolic material with the symbolic meaning. It disregards the character of the symbol to point beyond itself to something else. Literalism, for instance, localizes the fall of Adam on a special geographical point and attributes it to a human individual; it understands the Virgin Birth in biological sense, resurrection and ascension as physical events.² In doing this, by destroying the symbolic meaning of the symbolic material, literalism falls into idolatry. The evil of idolatry is so common because symbols, by participating in that to which they point, have the tendency to replace that to which they are supposed to point and to become ultimate in themselves. All idolatry is nothing else than the absolutizing of

¹ This view that theological language is always symbolic leads Tillich to a radical demythologization of many traditional concepts, as it has been rightly pointed out by G. Tavad. "Tillich's attitude to dogmas, like his approach to the Bible, is one of demythologization. The Councils, and whatever other ecclesiastical authorities formulated the traditional dogmas, did but discover, in their apprehension of the revelatory events of the Christ, symbols, or sets of symbols, pointing to the Christian message. This they formulated in propositions and rational statements. Combining these symbols, they constructed Christian myths. Thus the Creeds, with their picture of a divine being descending in the flesh and ascending to heaven again after passing through, and triumphing over, death, are mythological epics. Their truth does not lie in the historical exactness of every detail of the picture, but in the ability of those symbols to express the Unconditional appearing under the conditions of existence. Their value to the Church lasts as long as, and no longer than, their symbolic meaning is perceived. Dogmatic myths must be 'broken', that is, understood symbolically. If we take them literally, we undermine their religious dimension. Creeds and dogmas then become intellectual taboos that must be defended without regard to scientific honesty." (Tavad, *Paul Tillich and the Christian Message*, p. 116). For Tavad's critique of Tillich's demythologization of Christian dogmas see *op. cit.* p. 117 and ff.

² Cf. *Dynamics of Faith*, pp. 51-42; "Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God," p. 196.

symbols of the Holy and making them identical with the Holy itself.¹

The other danger of symbolism is mysticism. Mysticism is a reaction against literalism. Literalism distorts symbols by making them identical with the ground of being. Mysticism criticizes the demonically distorted symbols by devaluating every medium of revelation of the ground of being and by trying to unite the soul directly with the Holy, to make it enter the mystery of God without the help of any finite symbolic material. In this way mysticism liberates one from the concrete-sacramental sphere and its demonic distortions, but it pays the price of removing the concrete character of revelation and of making it irrelevant to the actual human situation. It elevates man above everything that concerns him actually, and implies an ultimate negation of his existence in time and space.²

Before considering the remedies Tillich suggests against the dangers of symbolism, it may prove worthwhile examining whether Tillich has entirely escaped these dangers. There is no doubt that he has escaped the danger of literalism.³ But it seems to us that he has not been equally able to avoid the danger of mysticism. From his discussion of the symbol of Jesus as the Christ, and from the examples he uses in criticizing literalism, we see that in order to avoid the danger of literalism Tillich does away with much symbolic material (for instance, the factual element of resurrection, ascension, Virgin Birth, fall of Adam, etc.). Although he recognizes that the symbol of Jesus as the Christ requires the fact of Jesus of Nazareth, Tillich tends to disregard the historical events of the life of Jesus and to stress only their symbolic meanings; he tends to do away with the symbolic material, i.e. Jesus of Nazareth, and to keep only its two functions, namely the Christ and the Church. But

¹ Cf. *Dynamics of Faith*, pp. 52-54; *Protestant Era*, pp. 62-65 & 119; "Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God," p. 193.

² *Systematic Theology* I, p. 140; cf. "Mythus und Mythologie," p. 364; *Interpretation of History*, pp. 102 ff.; *Dynamics of Faith*, pp. 60-62.

³ But it seems to us that Tillich's criticism of this danger is badly stated if not completely irrelevant. For, the danger of symbolism does not consist, as Tillich seems to believe, in an identification of the symbolic material with the symbolic meaning, or of the symbolic sense with the literal meaning (cf. "Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God," p. 193; *Protestant Era*, p. 119; *Dynamics of Faith*, pp. 51 ff.). For instance, assuming that the symbolic sense of a flag is a nation and that its symbolic material is a piece of cloth, who would confuse the symbolic sense of the flag with its symbolic material? The danger of symbols does not come from their literal aspect but from their symbolic sense. Since the literal aspect is open to inspection, no mistake is possible about it. The symbolic sense, on the contrary, is hidden and because it is hidden one can be mistaken about it. Therefore the danger of symbolism is not an identification of the symbolic meaning with the symbolic material, but a misplacement of the symbolic meaning either by putting a symbolic meaning where there is none or by attributing to an object a symbolic meaning different from the one it has. An example of the first misplacement would be the cult of the stones of Mount Washington; an example of the second misplacement would be the adoration of Moses or Elias.

it is not possible, in an objective theory of symbolism, to have a symbolic meaning without any symbolic material. It is possible only in a subjective theory of symbols. Tillich's tendency to fall into mysticism is even clearer in the case of the Fall, the Virgin Birth, the Ascension and the Resurrection, where the factual elements, the symbolic materials, are entirely eliminated.¹

We may now turn to the remedies against the dangers of symbolism. Tillich maintains that it is the task of theology to protect religious symbols from the dangers of literalism and mysticism.² Theology accomplishes this task by interpreting, explaining and criticizing religious symbols in such a way that by resisting these two dangers they may express the transcendence of the Holy in tension with its expression of the divine immanence. Theology, then, deals with religious symbols by conceptualization, explanation and criticism. Conceptualization discloses the relation of the symbols to each other and to the whole to which they belong. Explanation attempts to make understandable the relation of the symbols used to that to which they point. It explains the relation of the religious meaning of the symbolic material to its original and simple meaning. Finally, theological criticism of religious symbols attempts to do two things. First, it seeks to prevent the reduction of the symbols to the level of non-symbolic thinking. The moment this happens, their meaning and their power is lost. Secondly, it tries to establish, on one hand, that some symbols are more adequate than others to the encounter which expresses itself in symbols; on the other hand, it shows that some symbols are inadequate in the totality of the symbolic meaning which they represent; they contradict the fundamental symbolic structure.³

¹ See *Dynamics of Faith*, pp. 51-52; "Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God," p. 196.

² Sometimes Tillich defines theology as the study of religious symbols (cf. for instance "Relations of Metaphysics to Theology" in *Review of Metaphysics* (1956), p. 59; "Theology and Symbolism," p. 108); other times he defines theology as the study of divine revelation (for instance in *Systematic Theology* I, pp. 3, 6, 8, etc.) I think that the second definition should be considered as complementary of the first, since revelation is a function of religious symbols. It is not the task of theology to create religious symbols. "Theology as such has neither the duty nor the power to confirm or to negate religious symbols. Its task is to interpret them according to theological principles and methods" (*Systematic Theology* I, p. 240). The theologian cannot discard traditional Christian symbols; that they are symbols and, as such, endowed with divine power, is enough for him. This cuts the ground from under much of liberal Protestantism and its rejection of Catholic symbols. Yet the theologian should criticize symbols: he "may discover contradictions between symbols." (*ibid.*) He may also by his prophetic insight contribute to the surge of a new revelatory situation out of which new symbols will grow. This, for Tillich, condemns the "static character which he attributes to Catholic sacramentalism and Catholic theology."

³ "Theology and symbolism," pp. 111-113.

4. SYMBOLISM AND ANALOGY

On several occasions Tillich asserts that by his doctrine of symbolism he means the classical doctrine of analogy. So, for instance, in his remarks on Weigel's "Contemporary Thought and Paul Tillich," Tillich states categorically that by symbolic knowledge he means "exactly what St. Thomas means with *analogia entis*."¹

In my opinion this identification of symbolism and analogy is not correct. It rests on an ambiguity, due to an indiscriminate use of the terms "metaphorical," "symbolic" and "analogical." Tillich maintains that theological language must be interpreted symbolically rather than literally, because only a symbolical interpretation safeguards God's transcendence and avoids idolatry; and by symbolical interpretation he means metaphorical or analogical interpretation. Tillich uses the terms "analogical," "symbolical" and "metaphorical" as equivalent names of his theory of theological language.²

Now it may be granted to Tillich that in ordinary language the terms "analogical," "symbolical" and "metaphorical" are sometimes used synonymously, and that Aquinas himself occasionally uses the term "analogy" for "metaphor." But this is no excuse for identifying a theory (Tillich's theory) that interprets theological language symbolically in such a way as to exclude from it all literal interpretation, with Aquinas' theory that interprets theological language analogically in such a way that literal interpretation is preserved. In our discussion of Aquinas' four modes of analogy we have seen that at least in the analogies of intrinsic denomination the literal meaning is maintained.³ It is then clear that symbolism and analogy do not solve the problem of theological language in the same way. According to the symbolical theory of theological language everything can be predicated of God

¹ In *Theological Studies* (1950), p. 201; cf. Tillich, *Systematic Theology* I, p. 131.

² Cf. *Systematic Theology* I, pp. 79, 131; II, p. 34; *Theology of Paul Tillich*, p. 339.

³ It is by means of a distinction within analogous names between the mode of signification and the thing signified (*modus significandi* and *res significata*) that analogy is able to preserve an element of literalness even in the names of God. The names of God are predicated literally with regard to the thing signified. Tillich is not entirely unaware of the distinction between mode of signification and perfection signified. With regard to "personality," for example, he says that it is predicated of God only symbolically because the perfection of personality is identified with its realization in man (*Protestant Era*, pp. 62 ff.). Another time he says that "in the notion of God we must distinguish two elements: the element of ultimacy, which is a matter of immediate experience and not symbolic in itself, and the element of concreteness, which is taken from our ordinary experience and symbolically applied to God" (*Dynamics of Faith*, p. 46). See also *Theology of P. Tillich*, p. 334, where Tillich speaks of a *via negationis* and a *via symbolica*. Cf. G. Weigel, "Myth, Symbol and Analogy" in *Religion and Culture*, ed. W. Leibrecht (New York, 1959), p. 127.

symbolically and only symbolically.¹ According to the analogical theory some names are predicated literally, some symbolically and some neither literally nor symbolically. For example, the analogical theory refuses to apply to God names like *accident*, *potentiality*, *sinner*, etc., even symbolically, but maintains that the perfection signified by names like *person*, *goodness*, *wisdom*, etc., applies to God literally. The symbolic theory does not make any distinction between these two classes of names and applies all of them to God as symbols.

Also the presuppositions of analogy and symbolism are in some important respect different. We have seen that Tillich's symbolism rests on a correlation of finite and infinite, or more precisely, on the second moment of this correlation, when the finite and infinite are estranged and the infinite is only symbolically apparent through the finite. Analogy, as we have seen, rests not on a correlation of finite and infinite, but on a unilateral relation of the finite to the infinite.

Analogy and symbolism, then, are two different interpretations of theological language.² They have, however, something in common.

(1) Both analogy and symbolism assume that creatures participate in the perfections of the Creator and that there is a relation of similarity between God and creatures. (2) Both assume that man does not know God immediately but mediately, through creatures. (3) Both hold that human language has its original meaning when applied to creature and is only used in a derivative meaning when applied to God. The direction of symbolic and analogical interpretation is from creatures to God; not from God to creatures. (4) Finally there is a fundamental harmony between analogy and symbolism in the spirit of their approach to the problem of theological language. The basis of this harmony is their similar appreciation of the depth of God's transcendence and in their

¹ Tillich allows only one exception to this universal symbolism. There is a statement about God that must be understood literally. This statement is that God is "being-itself" (cf. *Systematic Theology* I, p. 146; "Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God," pp. 193-194). In *Systematic Theology* II Tillich seems to abandon this view and to maintain that the only non-symbolic statement about God is the statement that "everything we say about God is symbolic" (p. 9). In my opinion neither proposition is a correct statement of Tillich's view on non-symbolic predication. For he insistently argues, for instance, that existence cannot be predicated of God even symbolically (cf. *Systematic Theology* I, 110 & 140 ff.; II, 20 etc.). Therefore also the statement that existence cannot be predicated of God even symbolically must be included among the nonsymbolic statements. And in general, symbolists have always maintained that alle negative predication is to be understood literally. This is, for instance, Maimonides' view. Tillich has not offered an adequate treatment of the difference between negative and affirmative predicates.

² On this point see G. Weigel, "The Theological Significance of Paul Tillich," *Cross Currents* (1956), pp. 141-155; "Myth, Symbol and Analogy" in *Religion and Culture*, ed. W. Leibrecht (New York, 1959), pp. 120-130; C. Rhein, *Paul Tillich* (Stuttgart, 1957) pp. 173 ff.

common concern for the power of finite symbols to express the infinite. Both analogy and symbolism seek, on the one hand, to prevent any segment of creation from making itself God and, on the other hand, to shut out no segment or aspect of the creation from being a pointer to God; they both war against everything that usurps the place of God and everything that mutilates man and the subhuman order.

BARTH'S DOCTRINE OF ANALOGY OF FAITH

Karl Barth is the most genial prolific and influential Protestant theologian of our time. In the history of his thought there are two decisive turning points. The first is the abandonment of liberalism in favor of a dialectical method which draws upon the infinite qualitative difference between time and eternity;¹ the second is the abandonment of the method of dialectic in favor of the method of analogy.² The first conversion is documented by *Römerbrief*.³ In this revolutionary book Barth reasserts the transcendent and sovereign character of the God of the Bible. For a century the liberal school had emphasized the immanent character of God by relating religion to the other aspects of human life and thought, to reconcile religion with science, and to show the universal harmony between human mind and divine spirit. As a student of Harnack, Barth had also embraced and defended the principles of the liberal school for several years. But with the *Römerbrief* he gave the signal for revolt. With warlike temper he attacked the rationalism, humanism and liberalism that had invaded Protestant theology and brought to light again the unique and paradoxical character of Biblical faith. To give expression to the infinite qualitative difference

¹ For liberal Protestantism in general and for Ritschl in particular religion is born of the effort of the human spirit to find the harmony between the world of nature and the inner world of personality. "In every religion what is sought, with the help of the superhuman spiritual power revered by man, is a solution of the contradiction in which man finds himself, as both a part of the world of nature and a spiritual personality claiming to dominate nature." (A. Ritschl, *Justification and Reconciliation*, English Translation, II, p. 199). Barth himself declares that the "infinite qualitative difference is his central theme", that characterizes his first conversion. See *II Römerbrief* p. xiii.

² In *Church Dogmatics* (2/1, p. 225) Barth declares that analogy is "unavoidable." This view was already announced in the *Fides Quaerens Intellectum*, which is the document of his second conversion. Barth himself writes in "Parergon" that the document of his second conversion is not his famous *Nein* to Brunner but the unpopular *Fides quaerens Intellectum* "das ich mit der grössten Liebe geschrieben zu haben meine, und das... am wenigsten gelesen worden ist" ("Parergon," *Evangelische Theologie*, 1948, p. 272).

³ First edition 1919.

between natural and revealed religion and between philosophy and Bible, Barth introduced the dialectical method.¹ But this method proved very soon to be unsatisfactory and incapable of expressing the infinite qualitative difference, because dialectic conceives the universe, before creation and after the end, pantheistically. Moreover dialectic does not make any distinction between existence and sin and is therefore unable to give an adequate interpretation to the divine-human relation. In *Fides Quaerens Intellectum* Barth came to a better understanding of the nature and function of theology. Its task is not to emphasize the otherness of God, but, on the basis of faith, to penetrate into the meaning of Revelation, i.e. into the knowledge of God that God himself makes available to man. Now Barth realized that only with the method of analogy was the theologian in a position to arrive at an understanding of the content of Revelation. But not by means of the *analogia entis*, which as a human philosophical category, is unable to understand the Word of God. The only analogy capable of understanding God and his Revelation is the analogy of faith (*analogia fidei*). *Fides Quaerens Intellectum* then, represents in the history of Barth's thought the second decisive turning point: the abandonment of dialectic in favor of *analogia fidei*. In *analogia fidei* he discovered the tool, the form capable of expressing the content that dialectic had sought in vain to communicate in the *Römerbrief*.² But before the *Kirchliche Dogmatik* Barth does not arrive at

¹ In *Römerbrief* Barth does not give a definition of dialectics. He does not define the nature of theological language. Theology and religion are considered "the working capital of sin; its fulcrum; the means by which men are removed from direct union with God and thrust into disunion, that is, into the recognition of their creatureliness" (*The Epistle to the Romans*, transl. E. C. Hoskyns (London, 1953), p. 248). But the divine-human relation is conceived everywhere dialectically: man is either united or separated and opposed to God; he is not analogous to Him. "The world was originally one with the Creator and men were one with God... (Men) ought not, as creatures, to be some second thing by the side of the Creator. Men ought not to know that they are merely men... When men stretch out their hands and touch the link which binds them to God, when they touch the tree in the midst of the garden, which ought not to be touched, they are by this presumptuous contact separated from Him" (pp. 247-248). For a penetrating study of the dialectical method in *Römerbrief* see H. U. von Balthasar, *Karl Barth: Darstellung und Deutung seiner Theologie* (Köln, 1951), pp. 79-93. Balthasar defines dialectic as a method "das seinen Gegenstand in Aussage und Gegenaussage, in einem Sic et Non zu treffen sucht" (p. 80). Balthasar concludes his study of the use of dialectic in theology with the statement that the dialectical method cannot be used because "die bloße Dialektik löst jene Subjekte auf, zwischen denen das theologische Geschehen sich gibt: Gott und die Kreatur: Gottes Aseität löst sich auf in das Ereignis seiner Offenbarung und hebt sich damit selbst auf, während die Kreatur keine Eigenständigkeit Gott gegenüber besitzt, sondern entweder (im Ursprung und Ziel) mit ihm zusammenfällt, oder (in der Sünde) als der reine Widerspruch zu ihm nur das Nichts sein kann" (p. 93). See also H. Bouillard, *Karl Barth: Genèse et Evolution de la Théologie Dialectique* (Paris, 1957), pp. 29 ff.

² It has generally been maintained that in *Römerbrief* Barth denies the existence of any analogy between man and God, between theological language and God's being. See, for example, E. Przywara, *Ring der Gegenwart*, II, pp. 553-554; H. Volk, *Die Kreaturfassung bei Karl Barth* (Würzburg, 1938) pp. 86-97; E. Brunner, *Natur und Gnade: Zum Gespräch mit*

any systematic elaboration of the doctrine of the *analogia fidei*, and even in his monumental work he never stops to give us a thorough exposition of the method of analogy of faith. In the different volumes of this work, however, he has disseminated many thoughts on the subject of the *analogia fidei*, which, once collected and coordinated, may form a complete exposition of Barth's method. In the present chapter we will attempt to collect Barth's thoughts on analogy of faith. We will summarize what he has to say on the necessity of the method of *analogia fidei* as a solution of the problem of theological language, and will analyze and discuss his solution of the semantical, epistemological and theological problems of analogy of faith.¹

1. PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

Barth's discussion of the problem of theological language is a theological not a philosophical discussion. He believes that this is the only right position. He does not deny the possibility of a philosophical theory of theological language. He recognizes the existence of a natural theology and implicitly the possibility of a philosophical interpretation of theological language.² But he believes that natural theology is necessarily a false theology and that any philosophical solution of the problem of theological language must be also false.³ Here a brief analysis of Barth's view on the relations between philosophy and theology is necessary.⁴

Barth does not give a formal definition of philosophy. He calls philosophical any product of the human mind, and seems to conceive philo-

Karl Barth (Tubingue, 1935), p. 39. Bouillard, however, has shown that traces of a doctrine of analogy are already present in *Römerbrief*. See Bouillard, *Karl Barth* (Paris, 1957) I, pp. 29-30; II, pp. 197-198.

¹ Throughout our discussion of Barth's doctrine of analogy we shall use the term "*analogia fidei*" to designate Barth's doctrine of analogy and the term "analogy" to designate Aquinas' doctrine of analogy. We refuse to call Aquinas' doctrine *analogia entis* both because this terminology is foreign to Aquinas and because, as we shall see, the doctrine of *analogia entis* criticized by Barth has little in common with Aquinas' doctrine of analogy. For an excellent discussion of the doctrine of *analogia entis* rejected by Barth see Bouillard, *Karl Barth*, 3c., pp. 199-217.

² *The Knowledge of God and the Service of God* (Gifford Lectures 1938), pp. 4-5; see also *Church Dogmatics* 2/1, pp. 63 ff. and Brunner-Barth, *Natural Theology*, pp. 73 ff.

³ See references in previous note.

⁴ The problem of the relations between philosophy and theology has been dealt with by Barth in the following works: *Die Kirchliche Dogmatik*, especially 1/2, pp. 815-867, and 3/2, pp. 1-20; *Grundfragen*, pp. 23-25; *Fides Quaerens Intellectum*, passim, and *Das Wort Gottes und die Theologie*. A knowledge of Barth's doctrine on the relation between philosophy and theology is indispensable for an understanding of his system, because he conceives the relations between faith and reason, natural and supernatural, God and man, human and divine natures in Christ in the same way.

sophy not so much as a systematic rational view of the world as a human way of thinking about anything. Much more accurate and detailed is his determination of the nature of theology. Theology (more precisely, dogmatic theology) is defined again and again as the "self-test to which the Christian Church puts herself in respect of the content of her peculiar language about God."¹ The purpose of theology is to test "the coherence of present-day proclamation with the original and prevailing essence of the Church."²

The main differences between philosophy and theology are the following. The object of philosophy is abstract; the object of theology is concrete: the concrete historical Word of God. The object of philosophy is within man's power; the object of theology is not: it is freely given by God. The object of theology is not bound to any established precondition, that can be calculated by human knowledge, but is an "absolute" event. The object of philosophy is known by reason; the object of theology is known by faith. There is no continuity between faith and reason, philosophy and theology, nature and supernatural, man and God.³

Although philosophy and theology are two different sciences, there is no necessary conflict between them; on the contrary, theology is always bound to go together with philosophy, since all theology must take a philosophical form.⁴ It is inescapable that the theologian in testing the coherence of the present-day proclamation of the Word with the original "Kerygma" carries with him, consciously or unconsciously, some kind of philosophy. "We all wear some kind of glasses. If we did not we would not be able to see."⁵ Therefore, philosophy cannot be either con-

¹ *Church Dogmatics* 1/1, p. 11; see also pp. 5, 14, 43, 87-88, 92, 97 etc.

² *Church Dogmatics* 1/1, p. 56.

³ Cf. also *Church Dogmatics* 1/1, p. 225 and *Grundfrage*, pp. 23 ff. Barth refuses to interpret the divine-human relation either in terms of correlation or in terms of continuity. Both Tillich's and Schleiermacher's principles do violence to God's transcendence.

⁴ The category, form-content, is one of the central categories of Barth's thought. It is already present in the essay "Die Kirche und die Kultur" (1926), where Barth says that the Church must always take an exterior cultural aspect: "the Kingdom of God is in the *regnum naturae*." As the Church must take an exterior cultural aspect, theology must take some philosophical form. This is shown by Barth in the essay "Schicksal und Idee der Theologie" (1929). Philosophy lives within theology, as the Church lives within the "Aussenseite" of culture. Theology cannot develop except within some type of philosophy. The category, form-content, has universal application in Barth's system; it is used to explain the relation between faith and reason (cf. *Church Dogmatics* 1/1, pp. 201, 208-209); the relation between divine and human natures in Christ (cf. *Church Dogmatics* 1/2, pp. 132 ff.); the relation between creation and revelation (cf. *Kirchliche Dogmatik* 3/1, pp. 267 ff.).

⁵ *Prolegomena*, p. 404. It is in this context that Barth says that also Luther and Calvin have their philosophy. Both were Platonists. Luther was more Neo-Platonist and Calvin more Old-Platonist. It is an illusion to expect to save theology by fighting against this or that philosophy. Platonism did not prevent Augustine from being a good theologian, as Aristotel-

demned or repudiated by any theologian. Theologians, however, may not forget that the use of philosophical concepts in theology is a dangerous enterprise. For, it may happen that those concepts, whose form he intends to apply to a theological content, may already have such a content that will drive the theologian inevitably into a mode of thought in contradiction with Revelation. This danger can be avoided only if the theologian allows his language to be determined by his object (i.e. Revelation). The Word must not be subjected to human presuppositions, but human presuppositions are to be subjected to the Word. Of course, human presuppositions cannot be eliminated, but the theologian must realize that they do not enter into theology as a part of a synthesis but only as form of a guiding object. Theology is never responsible for its statements to any philosophy; it is responsible only to God in Jesus Christ. No philosophy can be the norm of theology. Therefore theology cannot be bound to accept any specific type of philosophy. No philosophical system as such is appropriate to the interpretation of the Bible. It can at the most become such in the encounter with Revelation, with an act of submission to the Word of God. Philosophy is the handmaid of theology. This signifies that the theologian must not consider his philosophy as something absolute, situated, so to speak, on the same level as the Bible. The use of a philosophical scheme of thought in theology is legitimate and fruitful, only if it is determined and commanded by the text of the Bible. In conclusion, philosophy and the Word of God are inseparably joined in theology. But philosophy can only be the *ancilla*. The *Domina* is the Word of God.¹

We may now turn to the exposition of Barth's doctrine of the *analogia fidei*. Much of what he says on this subject can be understood only in the light of his teaching on the relations between philosophy and theology.

2. NECESSITY OF 'ANALOGIA FIDEI'

We cannot find any better words for stating Barth's view on this point than his own words. In Section 27 (*on the limits of the knowledge of* *ianism* did not hinder Aquinas. With the same presuppositions one can be a good or a bad theologian. A philosophy is dangerous not because it is philosophy, or because it is this or that philosophy. It is dangerous because a theologian may forget the relativity of the factors that determine his knowledge of the Word (cf. *Ibid.* pp. 404-406). Philosophical forms are so indifferent to the theological content that the same theologian may use different philosophical forms in order to express the same theological content. In *Grundfrage* he refers to his *Römerbrief* and *Kirchliche Dogmatik* as an example of two different philosophical forms for the same theological content (p. 24).

¹ Cf. *Kirchliche Dogmatik* 1/2 pp. 815-825; *Grundfragen*, pp. 23-25; *Das Wort Gottes und die Theologie*, pp. 000.

God) of *Church Dogmatics* Barth tells us, in a synthetic and schematic form not customary to his style, that in theological discourse univocity and equivocity are impossible and that *analogia fidei* is "unavoidable". Here are his words:

What do we mean when we apply the same word to the creature on the one hand and to God's revelation and God on the other? We are aware, or we think we are aware, of what being, spirit, sovereignty, creation, redemption... mean when we use these terms to describe a creature. We are also aware, or think that we are aware, what we are saying, when in the sphere of the creature we say eye, ear, mouth... Does all this mean the same thing when we also say it about God?... Obviously we cannot affirm this, nor can the veracity of our knowledge be found in a likeness of this kind between our knowledge and Him as the known. A parity of this type would mean either that God has ceased to be God and become merely a creature, or that man with his capacity has become a god.

Ought we then to speak of a disparity of content, and meaning when we apply a description to the creature on the one hand and to God's revelation and God on the other? When we speak of God as being spirit, sovereign... do they mean something different from when we use them to describe a creature? We must be careful what we are affirming if we wish to affirm this. There can be an all too human exaggeration of that awe in the knowledge of God, by which we do not praise God but deny Him. This kind of disparity necessarily means that in fact we do not know God. For if we know Him, we know Him by the means given us; otherwise we do not know Him at all. The fact that we know Him must mean that, with our concepts, views and words, we do not describe something quite different from Himself, but that in and by these means of ours – the ones we have – we describe and express God Himself. Otherwise without this relationship, under the presupposition of a simple disparity, there cannot possibly be any question of the veracity of our knowledge of God. The whole relationship will have to be regarded as simply negative, as a relationship of mutual exclusion. There will not then be in fact any fellowship between the knower and the known. God's revelation will simply be a veiling, and it cannot therefore be understood as revelation... In this perplexity the older theology accepted the concept of analogy to describe the fellowship in question. By this term both the false thesis of parity and equally false thesis of disparity were attacked and destroyed, but the elements of truth in both were revealed. In distinction to both likeness and unlikeness "analogy" means similarity, i.e., a partial correspondence and agreement and, therefore, one which limits both parity and disparity between two or more different entities. The term is burdened by its use in natural theology, and it needs specific clarification in this respect. But at this point it is as such unavoidable. If in this fellowship there can be no question of either parity or disparity, there remains only what is generally meant by analogy: similarity, partial correspondence and agreement.¹

In brief, Barth's argument starts from the fact that we predicate the same words, e.g. eye, mouth, being, spirit, of both creatures and God, and we believe that we know what we mean not only when we predicate them of creatures but also when we predicate them of God. The second step of the argument is that this situation cannot be correctly expressed either by univocity (since no parity such as supposed by univocity exists between creatures and God) or by equivocity (since it

¹ *Church Dogmatics* 2/1, pp. 224–225; cf. also 223.

makes all knowledge of God impossible, which contradicts what has already been affirmed in the first step of the argument). Therefore, the conclusion that analogy is the only correct interpretation of theological discourse, is legitimate and necessary.

Barth, however, is careful to point out immediately that analogy is necessary ("unavoidable") not because it is imposed by man, but because it is chosen by God: "Pressed... by the true revelation of God, we are pushed to the word 'analogy'."¹ It is the relationship posited in God's true revelation that in some way attracts this word to itself, and makes it unavoidable. Analogy is not a deification of man and his word. By declaring that analogy is the correct interpretation of theological discourse we are not trusting in a power of apprehension and therefore of correctness immanent in us or in this word. We know that it cannot have such in and of itself. But we trust in the true revelation of God coming to us and therefore to these words as well. For the sake of God's revelation man and his human word cannot be abandoned to a nothingness of fundamental godlessness.² According to Barth, then, analogy is only factually necessary. Analogy is required by the fact that man knows God and speaks about Him; but analogy is freely established by God. Man is not an element of a correlation of which God is the other extreme. Man is a creature freely called into being by God. Moreover, God does not manifest to man the analogous content of theological language in the act of Creation but only in the act of Revelation. For this reason Barth's analogy is an *analogia fidei*. Analogy of faith is an interpretation of theological language that differs at the same time from both symbolism and analogy. It differs from symbolism inasmuch as symbolism is based on a correlation between finite and infinite, while *analogia fidei* is based on a unilateral relation between God and creature. It differs from analogy, inasmuch as analogy admits the possibility of a true interpretation of theological language also outside Revelation. This is denied by *analogia fidei*.

3. THEOLOGICAL SEMANTICS OF 'ANALOGIA FIDEI'

(a) Barth's use of *analogia fidei*

Barth is familiar with all the traditional uses of analogy.³ In this study we are interested only in his use of analogy as a form of

¹ *Ibid.* p. 226.

² *Ibid.* pp. 226-227.

³ Cf. for instance, *Church Dogmatics* 1/1 pp. 152-153, where both reasoning by analogy and analogy as a form of illustration are used.

predication and in its epistemological and ontological presuppositions. Barth never deals systematically with the various uses of analogy of predication. But he occasionally mentions all the main forms, i.e. *analogia proportionalitatis*, *analogia inaequalitatis*, *analogia attributionis intrinsecae et extrinsecae*.¹ There are many other kinds of analogy described or used by Barth, as *analogia entis*, *analogia relationis*, *analogia operationis*.² But these are not modes of predication but modes of being, and, therefore we shall consider them later in the analysis of the ontological foundation of analogy.

Of the four modes of analogy of predication Barth rejects analogy of inequality (*analogia inaequalitatis*) because it is unable adequately to express God's transcendence and is exposed to pantheism.³ Barth rejects also analogy of proportionality (*analogia proportionalitatis*). By analogy of proportionality he means a mode of predication signifying a quantitative correspondence between two beings. The quantitative correspondence can be understood and represented algebraically as a plus and minus on both sides. The correspondence and agreement *partially* exist and *partially* do not exist. It is the mathematical character that commands the exclusion of this analogy from theology, since "this kind of algebraic division... is quite out of the question as between God and ourselves."⁴ The only mode of analogy capable of offering an adequate interpretation of theological language is, according to Barth, the analogy of attribution (*analogia attributionis*). There are two kinds of this analogy, the extrinsic and the intrinsic. By analogy of extrinsic attribution Barth means a form of predication that signifies a similarity of two objects. This similarity consists in the fact that what is common to them exists first and properly in the one, and then (because a second is dependent upon it), in the second.⁵ By analogy of intrinsic attribution he means a form of predication that signifies a similarity which properly belongs both to the *analogans* and to the *analogatum*. It is inward to both of them, although to the last only secondarily and *per dependentiam*.⁶ Of these two kinds of attributive analogy Barth considers only the first, namely analogy of extrinsic attribution, adequate to the interpretation of theological language. The reason he gives for this is that the attribution to a creature of a perfection that belongs also to God is made

¹ Cf. *Church Dogmatics* 2/1, p. 234; 238 ff.

² Cf. *Kirchliche Dogmatik* 3/1, pp. 219-220; 3/2, p. 262.

³ *Kirchliche Dogmatik* 2/1, pp. 267 ff.

⁴ *Church Dogmatics* 2/1, p. 234.

⁵ *Church Dogmatics* 2/1, p. 238.

⁶ *Ibid.*

possible by Revelation rather than by Creation. By its nature a creature cannot be put on the level of God and can never be compared with God.¹

(b) *Justification of the predication of certain words both of God and man*

Human language is drawn from the material world and is made to deal with material objects, with the world of phenomena. On what ground is the theologian justified to extend human language to speak about God, who transcends the material word, and is not Himself a phenomenon? This is the main problem of theological semantics. To the solution of this problem Barth has devoted a long section of the first volume of *Church Dogmatics*.² His solution has three moments. In the first he shows that it does not lie in man's power to extend his language to God. In the second he shows that this belongs to the power of God. Finally, in the third moment, he argues that even when God has given to human language the power to talk about Him, human language is able to talk about God only indirectly, in a veiled form. Let's examine these three moments in detail.

It does not lie in man's power to extend his language to talk about God. For this Barth gives the reason that in our mouth our words are words which denote the creature but not God. Our words as such can be applied only to the creaturely.³ In our opinion this argument is valid only if the distinction between mode of predication and thing signified is impossible, or if no true knowledge of God is possible outside Revelation. We shall see later that Barth does not ignore the important distinction between mode of predication and thing predicated.⁴ We must then conclude that the validity of Barth's argument that human words as such can be applied only to the creaturely, rests on the assumption that no true knowledge of God is possible outside Revelation. And this is indeed the case, because the *sola fides* is the basic principle of Barth's system.⁵ As in Tillich symbolism and in Aquinas analogy, also in Barth *analogia fidei* is not itself the ultimate principle but is based on a superior principle. Tillich's symbolism is based on the principle of correlation; Aquinas' analogy is based on the principle of the similarity between cause and effect; Barth's *analogia fidei* is based on the principle of the *sola fides*.

¹ *Church Dogmatics* 2/1, pp. 238-241.

² *Church Dogmatics* 1/1, sect. 3, pp. 51-98.

³ Cf. *Church Dogmatics* 1/1, p. 150; 2/1 pp. 227 & 231.

⁴ See *infra* p. 158.

⁵ See *The Knowledge of God and the Service of God*, pp. 8-9.

It belongs to God to give to human language the power to talk about Him. Barth's justification of this proposition is the combination of the principle that it does not lie in man's power to extend his language to God and the fact that human language has been actually extended to talk about God. The combination of the principle with the fact makes unavoidable the conclusion that human language can be extended to God by God alone. Indeed all kinds of things might be analogous to God, if God had not made and did not make a very definite and delimited use of His omnipotence in His revelation: that is to say, if the analogy of the creation and the creaturely word, effected by His revelation did not mean a selection, determined and carried out by Himself, from among the infinitely many possibilities. It is then necessary to recognize that the human word receives concrete content from God and becomes capable of saying something by the fact, and only by the fact, that it is spoken on the strength of God's permission and command.¹

It is very important to notice here that Barth's argument is not simply: man has no power to talk about God, *ergo* he has received this power from God Himself. To this argument one could object that it is the Devil that teaches man how to talk about God. Barth escapes this criticism because his conclusion is based on something more solid than syllogistic procedure and dialectical argumentation. His conclusion that human language has the God-given power to speak about God Himself rests upon four important factual reasons:

(i) God creates language first for Himself. Our words are not our property but His. And disposing of them as His property, He places them at our disposal. For example, the words "father" and "son" do not first and properly have their truth in our thought and language. In a way that is incomprehensible and concealed from us, but in the incontestable priority of the Creator over the creature, God Himself is *the* Father and *the* Son. Therefore, when God authorizes and commands us in His revelation to make use of our views, concepts and words, He is not doing something, so to speak, inappropriate. No, He takes to Himself something that belongs originally and appropriately to Him.²

(ii) Man can extend his language to God because God has already

¹ *Church Dogmatics* 2/1, p. 232.

² *Church Dogmatics* 2/1, pp. 228-229; c. 1/1 p. 157. There is some confusion in this argument. It seems to us that the confusion is due to the overlapping of two arguments. One argument shows that human language is analogous to God's language, because it is an imitation of the latter: the word "father" is an imitation of the word "Father". The other argument shows that there is analogy between human language and divine language because God, as the Creator of human language, remains the Lord of human language and may command, and has actually commanded, to man to use his language for God.

used human language for Himself. So man can apply, for example, the terms "reason," "speaking," "hearing" and "understanding" to God because God actually had already claimed these words for Himself and man cannot abandon them unless he wishes to take up a stand elsewhere than where the Word of God is heard.¹

(iii) Man can extend his language to God because the meaning of his language is first and fully realized only in God. Take for instance the word "person." The problem is not whether God is a person; the problem is whether we are persons. Or shall we find among us one whom in the full and real sense of this concept we can call a person? But God is really a person, really a free subject.²

(iv) Man can extend his language to God because it has been sanctified by Christ and the Church. When the essence of the Church, Jesus Christ as the acting person of God, sanctifies the being of men in the visible area of human happening and transforms it into being in the Church, then He also sanctifies their language and transforms it into the language about God which is found in the Church.³

These four facts show not only that it lies in the power of God to extend human language to talk about Him, but also that God has actually given this power to man's language. This is, according to Barth, the only valid argument for the truth of theological language, because in theology only arguments from actuality to possibility are valid. It is only the fact that God has actually given to human language the power to express a divine content that authorizes man to believe that he can talk about God without blaspheming. It is not by means of an inquiry into the nature of human language, of its properties and possibilities, that man can arrive at this discovery. Such linguistic inquiry could never say anything about this. For, if man could discover this by himself it would no longer be a grace of God.

By God's grace alone, then, human language can be used to speak about God. It remains now to be seen what human language is able to say of God. According to Barth human language can express God only in a veiled, hidden way. And the reason for this is obvious. The very fact that God has created language first for Himself and only secondarily for man proves that only God has a full understanding of His language. Since man remains always man even in Revelation, he will never be able fully to understand God's Word or to grasp the entire

¹ *Church Dogmatics* 1/1, p. 153.

² *Church Dogmatics* 1/1, p. 157.

³ *Church Dogmatics* 1/1, pp. 53-54.

meaning of his word when attributed to God. Human language when employed by God or for God is, therefore, always something hidden, veiled and ambiguous to man's understanding. God's Word is and always remains God's Word, unbound, unattachable to this thesis or to that antithesis. A sketch of the concept as the philosopher would like it has not arisen and cannot arise. God alone conceives of Himself, even in His Word. Our concept of Him and His Word can only be a pointer of the limits of our conceiving.¹

There is another reason that makes God's language necessarily mysterious to man's understanding, and that is its worldliness. Even when human language is spoken by God, it maintains its worldliness, since "when God speaks to man, this happening is never so marked off from the rest of what happens that it might not promptly be also interpreted as a part of this other happening."²

The mystery and ambiguity of theological language is due to what Barth calls "a contradiction between form and content."³ Its content, the thing signified, is divine; its form, the mode of signification, is human. Theological language considered in its form is always and only human language. But its content is the *concretissimum*, God Himself.⁴ Man is absolutely incapable of arriving at a separation of the form from the content and at an isolation of the divine meaning hidden under the human form. Not even faith can do this for faith is precisely to hear "the divine content of the Word of God, although absolutely nothing but wordly form is discernible by us."⁵

In the discussion of Barth's teaching on the relation of philosophy and theology we have already pointed out that the category form-content is central to Barth's system.⁶ This is now confirmed by his theory of theological language. Some further consideration on Barth's understanding of this category is therefore in order. We have seen that in Revelation the Divine takes a human form, and that the human form is not adequate to express the divine content. The human form hides and even contradicts the divine content. This is true on all levels of reality. On the logical level human words and concepts are the mask of the divine Logos. On the factual level a human person is the mask of the divine Person. The category of form-content in Barth's system has

¹ *Church Dogmatics* 1/1 pp. 186-187.

² *Church Dogmatics* 1/1 p. 188.

³ *Church Dogmatics* 1/1 pp. 466 ff.

⁴ *Church Dogmatics* 1/1 p. 159.

⁵ *Church Dogmatics* 1/1 p. 201.

⁶ *Supra* p. 150, note 4.

the function of expressing the mystery of divine sovereignty and gracefulness, of divine transcendence and immanence in the event of Revelation. It seems to us that this category is substantially adequate to this function. In this regard the category of form-content has an advantage over the category of correlation, which, as we have seen in the analysis of Tillich's doctrine of symbolism, seems to threaten God's transcendence. But, unlike the category of correlation, the category of form-content is exposed to the danger of exaggerating God's transcendence. And it seems to us that Barth has not been able to escape entirely this danger. He usually stresses so much the worldliness of the human form, its reality and evidence both in the case of the Word of the Bible and of the human person of Jesus, that the evidence of the divine Word and the divine Person is absolutely hidden.¹ This is not inconsistent with Barth's basic principle of the *Sola Fides*. But the *credo* here risks becoming only a *credo quia absurdum*.

4. THEOLOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGY OF 'ANALOGIA FIDEI'

The main epistemological problem of analogy is the problem of the possibility for man of having analogous concepts of God. Barth has faced this problem again and again in his *Church Dogmatics*.² His solution may be summarized in three propositions: (a) human reason alone is unable to conceive any true concept of God; (b) analogous concepts of God are made possible only by Revelation; (c) analogous concepts do not express God openly but only hiddenly.

(a) *Human reason alone is unable to conceive any true concept of God*

Barth does not deny that natural reason can achieve some knowledge of God.³ But all this human knowledge is rejected by Barth as false knowledge because it obscures the knowledge of God given to man by Revelation. For instance, the natural knowledge of the existence of God obscures the Christian knowledge of God as the triune God; and the natural knowledge of God as Supreme Cause obscures the Christian knowledge of God as Creator. Therefore, in order to safeguard the integrity of Revelation, Barth is willing to deny any connexion between

¹ See, for example, *Kirchliche Dogmatik* 1/1, p. 116 ff.; 1/2, pp. 166-167, 587 ff. For a more exhaustive analysis of this point see Bouillard, *Karl Barth II*, pp. 121 ff.

² Cf. *Church Dogmatics* 1/1 sect. 5: "The nature of the Word of God"; sect. 6: "The Knowability of the Word of God"; 2/1, sect. 26: "The knowability of God."

³ See *The Knowledge of God and the Service of God*, pp. 4-5; *Church Dogmatics* 2/1 pp. 63 ff.; Brunner-Barth, *Natural Theology*, pp. 73 ff.

God and man, i.e., any knowledge of the Word of God by man, in the sense that a capacity in man in abstraction from the Word of God is to be the condition of this connexion.¹

In Section 26 of volume 2/1 of *Church Dogmatics* Barth passionately shows that natural reason cannot know God as the Lord, the Creator, the Reconciler and the Redeemer, and expressly rejects the opposite teaching of the Roman Catholic Church as defined by the Vatican Council. For all these four attributes of God Barth's argument runs more or less as follows:

"We have no analogy on the basis of which the nature and being of God as the Lord (the Creator, the Reconciler, the Redeemer) can be accessible to us... No idea that we can have of the "Lord" or "lordship" will ever lead us to this idea, even though we extend it infinitely" (pp. 75-76). "Only as we know God's lordship (creation, reconciliation and redemption), will our own ideas of lordship have content, and within their limits, existence" (p. 76). Therefore "if we know about God as the Lord (Creator, Reconciler, Redeemer), it is not because we also know about other lords and lordships. It is not even partly because of this previous knowledge and partly because of God's revelation. It is in consequence of God's revelation alone" (p. 76).²

Here we cannot pass over the gross error committed by Barth in assuming that the Vatican Council has defined that human reason alone can know God as the Lord, the Creator, the Reconciler and the Redeemer. Experts in conciliar definitions have since long established that the object of the Vatican definition is not the ability of human reason to know God as the Lord, the Mediator, the Reconciler and the Redeemer, but only the ability of human reason to know God's existence and God's providence. The attributes Lord, Mediator, Reconciler and Redeemer are not part of the conciliar definition.³

There is something else in Barth's argument against natural theology that cannot be easily granted, namely, his claim that to make a provisional division or partition in regard to the knowability of God will inevitably lead to the partitioning of the one God as well.⁴ Different modes of knowledge do not necessarily disrupt the unity of the object. I may, for instance, examine the same star with the naked eye and with a telescope. Certainly with the telescope I shall see the star much more

¹ *Church Dogmatics* 1/1, p. 224; 2/1 p. 69.

² See also *Church Dogmatics* 2/1 pp. 77-78.

³ Cf. J. M. Vacant, *Etudes Théologiques sur les Constitutions du Concile Vatican*, pp. 309 ff.; Balthasar, *K. Barth*, pp. 314 ff.

⁴ *Church Dogmatics* 2/1, p. 79.

clearly and completely, but the star remains always the same. Similarly one may know that God exists without knowing that He is triune, yet it is truly God that he knows. What Barth fails to recognize is the distinction between false knowledge and incomplete knowledge of something.¹ In his view, an incomplete knowledge of God is a false knowledge of God. But is this true? If one, for instance, knows that God exists without knowing that He is triune, is his knowledge of God false? If so, God does not exist. Certainly Barth will not accept this conclusion. But this conclusion can be avoided only by recognizing the validity of the distinction between incomplete and false knowledge. Barth has no need to accept natural theology in order to recognize this distinction. He may continue to deny to reason the power of knowing God's existence and, therefore, keep the door closed to natural theology. Theology cannot, however, dispense with this distinction, because on Barth's assumption that incomplete knowledge is false knowledge, man's knowledge of God would always be false. Since even the knowledge of God that man receives in the event of Revelation remains an imperfect, partial incomplete knowledge of Him. Only God knows God completely.²

(b) Analogous concepts of God are made possible only by Revelation

Only Revelation provides man with true concepts of God. This is well expressed by Barth in the following passage:

To the question how we come to know God by means of our thinking and language, we must give the answer that of ourselves we do not come to know Him, that on the contrary this happens only as the grace of the revelation of God comes to us and therefore to the means of our thinking and language, adopting us and them, pardoning, saving and protecting, and making good. We are permitted to make use and a successful use of that, of the means given to us. We do not create this success. Nor do our means create it. But the grace of God's revelation creates it.³

According to Barth, the only possibility for a true knowledge of God is rooted in God's revelation. This, however, does not show how a knowledge rooted in God Himself can truly be called man's knowledge of God.

Barth has always acutely felt that his emphasis on the divine side is

¹ Cf. for example, *Church Dogmatics* 2/1, p. 83.

² Aquinas does not believe that a double knowledge of God disrupts His unity, because the twofold knowledge or truth does not take place on the part of God Himself "Who is truth one and simple, but from the point of view of our knowledge, which is variously related to the knowledge of divine things" (Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentes*, I, 9 in prin.).

³ *Church Dogmatics* 2/1, p. 223.

the only possible way to secure reality to the human side, but he has also been aware that this emphasis may be a threat to the very reality of the human side, and has constantly struggled to save the reality of man as God's partner. For instance, in the present problem concerning the possibility of true concepts of God, Barth maintains that for this possibility two conditions must be posited: God on one side and man on the other side. The possibility of the knowledge of God springs from God in that He is Himself the truth and He gives Himself to man in His Word by the Holy Spirit to be known as the truth. It springs from man, in that, in the Son of God by the Holy Spirit, man becomes an object of the divine good-pleasure and therefore participates in the truth of God.¹ The knowability of God by man requires not only a readiness of God to be known but also a corresponding readiness of man for knowledge – for what is here in question is not God's knowledge of Himself but man's knowledge of God. If there is no corresponding readiness of man, there can be no knowability of God – at any rate not a knowability which will ever be a problem for man. There can be only the knowability of God for Himself, and even this in such a way that it can not be the theme of man's investigation.² Yet the readiness of man cannot be an independent one. It is a readiness that cannot finally be grounded in itself, i.e., in the nature of the activity of man, so that between it and the readiness of God there is a relationship of mutual conditioning; God and His readiness having to wait, as it were, for the readiness of man in order that together they may constitute the knowability of God which establishes the knowledge of God. If there is readiness on the side of man, it can have only a borrowed, mediated and subsequent independence. It can be communicated to man only as a capacity and willingness for gratitude and obedience. It can be opened and apportioned to man only from the source of all readiness – the readiness of God Himself, beside which there cannot ultimately be a second.³

¹ *Church Dogmatics* 2/1, p. 63.

² *Ibid.*, p. 65.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 65–66. A restatement of this argument is found also in Section 27 (on the limits of the knowledge of God). Here Barth argues from the principle "God is known only by God" to conclude that a possibility of man's knowledge of God is conceivable only "as a participation in the truth of God by God Himself in grace." Although I have no difficulty to accept Barth's conclusion if he is willing to include also creation in his category of grace, I have some difficulty to understand Barth's principle that "God is known only by God" if the principle means that God alone can know Himself. This is in fact a proposition formulated by Barth about God and not enunciated by God about Himself. Now the proposition "God alone can know Himself" is either true or false. If it is false, somebody else besides God knows Him. If it is true, there is at least another being besides God, namely Karl Barth, that knows something about God. In both cases Barth's principle breaks down. The principle stands only if it is understood to mean that God can be known only by God's grace. But, again, if grace means

Thus far Barth has shown how human reason alone cannot conceive true concepts of God and how reason can do this with God's grace. There remains the problem of proving that God's revelation has actually taken place. According to our theologian this "fact cannot be inferred from the general concept of language,"¹ since the existence of human language is in no wise necessary to God: "God has no need to speak to us."² There is nothing in the nature of language, or even in the nature of man and his history that can make Revelation necessary. Therefore neither philosophy nor historical research can lead man to the discovery of the fact of Revelation. The only guarantee man has for the fact that God has spoken to him, the only guarantee he has of the fact of Revelation is Revelation itself in act: "the only way to know it, is as the Word, directed to us, coming home to us."³

(c) *Analogous concepts do not express God openly but only hiddenly*

Having established that human reason alone cannot arrive at any true concept of God, that it can do this only with God's grace, and that it has actually received this grace in Revelation, Barth should have examined the nature of this, knowledge. He has done so occasionally but not systematically. Actually the solution of this problem is but a corollary of the parallel problem examined in the theological semantics of *analogia fidei*, i.e., that analogical language can express God only in a hidden, veiled way. Everything said there about the worldliness and mysteriousness of theological language holds also of analogous concepts. As analogous language signifies God only indirectly, so too analogous concepts express God only indirectly. The form of analogous concepts is simply human, only its content is divine. Analogous concepts have a wordly form, the form of all sorts of human acts, and this form is the veiling of the divine content, the calling of it in question. There is no experience of the Word of God other than in this problematic form so deeply grounded in the facts. As in analogous language, so too in analogous concepts, there is contradiction and radical conflict between form and content. Because of this contradiction man can never arrive at a direct encounter with the content through the form of his concepts. With his concepts of God man can never see Him directly and im-

any sort of divine operation (creation, revelation, redemption etc.) the principle does not say anything startling: it is merely a brief formulation of the principle of God's universal causality, with a special reference to man's knowledge of God.

¹ *Church Dogmatics* I/1, p. 158.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

mediately. All the knowledge he can reach remains a mediated knowledge of God.¹ Man is never alone directly before God, but is always separated from God by some object. But, strangely enough, through these very same objects that separate him from God, through concepts which because of their wordly form hide God from his eyes, man is able with God's grace to see God. In the objectivity of these objects, in the wordliness of these concepts, man knows God.²

5. THEOLOGICAL ONTOLOGY OF 'ANALOGIA FIDEI'

To our present knowledge of *Church Dogmatics* theological ontology of *analogia fidei* is nowhere discussed systematically. Barth, however, has dealt with the ontological aspects of the analogy of faith on several occasions and has made his views on this sufficiently clear. Here we shall summarize Sections 41 and 45 of the third volume of *Church Dogmatics*, which deal with the ontological aspects of *analogia fidei* rather extensively. On the basis of these two sections, we shall then attempt to reconstruct Barth's general doctrine on the theological ontology of *analogia fidei*.

(a) In Section 41 (on creation as the exterior ground of revelation) Barth discusses the meaning of Gen. 1, 26: "Let us make man in our image and likeness" (*Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram*). He denies the view that man is an image of God because of any quality of his body or his mind: such an understanding of the image of God cannot be correct, because it is built upon a shaky anthropology.³ Barth also dismisses as unsatisfactory the view of those theologians who make it consist in the *dominium terrae*, since an image of this kind would be only an exterior one.⁴ Barth maintains that man is an image of God not because of some particular quality or because of

¹ See *Church Dogmatics* 1/1, pp. 184 ff.; 200, 236, 276-277; 2/1, pp. 16-17.

² Our analysis of Barth's semantics and epistemology of analogy shows that although he formulates the problem of analogy in exactly the same way as Aquinas, i.e., as the problem of the predication of divine names, he constantly shifts the discussion into something different, namely into the problem of obtaining true concepts of God. There is, then, a fundamental difference between Barth's doctrine of *analogia fidei* and Aquinas' doctrine of analogy. *Analogia fidei* deals with the problem of true representations of God and His perfections; it asks the question: "How can we have a true representation of God's justice, goodness, etc.?" Analogy deals with the problem of true judgments about God and His perfections; it asks the question: "How can the names 'goodness,' 'justice,' etc., be predicated of God?" Aquinas believes that man can only know true judgments about God and maintains that man can never conceive adequate representations of God and His perfections. See Bouillard, *Karl Barth*, III, pp. 208 ff.

³ *Kirchliche Dogmatik* 3/1, pp. 216-217.

⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 217-218.

some external accident; man is an image of God as man. "Man would not be a man if he were not an image of God. He is an image of God inasmuch as he is man."¹ Although man as man is an image of God, Barth believes that his being an image of God becomes particularly manifest in the I-Thou relationship. The human I-Thou is an image of the divine I-Thou.² Obviously this is not an analogy of being (*analogia entis*) but an analogy of relation (*analogia relationis*). Barth gives the following formulation of the analogy of relation: "as the addressing I in the divine nature is related to the addressed divine Thou... so also in human existence the I is related to the Thou, man to woman."³ Barth calls the reader's attention to the fact that the I-Thou relationship is not accidental; therefore, his contention that it is not accidental that man is an image of God is valid. "This I-Thou relationship is not accidental. It is constitutive, first in God and then also in man created by God. If one tries to think this relationship away, he will have to think away both the divine from God and the human from man."⁴ Moreover Barth finds that the I-Thou relationship is particularly adequate to reveal the nature of the image of God in man, because it shows at the same time how the image is similar to the prototype and how it is different from it. The similarity consists in the correspondence between the I-Thou relationship of Father and Son, and the I-Thou relationship of man and woman. The dissimilarity is most noticeable in the fact that the I-Thou relationship in man takes place only between different individuals; in God, on the contrary, it takes place within the same unique *individuum*.⁵

(b) In Section 45 (on man in his determination to be God's partner) Barth discusses the different analogies that exist between Jesus Christ and God, and between Jesus Christ and man. According to Barth there are three important analogies: (i) analogy between Christ and God: Christ is the image of God; (ii) analogy between Christ's humanity and his divinity: Christ's humanity is the image of his divinity; (iii) analogy between humanity in general and Christ's humanity.

(i) Analogy between Christ and God. – There is an analogy between

¹ *Ibid.* p. 207.

² *Ibid.* p. 219. Barth insists mainly on the I-Thou of the marital (husband-wife) relationship.

³ *Ibid.* p. 220.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 207. Barth finds confirmation for his interpretation of the image of God in Gen. 1, 27: "God... as man and woman created them." God did not simply create man, but created him as a social being. Sociability is the most essential characteristic of human nature, since everything else is to be understood in the light of this fact. "Die Menschen sind Mann und Frau und nur das: alles Andere nur in dieser Unterscheidung und Beziehung" (p. 209).

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 220.

Christ and God because the relationship that God establishes in Jesus with mankind is not completely foreign to God; rather it is proper and natural to Him. By establishing this new relationship God creates an image of His inner relationship. In God's inner life there is the prototype of the I-Thou relationship of which Christ's relation to mankind is only an image. Between prototype and image there is correspondence. The correspondence consists in this, that the man Jesus in his being for man imitates the relation of the Son to the Father. "It is clear that we have here (in this relation of the Son of the Father) the final and decisive ground, which we were looking for, when we were discussing the ontological character, the reality and radicality of Jesus' being for man."¹

(ii) Analogy between Christ's humanity and his divinity. – Barth maintains that between Christ's humanity and his divinity there is not only parallelism, but an inner agreement. Moreover, the correspondence and similarity between the two is not merely factual but "essential." The correspondence, however, cannot be such as to eliminate the natural difference that exists between humanity and divinity. Certainly Christ's humanity is not his divinity. In his divinity Christ comes from God and goes back to God. In his humanity he comes from the *kosmos* and goes back to the *kosmos*. But God is not the *kosmos* nor is the *kosmos* God.²

(iii) Analogy between humanity in general and Christ's humanity – The very fact that the Word has taken up humanity for man implies that, notwithstanding all differences, Jesus and man are similar in some fundamental respect; for, when a nature is for another nature they must have some dimension in common. If man were of such a nature that his humanity ought to be classified under an entirely different category from Jesus', it would be idle and misleading to speak of both Jesus and man as "man". "Man" here and "man" there would mean two entirely different natures, which would be better signified by two different words. Then, it would be absolutely incomprehensible why the "man" Jesus has been called to be the Saviour of the other "man."³ There can be no doubt, therefore, that there must be some similarity between Jesus and mankind. Barth finds this similarity in the "essential characteristic" (*Grundform*) of humanity which we have seen to consist

¹ *Kirchliche Dogmatik* 3/2, p. 261; see also pp. 260–262.

² *Ibid.* pp. 259–261. On p. 261 Barth says that inasmuch as Christ's humanity is only an image of God it is already clear that it cannot be directly but only indirectly identical with God.

³ *Ibid.* p. 266.

in the I-Thou relationship. Barth concludes that the analogy between Christ and humanity in general is an analogy of relation: as Jesus is for God (or for man), man is for other men.¹

(c) *Barth's general doctrine on the theological ontology of 'analogia fidei'*

We may here reconstruct a general doctrine of what we believe to be Barth's teaching on the theological ontology of *analogia fidei*. It seems to us that Barth's theological ontology of the analogy of faith is based on two principles: (1) By nature man is not an image of God; between God and man there is no natural analogy; it is only by grace that man becomes an image of God. (2) The analogy established by grace between God and man is not an analogy of being but an analogy of relation.²

The first principle requires some explication. From what Barth tells us concerning the analogy of the human I-Thou to the divine I-Thou, we may be tempted to believe that this is a natural analogy rather than an analogy established by grace. But we believe that this is a misinterpretation of Barth since in his *Church Dogmatics* Barth is no less hostile to natural theology than he was at the time of his *Nein* to Brunner. He affirms again and again that only the *analogia fidei* safeguards God's transcendence and God's gracefulness; that natural theology in all its ramifications (natural semantics, natural epistemology and natural ontology when they have God as their object) can be only an idol, a work of the Devil.³ He insists that even the analogy of the human I-Thou with the divine I-Thou is only an analogy of faith. In truth it is an analogy that man can know only after Revelation has manifested the mystery of the Trinity. Only when grace has revealed to man that in God there is a Father and Son is man in a position to recognize the analogy between the human I-Thou and the divine I-Thou.

As to the second principle, that the analogy established by grace between God and man is not an analogy of being but an analogy of relation, its meaning is made sufficiently clear by the many examples employed by Barth: the I-Thou relation, the husband and wife relation, the relation of Christ's humanity to his divinity, the relation of Christ to the Church, etc. These examples bring out the differences between *analogia fidei*, analogy and symbolism. Analogy and symbolism are both based on a direct participation of the creature in its Creator.

¹ *Ibid.* pp. 262, 272, 290.

² Analogy of relation is frequently called analogy of action (*analogia actionis*) and analogy of faith (*analogia fidei*).

³ C. *Kirchliche Dogmatik* 3/1, p. 220; 3/2, 262; 3/3, pp. 57-59, 490-492, 515-516 etc.; *Church Dogmatics* 1/1, p. x, 273-274.

Analogia fidei is based on the similarity of two relations: it is a similarity between the relation of the divine to the divine (e.g. Father to Son), and the relation of the human to the human (e.g. husband to wife). Insofar as the *analogia fidei* is a similarity of relations it could be called an analogy of proportionality. But we have seen that Barth objects to this terminology because of its mathematical, quantitative implications, and because of its use in Thomistic natural theology. Actually the epistemology and ontology of Barth's similarity of relations differ *toto caelo* from the ontology and epistemology of the analogy of proportionality of Thomistic natural theology. The ontology and epistemology of Barth's analogy of relations are either based on, or related to, revelation and grace. The ontology and epistemology of the analogy of proportionality of Thomistic natural theology are based on nature as such, apart from revelation and grace. The analogy of relations is, then, an analogy of faith, not an analogy of being (*analogia entis*). Barth constantly rejects the view of those theologians, who conceive the divine human relation as an analogy of being.¹ In the Preface to the first of volume of *Church Dogmatics* Barth expresses his aversion for the *analogy of being* (*analogia entis*) by calling it "the invention of Antichrist."² Other attacks to the analogy of being are disseminated throughout the many volumes of *Church Dogmatics*. The main reasons that have led Barth to the rejection of *analogia entis* are the following:

(i) *Analogia entis* eliminates the infinite qualitative difference between God and man by reducing it to a quantitative difference, to a difference of degree. The *analogia entis* does this especially by bringing God and man under the same category of being, namely, an idea, a genus in which God and man are comprehended together.³

(ii) *Analogia entis* turns the divine-human relation upside down. Instead of starting with God in order to descend to man, *analogia entis* starts with man in order to ascend to God.⁴

¹ C. *Kirchliche Dogmatik* 1/1, pp. 40, 175, 180, 252, 262, 459-460; 1/2, pp. 41, 48, 158, 262; 2/1 pp. 90, 349, 654 ff.; 3/1, pp. 206 ff., 219, 262, 390 ff.; 3/2, pp. 115 ff.; 3/3, pp. 57-59; 490-492; 515-516 etc.

² *Church Dogmatics* 1/1, p. x.

³ See *Kirchliche Dogmatik* 1/1, pp. 459-460; 2/2, pp. 588 ff.; 3/1, pp. 206 ff., 390 ff.; 3/2, pp. 115 ff. Barth firmly rejects a doctrine of *analogia entis*, that conceives being as a genus, because "es gabe also Zwischen Schöpfer und Geschöpf eine *analogia entis* und insofern einen Oberbegriff, einen Generalnenner, ein *genus* "Sein," das beide, Gott und sein Geschöpf, umfasst." (3/3, p. 116). See also 1/1, p. 252; 2/1, pp. 272-273, 349. In rejecting a doctrine of *analogia entis* that conceives being as a genus, Barth is not opposing Aquinas, as he believes that he is doing, rather he does exactly what Aquinas does when he condemns the *analogia duorum ad unum*. See *supra* pp. 10 ff. This point is well brought out by Bouillard, *Karl Barth*, III, pp. 205 ff.

⁴ See references in the previous note.

Against the *analogia entis*, Barth teaches an *analogia fidei*.¹ Analogy of faith is a similarity between God and man established by grace and manifested by revelation. According to Barth analogy of faith avoids all the dangers of analogy of being. It keeps the natural order of things: first, God and second, man; and safeguards the infinite qualitative difference by conceiving the analogy between God and man not as analogy of being but as an analogy of relations.²

6. 'ANALOGIA FIDEI', 'ANALOGIA ENTIS' AND ANALOGY

We may now examine the weight of Barth's criticism of *analogia entis*. In our opinion his criticism has weight only against those deistic philosophers of the eighteenth century and those liberal theologians of the nineteenth century who, in attempting to establish the harmony of reason and faith, interpreted the divine-human relation in such way as to destroy the supernatural, external revelation and dogmas implying mysteries, and to make reason the touchstone of religious validity. Against these philosophers and theologians, Barth is right to object that their interpretation of the divine-human relation destroys the infinite qualitative difference and turns the real situation upside down by giving to man a priority over God.³ Barth, however, intends to include in his criticism of *analogia entis* not only the liberals of the nineteenth century and the deists of the eighteenth century, but also the theologians of the Middle Ages, particularly Aquinas. Now, it seems to us that Barth's criticisms⁴ cannot affect in any way Aquinas' doctrine of analogy, and this for three reasons: (1) Aquinas' analogy does not rest on a preconceived epistemology, but remains valid both in a natural and in a revealed epistemology.⁵ (2) Aquinas' analogy does not destroy

¹ *Analogia fidei* is also called *analogia gratiae* (*Kirchliche Dogmatik* 2/1, p. 275) and *analogia revelationis* (*Kirchliche Dogmatik* 3/3, p. 59).

² See *Kirchliche Dogmatik* 1/1, pp. 459-460; 1/2, pp. 91-92; 2/2, pp. 588 ff. and 829 ff.; 3/1, pp. 390 ff.

³ Bouillard believes that Barth is also right to criticize some recent Catholic and Protestant theologians who have interpreted Aquinas' doctrine of analogy as an *analogia entis*. See Bouillard, *Karl Barth*, III, pp. 205 ff. But I think that it is only by keeping in mind that Barth's conversion to *analogia fidei* is born as a reaction against the theological liberalism of the nineteenth century that it is possible to understand much of what he says of the *analogia entis*.

⁴ *Supra*, p. 168.

⁵ Cf. E. Przywara: *In und Gegen* (Norimberga, 1955), p. 278: "Analogia entis" ist Kurzformel für das, was das Vierte Laterankonzil 1215... definierte: dass auch in einem noch so "übernatürlichen" Bereich (wie es hier die Trinitäts-Mystik war) "keine so grosse Ähnlichkeit angemerkt werden könne zwischen Schöpfer und Geschöpf, dass nicht eine jeweils grössere Unähnlichkeit angemerkt werden müsse." "Analogia entis" sagt so in keiner Weise eine "natürliche Theologie" sondern gilt gerade im spezifisch übernatürlichen und genuinst christlichen Bereich." Thomists have nothing to object to Barth's *analogia fidei* as an inter-

the infinite qualitative difference between God and man, because it simply asserts the priority of God over man with respect to the perfections of both God and man.¹ (3) Aquinas' analogy does not put God and man on the same level by bringing God and man under the same category, the category of being. Aquinas does not consider being as a genus of which the Creator and the creature share a part. To avoid this misconception sometimes Aquinas refuses to call God being and prefers to call Him "super-being."² By rejecting a doctrine of *analogia entis* that considers being as a genus, Barth is not opposing Aquinas, rather he is just doing what Aquinas does when he condemns *analogia duorum ad tertium* in the predication of divine names. Aquinas' analogy is as much concerned to safeguard God's transcendence as Barth's *analogia fidei*. Therefore it is not in the infinite qualitative difference that one should look for a differentiation between Aquinas and Barth. The difference between them is usually thought to lie in their conception of nature and grace. They are generally understood to conceive this relation in ways that are diametrically opposed. Barth is understood to give such a priority to grace as make nature just an instrument of grace. Apart from grace, nature is meaningless. Hence, no true knowledge of nature, as such, is possible. True knowledge is possible only in the light of grace. Aquinas, on the other hand, is understood to stress the consistency of creature and its self-sufficiency in such a fashion that its relation to grace is purely accidental. Nature has ontological priority over grace, it can exist and be known apart from grace. The subordination of nature to grace is not necessary but contingent.

We know that this understanding of Barth and Aquinas is based on

pretation of the divine-human relation in the light of revelation. This is just what Thomists want to say with their doctrine of analogy in dogmatic theology. See also Balthasar, *K. Barth*, pp. 390 ff.

¹ This is the important function of the distinction between mode of signification (*modus significandi*) and perfection signified (*perfectio significata*), namely to assure the absolute ontological priority of God over man.

² See *In Divinis Nominibus* no. 889-890. In a similar way Aquinas calls God *supersubstantia* (no 83), *supersubstantialis* (no 14, 28, 661, 991, 993 etc.), *superessentialis* (no 992), *superumus* (no 992), *superlucens* (no 661), etc. According to Aquinas being is not a genus but a transcendental. "Ens not potest habere differentias sicut genus habet. Et ideo ens genus non est sed est de omnibus communiter praedicabile analogice; similiter dicendum est de aliis transcendentalibus" (*De Natura Generis*, c. 1). See *S. Theol.* I, 3, 5; *In Meta.* no. 139, 433, 1966, 2169; *De Pot.* 3, 16 ad 4; *De Ver.* 1, 1. To being as a transcendental God and man are not related in the same way, but while all creatures are contained in being, being itself is contained in God. "Omnia existentia continentur sub ipso esse communi, non autem Deus, sed magis esse commune continetur sub eius virtute, quia virtus divina plus extenditur quam ipsum esse creatum; et hoc est quod (Dionysius) dicit, quod esse commune est in ipso Deo sicut contentum in continente." (*In Divinis Nominibus*, no 659). Cf. *In I Sent.* 8, 1, 1 ad 4. On Aquinas' concept of being see A. D. Sertillanges, *Saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris, 1910) I, pp. 176-190, and J. Maritain, *Les Degrés du Savoir* (Paris, 1946) pp. 827-843.

some of their central doctrines. But this way of contrasting the Catholic to the Protestant theologian oversimplifies beyond recognition their teaching on the relation between nature and grace. Although this understanding represents some of the main traits of Barth's and Aquinas' pictures of the relation between nature and grace, these traits alone give us a very artificial and distorted view of their teaching on the relation between nature and grace, faith and reason, philosophy and theology. By leaving out some common elements of their conception of the God-creature relation we are given the impression that they maintain two opposite theories. Actually neither Aquinas nor Barth maintains the rigid views described above. Barth knows that such an extreme supernaturalism is impossible. He knows that without some connection between nature and grace, man would not be able to recognize that grace has any meaning for him. He knows that without some previous knowledge of himself, of the world and of God, man could not understand the word of God spoken to him in revelation.¹ As to Aquinas, he knows that in the present historical situation, nature and grace are inseparable. He knows that nature is not an end in itself, but is subordinated to grace as to its superior end. He knows that true knowledge of nature comes from grace.² It is true that Barth insists more than Aquinas on the *sola gratia* but not to the point of eliminating nature and reason. On the other hand, it is true that Aquinas insists more than Barth on the relative autonomy of nature but not to the point of forgetting its subordination to revelation and grace.

In *Church Dogmatics*, as we have seen above, there are numerous passages, where all natural knowledge of God is condemned and any analogy between nature and grace is rejected, while it is maintained that true knowledge of God comes only from revelation and that the analogy between God and man is established only by grace. But these passages ought not to be taken in isolation. The passages where natural knowledge is denied and nature is declared sinful must be read together with the other passages where Barth says that man has a rational knowledge of God and that nature is an *imago Dei*, a permanent *continuum* without corruption. Barth says again and again in the second part of the third volume of *Church Dogmatics* that they must be taken together. There he says that the phenomena of the human, considered in themselves, do not provide any true knowledge of human nature. However, in the light of revelation, and taken together with the know-

¹ *Church Dogmatics* 2/1, p. 63 ff.; *Kirchl. Dogm.* 3/2, 243 ff.

² Aquinas, *S. Theol.* I, 1, 1; *C. Gent.* I, 4 & 6.

ledge provided by the Word of God in Jesus Christ, the phenomena become true symptoms of the nature of man. Barth, then, maintains a natural knowledge of man and of God (the two are inseparable), but its truth depends on the seal of revelation and its meaning can be fully grasped only in the light of the Word of God.

We can now see that Barth's teaching on the relation of nature and grace differs less from Aquinas' than first appeared to be the case. Their teaching is certainly different. Barth stresses the deficiency of natural knowledge and the weakness of human nature, whereas Aquinas insists on the goodness of human nature as an instrument of grace, and of reason as a power capable of shedding light on the mysteries of revelation. But, in our opinion, this is a difference of emphasis rather than of substance. Instead of maintaining two conflicting doctrines, Aquinas and Barth simply emphasize different aspects of the same reality.¹

The situation of the Christian man is a very complex one. It cannot be explained either in terms of grace alone or in terms of nature alone. Nor can the relation between reason and faith be stated only in terms of either reason or faith, since it is not a unilateral one. Reason cannot be reduced to be merely the receiver of the content of revelation. Revelation can't be confined to be merely the meaning of reason and natural knowledge. The relation between faith and reason is one of reciprocity. On the one hand, reason has some knowledge of its own, and, when it receives revelation, understands it in the light of its previous knowledge. On the other hand, revelation supplies reason with some knowledge that is beyond the capacity of reason and sheds new light on the knowledge previously possessed by this power. Barth is right in maintaining that revelation transforms the phenomena of natural knowledge into true symptoms. But Aquinas is also right in affirming that reason sheds light on revelation by distinguishing between true and false religion, true and false God, true and false revelation, and in asserting that reason lends to revelation the concepts previously acquired through natural knowledge.

We may then conclude that while Aquinas does not teach *analogia entis* at the exclusion of *analogia fidei*, Barth, *de facto*, does not teach *analogia fidei* at the exclusion of *analogia entis*. But whereas Aquinas' theory of analogy is coherent with his teaching on the God-creature relationship, Barth's theory of analogy of faith seems to be in conflict with his teaching on the God-creature relationship. As a matter of fact analogy of faith stresses so much God's transcendence as to do away with His immanence in creatures. On the contrary Aquinas' elaborate

theory of analogy of intrinsic attribution is able to do justice to both God's transcendence and immanence.

In conclusion: in the description of the God-creature relationship Aquinas' and Barth's views are much closer than in the interpretation of the meaning of theological language.

CHAPTER VIII

THE MEANING OF THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE

1. THE MEANING OF THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE ACCORDING TO AQUINAS, TILlich AND BARTH

Analogy, symbolism and *analogia fidei* are three methods whereby Aquinas, Tillich and Barth respectively seek to provide a tool capable of giving an adequate interpretation of the God-creature relation and a justification for theological language. Analogy, symbolism and *analogia fidei* are different answers to the same problem. The problem is the meaning of words applied to God and to creatures. If our words mean exactly the same thing when applied to God and to creatures, then God's transcendence is eliminated: God ceases to be God in order to be a creature or vice versa. On the other hand, if our words bear an altogether different meaning when applied to God, then God's immanence is obscured: man is no longer in a position to know God.

The answer of *analogia fidei* to the problem is that our language is not applied to God and creatures either equivocally or univocally but analogously; our language when applied to God and creatures has a meaning partly the same and partly different. The common element is the content, the different element is the form. Our language has a content that is applicable to God because it belongs primarily to God. But the divine content is always hidden in a human form and this cannot be applied to God. Moreover, the divine content is known by man only in revelation, namely when God adopts human words for the knowledge of Himself and gives them the meaning they originally and intrinsically have in Him. In the light of God's revelation it is seen that we use words improperly and derivatively when we apply them to creatures. The words "father" and "son," for example, do not possess their original truth in their application to the two male members of physical generation but rather in their application to God in the Trinity.

The answer of symbolism to the problem is that our language does not apply to God either univocally or equivocally but symbolically. Our language has a literal meaning that can be applied only to cre-

atures, and also a symbolic meaning that points to God. The symbolic power of our language is based on the principle that finite reality is rooted in the ground of being, and participates in its power and meaning. The power of the ground of being, however, has become especially manifest in the symbol of Jesus as the Christ.

The answer of analogy to the problem is that our language is not applied to God either univocally or equivocally but analogously. In some of our names the mode of signification is distinguishable from the perfection signified. The perfection signified is the analogous element that can be applied to both God and creatures, though primarily to God and secondarily to creatures. The analogy between God and creatures is based on the principle of similarity between cause and effect. All reality, both natural and supernatural, as an effect of divine causality, bears a likeness to God and can be the medium for an analogous knowledge of God.

In our study we have analyzed analogy, symbolism and *analogia fidei* with the purpose of determining whether they are tools capable of giving an adequate interpretation to the God-creature relation and a satisfactory justification for the use of theological language. Our criterion in determining their adequacy and satisfactoriness has been their ability at the same time to safeguard God's transcendence and immanence.

Our analysis has shown that *analogia fidei* is capable of providing an adequate interpretation for the God-creature relation in the dimension of revelation and grace but fails to provide an adequate interpretation for the God-creature relation in the dimension of creation and nature. God's immanence is guaranteed only in the dimension of revelation and grace. Barth believes that God's transcendence can be secured only by setting up a barrier between nature and grace. He believes that God's transcendence is safe only if analogy between God and man is established by Revelation and grace. But where there is no immanence, there is no transcendence. If God is not immanent in nature He cannot transcend it. In this situation nature becomes an independent power beyond God's control. It becomes the anti-God (the Antichrist!).

Our analysis of symbolism has shown that symbolism can offer an adequate interpretation of the God-creature relation and of theological language only if it is not based on the principle of correlation, since correlation does violence to God's transcendence. We have also shown that Tillich's frequent tendency to subjectivism is in contrast not only with God's transcendence but also with his professed objective theory

of symbolism. Subjectivism is especially manifest in his symbolic interpretation of historical events. While with respect to the physical universe he safeguards the empirical aspect, and with regard to biblical statements the literal meaning, he is willing to renounce the factual reality of historical events. We have shown that this is in conflict with an objective theory and that this cannot be done, because the symbolic aspect is inseparable from the literal aspect of the symbol.

Our analysis of analogy has shown that Aquinas does not interpret the God-creature relation according to analogy of proper proportionality but according to analogy of intrinsic attribution. We have shown that the principle on which intrinsic attribution rests, namely similarity of cause and effect, is reducible to the principle of sufficient reason. Analogy of intrinsic attribution is capable of giving an adequate interpretation to the God-creature relation and, consequently, a satisfactory justification for the use of theological language, because it stresses both God's transcendence (God is the primary analogate) and immanence (the secondary analogate is an image of God). Like Tillich's symbolism Aquinas' analogy seeks at one and same time to prevent any segment of creation from making itself God and to reveal the image of God in every aspect of reality. But, by not making the God-creature relation a correlation, analogy is able to safeguard God's transcendence better than symbolism. Like symbolism, analogy gives a negative picture of God rather than a positive one. It affirms categorical reality of God, but promptly denies the limiting connotation of the category: it affirms the perfection signified but denies the mode of signification. Like *analogia fidei*, analogy stresses the priority of the divine over the creaturely: the secondary analogate owes all its reality to the primary. Aquinas, like Barth, insists that every image of God is a grace of God. But Aquinas sees the grace of God wherever there is being and nature and not in revelation alone. Finally, Aquinas' justification for the use of theological language is more satisfactory than Tillich's and Barth's, since it also covers names of negative attributes and names of imperfections.

The present study has examined three different interpretations of the God-creature relationship, has shown some of their inadequacies and has suggested some improvements. But to the reader, who is familiar with Logical Positivism and Linguistic Analysis, our inquiry may appear to have evaded the basic question, i.e., the question of whether theological language can be meaningful at all, and, if it is meaningful, what is its true meaning.

This is a hard question to which, of course, we cannot give an ex-

haustive answer in few pages. But in order to avoid the accusation of evasion of the basic question, we shall summarize some of the answers already given to the problem of the meaning of religious language, and suggest where a satisfactory solution may be found.

2. THE MEANING OF RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE ACCORDING TO LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS

To see the task of philosophy as linguistic analysis was one of the basic features of Logical Positivism. The doctrine of this movement concerning the meaning of religious language was stated in the following unequivocal terms by Ayer: "To say that 'God exists' is a metaphysical utterance which cannot be either true or false. And by this same criterion, no sentence which purports to describe the nature of a transcendent god cannot possess any literal significance... All utterances about the nature of God are nonsensical."¹ Owing to its extreme radicalism Logical Positivism could not have long life. Its fall was due especially to the fact that its basic principle (the verification principle which claims to have cognitive meaning only propositions capable of being translated into a chain of sense data, i.e. empirical, statements) was indefensible.

After the fall of Logical Positivism the conception of philosophy as linguistic analysis was taken over by the philosophical movement called *Linguistic Analysis*, a powerful movement, that at present rivals with Existentialism and Thomism for the leadership of the Western world.

According to *Linguistic Analysis*, then, the task of philosophy is not to give new knowledge of the world by means of some faculty of speculation or intuition, but to clarify ideas through the study of language. The formal object of philosophy is the study of language, any kind of language, scientific, religious, moral and metaphysical.

What is the meaning of theological language according to Linguistic Analysis? We must confess that it is still too early to give a definite answer to this question because analysts have rarely dealt with religious language. They have refrained from oversimplified classifications of the meaning of the various types of language, and have concentrated their attention on either scientific or moral language, leaving the subject of religious language to professional theologians. But up to now very few theologians have faced the problem of religious (and theological) language from an analytic standpoint. In order to give a more faithful

¹ A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic* (New York: Dover), p. 115.

picture of the situation we shall summarize briefly the views of both philosophers and professional theologians upon the question of religious (and theological) language.

One of the first explicit attempts to deal with religious language within the perspectives of Analysis is the now celebrated article, "Gods," written in 1944 by John Wisdom.¹ The article begins with the remark that the existence of God is no longer thought to be "an experimental issue"; in other words, whether God exists or not cannot be decided by referring to any facts about the world. Thus, the difference between thinking that the world is an orderly cosmos governed by God, and that it is not, is not a difference over the facts. Is it then, asks Wisdom, solely a difference of words or of attitudes, with the consequence that there can be no question of one being right and the other wrong? This, he says, is implausible, for "the disputants speak as if they are concerned with a matter of scientific fact, or of transsensual, transscientific and metaphysical fact, but still of fact and still a matter about which reasons for and against may be offered, although no scientific reasons in the sense of field surveys or fossils or experiments on delinquents are to the point."² To say that God exists is, then, to take up a certain attitude to the world and to life; but it is not a "mere attitude," for we may ask whether or not it is appropriate. Wisdom suggests that, in fact, it is an inappropriate attitude, for vaguely Freudian reasons. Yet, the proposition "God exists" is not completely without point, for "it evinces some recognition of patterns in time easily missed"; it implies, for instance, that the world is not a pure chaos.³

If we now compare the views of the Analyst Wisdom with those of the Logical Positivist Ayer we find that they agree on the point that the existence of God (and the nature of His attributes) is not an experimental issue; they disagree on the point of the meaning of religious language: for Ayer it is nonsensical because it does not satisfy the verification principle; for Wisdom, who no longer accepts the verification principle as a criterion of meaning, it is meaningful. But the reasons adduced by Wisdom in support of its meaningfulness are easily disputable. The value of his article lies more in the sketch of a possible solution on the matter, than in the arguments on which such a solution is based.

An important contribution to the analysis of religious language was made in 1955 with the publication of the collection *New Essays in*

¹ Reprinted in *Philosophy and Psycho-Analysis* (Oxford 1953), pp. 149-168.

² *Ibid.* p. 156.

³ *Ibid.* p. 154.

Philosophical Theology.¹ In their attempt to eliminate the ambiguities of Wisdom's arguments in favor of the meaningfulness of religious language some authors of this collection fall back on Ayer's view that it is meaningless, whereas, others find new reasons for its meaningfulness. Here we shall concentrate upon the arguments of the two opposite views as stated by Smart and Hare.

In his article Prof. J. J. Smart attempts to show that any rational proof of the existence of God is impossible because the notion of God is meaningless. His argument may be summarized as follows. The conclusion of the proof of the existence of God based upon contingency is that a "necessary being," i.e. a "necessary existent" must be postulated to exist in order to explain why the things in the world actually exist rather than not exist. God, then, is defined as a necessary existent, that is to say, as a being or entity which cannot possibly not exist. Now Smart claims that, when we analyze exactly what is meant by "necessary existent," we see that it turns out to be a senseless notion, not false, but senseless or meaningless in the same way in which the notion of a square-circle is senseless. For it is not things or beings or entities which are necessary or contingent, but propositions. "Logically necessary being," Professor Smart concludes, "is a self-contradictory expression like 'round square'... We reject the cosmological argument, then, because it rests on a thorough absurdity."²

Smart's argument calls for some remarks. First, his restriction of necessity to propositions is arbitrary. "To claim that there is no other kind of necessity save linguistic necessity leads to the most flagrant kind of paradox, for, in order to assert that all necessity is reducible to linguistic necessity, we have to presuppose a non-linguistic type of necessity."³ Second, it is true and most philosophers agree that ordinarily "existent" is equivalent to "contingent" and that, therefore, in ordinary language "necessary" and "existent" cannot be used simultaneously. Yet many philosophers claim that there is at least an instance where the conjunction of the two terms is legitimate, and that in such a case the meaning of the term "existent" becomes much richer. They produce arguments in favor of their claim, which ought not to be simply discarded by appealing to ordinary language or to everyday

¹ Ed. A. Flew and A. MacIntyre (London: S.C.M. Press, 1955).

² *Ibid.* p. 39.

³ M. J. Charlesworth, "Linguistic Analysis and God," in *International Philosophical Quarterly* 1961, p. 149. See also the following pages where Charlesworth makes a very pointed critique of Smart's argument. Cfr. Charlesworth, *Philosophy and Linguistic Analysis* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ., 1959), pp. 134-135 for the critique of Ayer on this same point.

experience as a criterion of meaning, as Prof. Smart seems to do here.

R. M. Hare in his article attempts to show that religious language may be justified as being meaningful in a way which allows us to speak of the religious life being the right one, while at the same time denying that religious utterance are about matters of fact in any way. The article begins with the admission that religious statements cannot be assertion, for, if they were, then we would have to admit the possibility of evidence counting against their being true. In other words, if "God exists" is a factual assertion then we must know what would count against its being true, that is to say, we would have to admit that it was logically possible that God does not exist. And the same holds for all other pretended assertions about God. Nevertheless, if religious utterances do not function as factual assertions they do function quite meaningfully as 'bliks.' Hare invents the term 'blik' to describe certain basic metaphysical attitudes towards the world, on which ground men behave very differently. Now, according to Hare, although such 'bliks' assert nothing about the nature of the world, and, as such, are neither verifiable nor falsifiable, they are, however, justifiable in that it is possible to decide which is the right 'blik' to have. So, Hare says, "It is very important to have the right 'blik'."¹

We have here a sophisticated version of Wisdom's theory that religious language is meaningful and that its meaning can't just be reduced to a certain attitude because attitudes can be right and wrong (Wisdom called them "plausible" and "unplausible"). Hare persists in the same ambiguity about the criterion for judging which attitude (blik) is plausible (right) or implausible (wrong), that marred Wisdom's theory. If, indeed, the criterion is a pragmatic one, that is to say, if the correctness of an attitude is to be judged by seeing what kind of behaviour it leads to, as Hare seems to suggest, then his attempt to save the meaningfulness of religious language is successful only at the price of denaturing religious belief and religious language into a behavioristic fact.²

The views which we have been considering are those of philosophers who, holding to a certain philosophical position, seek to come to terms with religious language. We shall now pass to consider representative views of those who begin from the other side, so to speak; we mean those who are primarily Christian theologians seeking to come to terms

¹ *Ibid.* p. 100.

² Even more manifest is the danger of behaviourism in R.B. Braithwaite's theory. See especially *An Empiricist's View of the Nature of Religious Belief* (Cambridge University, 1955).

with the philosophical position of Linguistic Analysis. The best known representatives of what we might call linguistic theology are Professor I. T. Ramsey, Mr. A. Farrer, Mr. I. M. Crombie, Mr. B. G. Mitchell, and Mr. M. Foster.¹ For the sake of brevity, however, we shall limit our concern to Crombie's and Foster's views.

In an article included in the collection *Faith and Logic*,² entitled "The Possibility of Theological Statements," Mr. Crombie acknowledges that religious language involves "factual beliefs about a transcendent being," and he dismisses as inadequate any behaviouristic interpretation of religious language. As he puts it: "Christian worship cannot be exhaustively described in terms of how the worshipper feels, of what he says and does; it remains an irreducible element of belief."³ But then, what kind of factual beliefs is the user of religious language involved in? Is talk about God "nothing more than the old anthropomorphic conception of a superhuman being somewhere above the sky?" "Our business," says Crombie, "if we want to convince ourselves of the validity of theological language, is to show that the widespread readiness to attach sense to the notion of a being outside space and time has a more fundamental and more respectable origin than that."⁴ We may expect from this that Crombie will propose a "natural theology" of the traditional kind. But in fact he accepts completely the objections raised by the Analysts against the traditional proofs and denies that any strict demonstration of the existence of God is possible.⁵ However, we can apparently be led to see that the notion of "a being outside space and time" is a meaningful one by reflecting upon the fact that we ourselves, as human beings, have a non-spatial and non-temporal (or "spiritual") aspect. So, Crombie says, "the notion of a being outside space and time (of what I shall call a 'spirit') is perhaps most fundamentally based on our inability to accept with complete contentment the idea that we are ourselves normal spatio-temporal objects."⁶ However, to conclude from the fact that an aspect of our behaviour is *spiritual* to the notion of pure *spirit* is, as it were, to treat an adjectival word as a noun word and so to commit a "category transgression"; but this category mistake

¹ I. T. Ramsey, *Religious Language: an Empirical Placing of Theological Phrases* (London: S.C.M. Press, 1957); I. M. Crombie, "The Possibility of Theological Statements", in *Faith and Logic*, ed. by Mitchell (London 1957); B. G. Mitchell, *Faith and Logic*; M. Foster, "Contemporary British Philosophy and Christian Belief," in *Cross Currents* 1960, pp. 375-385.

² *Faith and Logic*, ed. B. Mitchell (London 1957).

³ *Ibid.* p. 32.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 55.

⁵ This is a view shared by Anglican theologians in general.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 57.

one deliberately committed "to express what we antecedently feel," namely that we are not wholly "spatio-temporal objects," and that there is "a being outside space and time."¹

Crombie's argument raises a number of difficulties. We shall mention a couple of the most serious ones. First of all, the Author doesn't seem to be aware of the gravity of the consequences which follow from his statement that when we use the word 'spirit' as a noun word instead of as an adjectival word we commit a "category transgression." For, if it is truly so, the notion of a pure spirit is strictly meaningless, and it does not help to say that we deliberately entertain a meaningless notion in order to express what we "feel." We cannot feel that something is meaningful if that something cannot be expressed meaningfully. Second, even if we admit the validity of Crombie's argument, it has been acutely pointed out² that, the conclusion that the notion of a pure spirit is meaningful (even though it involves a category transgression) does not enable us to say, strictly speaking, that the notion of God is meaningful. For, if we conceive of a "spirit" existing, we can equally well conceive of it as being such that it may not have existed; in other words, the notion of a finite spirit is not self-contradictory, whereas the notion of a finite God is a self-contradiction.

In his article "Contemporary British Philosophy and Christian Belief"³ Foster makes some interesting remarks about the way religious language has been handled by the Analysts, both philosophers and theologians. The most significant ones are the following: 1) The distinctive character, the spirit of Analytic philosophy is a demand for clarity from which the mysterious has been excluded.⁴ 2) This demand is grounded on the assumption that there is no unfathomable mystery in the world.⁵ 3) But this is just what the Christian theologian is not willing to concede, since "revelation is of mystery, but mystery revealed is not eliminated, but remains mysterious. It remains an object of wonder, which is dispelled when mystery is eliminated. There is no method by which revelation can be commanded... that is to say, it is not subject to human mastery."⁶ Therefore, 4), the Christian theologian maintains that with regard to revelatory statements the analyst's

¹ *Ibid.*

² M. J. Charlesworth, *Linguistic Analysis and God*, in "International Philosophical Quarterly" 1961, pp. 163-164.

³ The article has first appeared in *The Christian Scholar* (Fall 1960) and was, then, reprinted by *Cross Currents* 1960, pp. 375-385.

⁴ *Cross Currents* 1960, p. 383.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 383.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 384.

demand for clarity is out of place: revelatory language is essentially mysterious, and transcends every conceivable technique. "The sphere of techniques is the sphere of man's achievement, whereas, mysteries are subjects of revelation."¹ 5) Should we then conclude that to the philosopher as philosopher revelatory statements are necessarily meaningless? This is the unavoidable conclusion, says Foster, when philosophy is conceived as a search for clarity, but not when philosophy is conceived "as revelation."

At this point we may expect that Foster will propose a "natural theology" of the traditional kind. On the contrary he declares "to defend the idea of a philosophy based upon revelation, but not of a philosophy based upon *natural* revelation. Natural revelation is open to attack from two sides, not from one only; not only from the side of those who reject revelation as a means of knowledge, but from the viewpoint of a different conception (i.e. the conception of "Christian Realism") of revelation."² Here ends Foster's essay abruptly. But, because of this, what he has given us is nothing more than a negative defence of theological language. And, (this is worse), by rejecting the possibility of a natural theology he has shut out the only possibility to peer behind the veil of the mystery of revelatory statements and to grasp some of their meanings. For if the statements of natural theology are meaningless, is it not to be expected that the position of the statements of revealed theology is even worse?

3. THE MYSTERIOUS MEANING OF THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE

We shall now attempt to give a sketch of the direction which should present an adequate solution of the problem of the meaning of theological language. We say *theological language* and by this we mean the language used by the professional theologian. We intend therefore to concentrate our attention on revelatory statements only, and to omit the question of the meaning of the statements of natural theology. But since we believe in the possibility of a natural theology some of the answers that we shall give to the problems of theological language ought to be valid also for the language of natural theology.³

The first question to be faced when dealing with theological lan-

¹ *Ibid.* p. 385.

² *Ibid.* p. 385.

³ The reason for the restriction of our analysis to theological language is that this has been so far the scope of our study, since in the previous chapters we have been concerned with the meaning of theological language in Catholic and Protestant theology.

guage is logically the question of its origin. By whom is theological language created? By God or by man? In the study of Barth we have observed that he is of the opinion that God is the author of theological language. But we have seen that this theory doesn't seem to be defensible. For, even conceding, with the most literal interpretation of the Bible, that in some case God may have created some word, it is quite clear that all language, theological language included, (even the terms typically theological like "triune," "incarnation," "god-man," "immaculate conception" etc.) is man-made. It is a distinctive quality of human nature (as distinct from lower natures) to have the power to create symbols (and language is a symbol, an instrumental and conventional symbol with regard to the single words). It is, then, logical to infer that the faculty that in man is responsible for the creation of language is reason (since reason is what distinguishes man from animals).

We assert, then, that the creative power of theological language is to be found in reason, for, with regard to knowing powers, the believer does not differ from the unbeliever. The believer is not endowed with an extra-power, that the unbeliever does not possess. What distinguishes the believer from the unbeliever is faith, and faith is no knowing power, but a mere habit which gives to the knowing power previously existing (i.e. to reason) a disposition to accept as true, and meaningful, what otherwise would be rejected as false and nonsensical. Faith does not bring about a physical transformation of man, it does not increase the quantity of his brain. The believer continues to have the same knowing power that he had before becoming a believer. By this same power, strengthened by the virtue of faith, he acknowledges a meaning to some terms and some propositions that otherwise would be meaningless. Theological language is therefore the product of reason strengthened by faith: reason is responsible for the creation of theological language as a thing, faith is responsible for the acceptance of theological language as a symbol of meanings which are beyond the grasping power of reason, as such. But, if theological language points to a meaning that lies beyond the power of reason, how can it be meaningful to reason at all? The answer to this crucial question is that faith is not something heterogeneous but something "congenial" (not homogeneous!) to reason; faith is not something foreign, extrinsic, but something very intimate, something that takes hold of reason, pervades it through and through, strengthens and elevates it, so that by this transformation reason itself is in a position to grasp the meaning of a mystery that in

itself is highly meaningful, but whose meaning escapes the blunt power of reason alone.

In order to shed as much light as possible on this peculiar situation let's focus our attention on the origin and the meaning of theological concepts, which is the basic material of which all theological language is built. As far as their origin is concerned, it appears that it takes place by way of analogy. In fact, when God talks to man, He does not make use of concepts entirely new but of concepts (and the appropriate linguistic symbols) that are already familiar to man. So, for instance, He says to man that God is *father*, *creator*, *judge*, etc. i.e. He makes use of concepts that man already has. But in doing this God expects man and helps him to reshape his old concepts in order to adapt them to the new meaning, for the concepts of father, creator, judge, etc., cannot be attributed to God with the same meaning which they have when applied to human beings. God is not father, judge, creator in the way men are fathers, judges and creators, but in a much more perfect way. And it would be great insolence if man by taking advantage of God's condescension should disfigure His infinite beauty. In order that this may never happen it is necessary that man, especially the professional theologian, applies constantly to the concepts, chosen by revelation to become carriers of new meanings, all the techniques of analogy, which in the negative way (*via negativa*) free theological concepts from all imperfections, and in the positive way (*via affirmativa*) raise them to the highest degree of perfection. A great Catholic theologian of the XIX century, M. J. Scheeben, has given to these two phases of analogy the following remarkable description:

When supernatural truths are proposed to us by revelation, they remain invisible to us; they do not send their rays into the eye of our minds. Consequently they can no more project an image of their content toward us than we can become certain of their existence otherwise than through faith. Hence we do not have the same understanding of them as we have of the objects of philosophy; we have no such comprehension as would suppose their visibility or cause them to become visible. Our understanding of them must be achieved by means of natural concepts acquired by way of philosophical speculation; revelation itself clothes them with the forms and habiliments of these concepts.

In what, then, does the task of scientifically apprehending the objects of faith chiefly consist? Does it consist in this, that reason forces these objects into the conceptual forms it has found on the natural plane? The supernatural towers above the natural, and cannot be enclosed in the forms of the latter. If the supernatural and hence suprarational of the objects of faith is to be safeguarded, the concepts proper to reason must themselves be elevated, sublimated, and transformed according to the norm of the revealed proposition. A simple clarification, purification, and rectification, such as philosophy undertakes when dealing with the confused, inexact and distorted notions of everyday experience, is not sufficient; such a process is necessary even for

a correct scientific conception of natural things. Nor may the concepts be applied in the full, concrete value they have in the case of natural things; they may be transferred to the supernatural sphere only according to their highest aspects, those wherein natural things resemble supernatural things. We can designate this operation no better than by calling it a transfiguration, which takes place through the agency of revelation and faith, somewhat in the way that sensible representations are raised to the spiritual plane by the spiritual light of the intellect.¹

We may, then, conclude that theological concepts are formed in an analogical way, by taking as a starting point ordinary or philosophical concepts. They are the result of an extremely delicate operation, and are of themselves something very delicate and mysterious, for, in them, a new kind of incarnation, an epistemological incarnation, takes place: the form of the concept (a product of reason) remains human, whereas the content, the meaning (a product of faith) is divine. The condition of this epistemological incarnation is very much like that of Christ. As in the incarnation of Christ the human form was the reason why many people considered as absurd His claim of being a divine person, so too the human form of theological language is the reason given by many philosophers for considering as absurd the claim that it points to a mystery. Only the light of faith will enable the philosopher to see in the human form of theological language a divine meaning even as faith opened the eyes of the disciples and let them see the divine nature of Christ.²

It remains still to be seen how out of these mysterious concepts it is possible for the theologian to form meaningful propositions. Previously we had the occasion to report the views of some analysts who maintain that theological propositions cannot be said to be either true or false because theological concepts are nonsensical. But we have seen that theological concepts have a theoretical, though mysterious, meaning. Therefore, we claim that theological propositions are either true or false. In order to make this clear we shall attempt to show that the criterion of truth, i.e. objective evidence, can be applied to theological propositions.

We know that reason accepts or refuses to acknowledge a propo-

¹ M. J. Scheeben, *The Mysteries of Christianity*, transl. C. Vollert, (London-St. Louis: Herder, 1947), pp. 752-753.

² Elsewhere we have put the same thing this way: "Le parole adoperate per significare i concetti teologici sono le parole ordinarie, le quali, però, una volta che la trasfigurazione analogica è stata compiuta, vengono ad acquistare un significato nuovo. Tuttavia dato che esse continuano a ritenere anche quello vecchio, l'uomo versa nel costante pericolo di lasciarle ricadere in esso. Quando questo avviene, le parole teologiche diventano vuote, senza senso. Fino a quando però il vecchio senso (e l'uomo vecchio) non ha il sopravvento, esse conservano un significato, che, pure essendo misterioso (perché la fede non dissipa tutti i veli del mistero), ha certamente valore teoretico non solamente emotivo (*Positivismo logico, analisi linguistica e teologia*, in *Divus Thomas*, 1961, p. 306).

sition as true when there is enough objective, either immediate or mediate, evidence for doing so. We say that there is mediate evidence when the guarantee that something is so and so does not spring from the object itself, but from some reliable authority. There are many kinds of mediate evidence, but they may all be reduced to two: human and divine. Human evidence is based on human authority, divine evidence is based on divine authority. What distinguishes a proposition accepted on human authority from a proposition accepted on divine authority is the fact that the first proposition could be immediately evident at least to some human being, whereas the second can never become immediately evident to any human being in this world. The latter is the situation of theological propositions. For instance, a Christian theologian accepts the proposition "God is a triune being" as true on the authority of God alone: it has never been and will never become immediately evident to any one in this world. Consequently the criterion of truth to which theological propositions are subject is the criterion of divine authority: that is to say, they may be accepted as true only when one is certain that they have been revealed. Only when this condition is satisfied a claim to theoretical meaning can be truly acceptable.

Previously we saw that the meaning of theological concepts is mysterious; in fact the meaning of theological concepts is always a mystery. The same must be said of theological propositions. To be more precise, in the case of theological propositions we have mystery at the second power. This is due to the very nature of a proposition, which is composed of two elements: two concepts and a nexus. Now, in theological propositions both elements (at least one of the concepts and most certainly the nexus) are wrapped up in mystery. For instance, let's consider the proposition "God is triune." Here, we have a mysterious element in both concepts, and the nexus is also mysterious because we cannot see how God can at the same time be three and one. The connection between these two concepts, God and triune, cannot be verified by any human experience, but by the authority of the Revealer alone.

If our analysis of the mysteriousness of theological language is correct, we have one more reason for saying with Aquinas that "the highest point where our knowledge of God can arrive in this life is to acknowledge that He is higher than all that we can think."¹

¹ "Hoc enim est ultimum ad quod pertingere possumus circa cognitionem divinam in hac vita, quod Deus est supra omne id quod a nobis cogitari potest." (Aquinas, *In Divinis Nominibus* I, Lect. 3, no 83.

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